Opinion
IP IP02-1302-C B/S.
October 25, 2002
ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS CLASS ACTION CLAIM
I. Introduction.
This is an employment discrimination case in which the plaintiff, Maria Ruiz, alleges race and national origin discrimination pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Ms. Ruiz alleges that defendants treated her and other Hispanic would-be job applicants differently from similarly-situated Caucasian/Anglo job applicants at a job fair and thus denied her (and them) equal opportunities for employment.
The case is before us on a narrow issue of law. Ms. Ruiz's complaint alleges a class action. Defendant Addecco Employment Services seeks to dismiss the class action claim on the ground that Ms. Ruiz's underlying EEOC charge alleges facts which are insufficient to support a class action claim in her subsequent lawsuit. For the following reasons, we find that her EEOC charge does — barely — allege facts sufficient to support a class action lawsuit. Accordingly, we DENY defendant's motion to dismiss.
II. Discussion.
The parties agree that the essential issue here concerns the relationship between the factual allegations contained in Ms. Ruiz's EEOC charge and those contained in her complaint. They also agree that the defining case in the area is Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124,127 (7th Cir. 1989), which also involved the question of whether a class action claim that appeared in a federal complaint was sufficiently presaged in the plaintiff's underlying EEOC charge. In view of the parties' agreement as to the law, we summarize briefly.
It is well settled that a federal complaint alleging employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII must rest upon a timely charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC. It is also well settled that the allegations contained in the complaint must be sufficiently "like" or "related to" the allegations of the underlying EEOC charge so that: (1) the defendant was placed on notice of the claims it would be required to defend against; and (2) the EEOC had an opportunity to investigate the allegations that might eventually find their way into a lawsuit and attempt to conciliate the differences between the parties. Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 127; Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1985) ("allowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumvent the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge, as surely as would an initial failure to file a timely EEOC charge.")
We focus in this entry only on the plaintiff's Title VII claim because section 1981 actions do not require plaintiffs to file a prior administrative charge of any kind. regardless of the outcome with respect to the Title VII class action claim, plaintiff's class action § 1981 claim is subject to the ordinary procedures governing class actions.
The requirement that the complaint allegations be "like or reasonably related to" the allegations contained in the EEOC charge extends to the scope of the complaint, so that a class action claim in the lawsuit must have been properly anticipated in the underlying charge. Under the Schnellbaech regime, our focus is the content of the charge itself and not on the subsequent investigation, if any. Whether the EEOC in fact investigated certain allegations contained in the charge is likely to have some effect on whether the defendant receives adequate notice and has had a chance to conciliate. But even
a limited EEOC investigation will not necessarily defeat a complaint where the complaint contains allegations like or reasonably related to the EEOC charge, but which the EEOC failed to investigate. In such a case, "the proper inquiry would be into what EEOC investigation could reasonably be expected to grow from the original complaint."
Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 127, quoting Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 864, n. 2.
Addecco argues that Ms. Ruiz's EEOC charge alleges facts that would reasonably give rise only to an individual claim of discrimination, but not a class action. It quotes her EEOC charge as stating: "I believe that I have been have been discriminated against. . . ." "I was qualified. . . ." I was denied the opportunity. . . ." "I asked to receive a complete application. . . ." "I do not have a language barrier. . . ." These statements clearly imply an individual claim of discrimination.
Precisely how explicit must the class allegations in an EEOC charge be in order to support a later class action lawsuit? Addecco correctly concedes that the charge need not contain the magic words "class action." Although the Seventh Circuit has placed clear emphasis on the language of the charge itself, it obviously left room for reasonable inferences from that language, or its holding that a complaint may be "reasonably related" to the underlying charge would be nullified. Sure enough, contrasting Schnellbaech from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Fellows v. Universal Restaurants, Inc., 701 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1983), the Seventh Circuit illustrated why the complaint in Fellows was reasonably related to its underlying EEOC charge and thus why one could reasonably infer class-wide allegations from the charge:
The EEOC charge in that case [Fellows] . . . also contained allegations of several instances of discrimination, even though it contained no specific class-wide allegations. The plaintiff there had applied for several other positions in the employer's company, which she alleged had been denied her because of her gender, and further alleged that she was the only woman employed in the position from which she was discharged, and that she was paid less while employed in this position and discharged therefrom because of her gender. From this complaint one could infer a charge that it was the employer's policy to hire few women, as well as to discriminate against all women in promotions and pay.
Schnellbaech, 887 F.2d at 128. See Miller v. Baltimore Gas Electric Co., 202 FRD Cases 195, 207 (D.Md. 2001) (interpreting Schnellbaech and finding that class claim was reasonably anticipated in EEOC charge). Also see, Allen v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2000 WL 126776 (N.D.Ill. 2000) (interpreting Schnellbaech and finding that class claim was not reasonably anticipated in EEOC charge).
We read the allegations in Ms. Ruiz's EEOC charge as being more explicitly of a class-wide nature than those the Seventh Circuit approved in Fellows. Ms. Ruiz's EEOC charge alleges:
• "I noticed that Latino or Hispanic applicants were handed an abbreviated, one-page, one-sided paper applications [sic]."
• "The abbreviated application that the Hispanics received stated. . . ."
• "The Caucasian applicants received. . . ."
• "I asked the Enkai receptionist why my friend and I who is also Hispanic did not get the regular application."
• "All of the Hispanics were given the shortened abbreviated application. I believe that the type of application an applicant received was based solely on whether the applicant looked Hispanic and/or their color."
• The charge also contains additional references to "Caucasian applicants" and "Hispanic applicants." Pl. EEOC Charge (Pl. Ex. B).
These allegations are stated in the plural and create the clear impression that numbers of Hispanics were all treated less favorably than numbers of Anglos. The setting described in the EEOC charge also gives rise to an inference that several groups of individuals were treated differently from one another. It speaks of a job fair, the very purpose of which was to recruit applicants for employment; it mentions fifteen or twenty applicants — "Hispanics" as well as "Caucasians" — who were present when Ms. Ruiz and her friend arrived. [Pl. Ex. B.] These allegations were sufficient to have put Addecco (and the EEOC for that matter) on notice that a potential class action was in the making. Accordingly, we conclude that Ms. Ruiz's underlying EEOC charge is sufficient to support a complaint alleging a class action.
While we thus DENY defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's class action claim, we offer no opinion as to the merits of the case for purposes of class certification.
It is so ORDERED this ___ day of October 2002.