Opinion
No. 16-70204
05-15-2019
JAVIER SANTANA RUIZ, AKA Javier Ruiz Santana, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Agency No. A088-752-099 MEMORANDUM On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 13, 2019 Pasadena, California Before: WARDLAW and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, District Judge.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
An immigration judge ("IJ") denied Javier Santana Ruiz's applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") dismissed Santana's appeal. We have jurisdiction of Santana's petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ's finding that Santana failed to establish that he had suffered past persecution in Mexico because of a protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The evidence instead supported the conclusion that Santana was the victim of "harassment by criminals motivated by theft," which "bears no nexus to a protected ground." Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). The BIA also correctly concluded that Santana's proposed social group of those persecuted by police is impermissibly circular. See Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008) (holding that a social group could not "be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm in the past"); Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007) (same); see also Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating that a social group cannot be "amorphous," and must "generally be recognizable by other members of the community" (quoting Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2013)).
2. Substantial evidence supports the IJ's conclusion that Santana did not establish a reasonable likelihood of torture if returned to Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Santana offered no reason to believe that his assailants—whom he described as motivated by pecuniary gain—would seek him out, years later, now that he no longer operates a business. Substantial evidence also supports the IJ's finding that Santana could relocate to live with his family in Oaxaca, a considerable distance from where he was attacked. See Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
PETITION DENIED