Opinion
8:00CV382
September 14, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on plaintiffs motions for reconsideration, Filing Nos. 18 and 26, of this court's earlier orders remanding this action, Filing No. 17, and taking the motion to reconsider under advisement, Filing No. 25. Pursuant to the court's order of April 30, 2001, Filing No. 25, defendant has now submitted a status report including the administrative file, Filing Nos. 26 and 27. The court has reviewed the materials and finds that plaintiffs motion to reconsider the court's order of remand should be denied.
The materials submitted to the court show that Rucker first applied for disability benefits on July 10, 1997, and her application was denied. She sought reconsideration of the denial and the benefits determination was affirmed. She sought and was granted a hearing, but failed to appear at the hearing. The record shows that a second hearing was scheduled and Rucker again failed to appear. Although the record shows several attempts by the Social Security Administration to contact Rucker, there is no evidence that Rucker received notice of the hearings. One receipt for certified mail was signed by another person and messages were conveyed to Rucker's mother. Rucker filed a second application for benefits in April 2000. The record shows that Rucker had actual notice of the necessity for her to file a request for hearing with respect to the denial of her second application for benefits. The record also shows, however, considerable confusion regarding whether the Social Security Administration or this court had jurisdiction and confusion regarding the whereabouts of Rucker's administrative file. For whatever reason, Rucker has not had a hearing and has been left without a forum for her complaints.
Rucker may seek judicial review of the Secretary's decision in this court only after a final decision by the Secretary "made after a hearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); see Medellin v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 199, 202 n. 45 (8th Cir. 1994). A claimant is required to exhaust his or her administrative remedies by proceeding through all three stages of the administrative appeals process; only a claimant who does so receives a final decision from the Secretary. Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 481 (1986).
Exhaustion is generally required to prevent "premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review." Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975). If a claimant fails to request a hearing or review from the Council, she may not obtain judicial review because she has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See § 404.900 (b); Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106 (2000). The court finds that Rucker has not exhausted her administrative remedies and thus this court lacks jurisdiction at this time to review the merits of her claim.
Although the exhaustion requirement may be waived in certain limited circumstances, Rucker has not demonstrated that those circumstances apply. See Rodabaugh v. Sullivan, 943 F.2d 855, 857 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting the exhaustion requirement may be waived if a petitioner establishes (1) a colorable constitutional claim collateral to the substantive claim; (2) irreparable injury by enforcement of the exhaustion requirement; and (3) that the purpose of exhaustion would not be served by requiring further administrative procedures). Moreover, Rucker has not shown any affirmative misconduct by the government that would justify application of estoppel. See Olsen v. United States, 952 F.2d 236, 241 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1991) (test for estoppel).
The court is not unsympathetic to Rucker, but finds that her remedies lie at this point with the Social Security Administration. Because defendant requested a remand before answering the complaint and has shown good cause, the court finds a remand pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) is proper. Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2000). Accordingly,
In connection with this remand, the court notes that defendant's actions, as well as certain documents in the administrative file, show a de facto reopening of Rucker's initial claim. See Brown v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1243, 1246 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that review of merits of first application in a second application amounted to de facto reopening). The court further notes that review of the record shows that mental illness may be a factor and the Commissioner is directed to fully develop the record in that regard. An ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully in reviewing a claim for disability insurance benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a; Reeder v. Apfel, 214 F.3d 984, 987 (8th Cir. 2000) ("ALJ has a duty to develop facts fully and fairly, especially in a case where the claimant is not represented by counsel"); Wilcutts v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that Commissioner has duty to develop record because hearing is non-adversarial — the goals of the Commissioner and the advocates should be the same: that deserving claimants who apply for benefits receive justice).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiffs motions to reconsider, Filing Nos. 18 and 26, are denied;
2. Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed; this action is remanded to the Social Security Administration for proceedings consistent with this opinion.