Opinion
No. 05-05-01142-CR
Opinion Filed July 11, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F05-01031-LH. Affirmed as Modified.
Before Justices WRIGHT, MOSELEY, and LANG.
OPINION
Bobby Charles Roy was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court assessed punishment, enhanced by one prior conviction, at thirty-five years' imprisonment. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error by not inquiring into the voluntariness of his guilty plea after appellant's testimony raised self-defense. We affirm. Appellant initially pleaded not guilty to the indictment, which also contained two enhancement paragraphs. After a jury was seated and sworn, appellant changed his plea to guilty outside the jury's presence in exchange for the State striking one of the enhancement paragraphs. Appellant testified he understood the charges in the indictment, the punishment range for the offense enhanced by a prior felony conviction, and the consequences of changing his plea. Appellant testified he wanted to plead guilty before the jury, then go to the court for punishment. After appellant's signed judicial stipulation was admitted without objection, appellant pleaded guilty before the jury. He testified he was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty. The jury was instructed to find appellant guilty, and did so. During the punishment hearing, appellant again testified he knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea. He admitted that he struck the complainant several times with a baseball bat, but claimed he did so in self-defense after being struck in the face. Appellant testified he "blanked out," so he did not know he actually injured the complainant and did not recall everything that had happened. Appellant contends his testimony at punishment raised the issue of self-defense. He asserts that, at a minimum, the trial court should have inquired into the voluntariness of his plea. The State responds that the trial court did not err in accepting appellant's guilty plea. To the extent appellant complains the trial court should have sua sponte withdrawn his guilty plea, his complaint is without merit. Appellant did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea in a timely manner and may not complain for the first time on appeal that the trial court did not withdraw his guilty plea. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1; Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 350 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Further, the record shows the trial court properly admonished appellant. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2005); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Appellant understood the admonishments and the charges against him. The trial court was not required to admonish appellant on defensive issues related to his case. Moreover, the testimony appellant points to occurred after the jury had found appellant guilty. We conclude appellant has not shown that his plea was involuntary. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c); Kirk, 949 S.W.2d at 771. We overrule appellant's point of error. In a cross-point, the State asks us to modify the trial court's judgment to show that appellant pleaded true to one enhancement paragraph. We agree with the State. The trial court's judgment incorrectly states "not true" in the section regarding the enhancement paragraph. Therefore, the judgment is incorrect. We sustain the State's cross-point. We modify the trial court's judgment to show appellant pleaded true to one enhancement paragraph. We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.