Opinion
20-P-257
12-28-2020
JOYCE ROWLEY v. CITY OF NEW BEDFORD.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Pursuant to G. L. c. 248, § 36, Joyce Rowley filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of two Asian elephants, Ruth and Emily, seeking their immediate release from Buttonwood Park Zoo in New Bedford. A Superior Court judge summarily denied such petition, and Rowley appealed. On appeal, Rowley contends that Ruth and Emily constitute "persons" for the purposes of G. L. c. 248, §§ 35-36. We affirm.
Discussion. "Whoever is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty may, as of right and of course, prosecute a writ of habeas corpus . . . to obtain release from such imprisonment or restraint, if it proves to be unlawful." G. L. c. 248, § 1. Pursuant to G. L. c. 248, § 36, one who has reason to believe that another "person" is being improperly deprived of his or her liberty, may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on their behalf. Rowley claims that, despite being Asian elephants, Ruth and Emily constitute "persons" under the law, entitling them to immediate release from their detainment at the Buttonwood Park Zoo. We disagree.
Notwithstanding the issue of whether Ruth and Emily enjoy personhood, and while the language of G. L. c. 248, § 36, arguably does permit Rowley to file this petition on Ruth and Emily's behalf, Rowley may not litigate this petition on Ruth and Emily's behalf in the same manner a licensed attorney ordinarily would for a detainee. Because Rowley's own liberty is in no way constrained, she cannot be said to be acting as a pro se litigant. See G. L. c. 221, § 48. Therefore, because Rowley is not properly acting pro se, and because she is not a licensed attorney in this Commonwealth, her actions constitute the unauthorized practice of law. See G. L. c. 221 § 46A. Among the penalties for the unauthorized practice of law are criminal sanctions, as well as dismissal. See G. L. c. 221, § 41. See also Burnham v. Justices of the Superior Court, 439 Mass. 1018 (2003). Ultimately we decline to dismiss the appeal on this basis, and instead reach the merits.
When interpreting a statute, "[o]ur objective . . . 'is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature'" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Marrero, 484 Mass. 341, 343 (2020). "To do so, we look to the words of the statute, construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished" (quotation and citation omitted). Id.
Under G. L. c. 248, § 35, the Legislature stated, "No person shall be deprived of his liberty or held in custody by any person or in any place against his will . . . except by due process of law" (emphasis added). The term "person" has ordinarily and consistently referred solely to human beings. See Black's Law Dictionary 1378 (11th ed. 2019). Such a narrow definition of the term "person" is consistent with the Legislature's intent in enacting the statutory scheme for petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, as "[t]he great purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is the immediate delivery of the party deprived of personal liberty." Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Pires, 438 Mass. 96, 100 (2002), quoting Wyeth v. Richardson, 10 Gray 240, 241 (1857). Writs of habeas corpus are generally only "employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the person's imprisonment or detention is not illegal" (emphasis added). Black's Law Dictionary 854 (11th ed. 2019).
However, Rowley claims that the term "person" has been previously extended by courts of this Commonwealth beyond the generally accepted meaning of the term. In particular, Rowley cites Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759 (1977), where the Supreme Judicial Court held that an incompetent person retains the right to deny medical treatment, and Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 808 (1984), where the court found a viable fetus to be a person for the purposes of the vehicular homicide statute. Rowley claims that Saikewicz and Cass manifest a willingness on the part of the courts of this Commonwealth to extend the definition of "person." However, both Saikewicz and Cass are clearly distinguishable from the circumstances presented here.
Rowley cites numerous cases from the State of New York, in which petitions for a writ of habeas corpus were filed on behalf of animals. However, Rowley has failed to provide an instance in which such a petition has been granted. Rowley also cites a May 2020 decision of the Islamabad High Court that held that animals possess certain natural legal rights similar to humans. However, the decision of the Islamabad High Court, like the decisions from the State of New York, offer no precedential value and we are not persuaded by foreign authority in this matter.
In Saikewicz, the court held that the mere fact that a person becomes incompetent does not diminish his or her rights as a human being, in particular the right to deny medical treatment. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 745, 759. Furthermore, in Cass, the person involved was a viable fetus because the fetus would be born a human being, rendering the fetus a person for the purposes of the vehicular homicide statute. See Cass, 392 Mass. at 801.
Both cases offer support only for the premise that "the word 'person' is synonymous with the term 'human being.'" Cass, 392 Mass. at 801. Neither Saikewicz nor Cass, offer support for Rowley's claim that Ruth and Emily, two Asian elephants, ought to be considered "persons" under the law. In fact, properly characterizing Ruth and Emily instead as animals, i.e., personal property, is much more consistent with the law of this Commonwealth. See Irwin v. Degtiarov, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 234, 237 (2014) (animals, such as dogs, considered to be property under common law).
Rowley also cites Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 86, 95-96 (1999), for the proposition that if the Commonwealth recognizes corporations as "persons," then it should have no issue recognizing the personhood of Ruth and Emily. While it is true that we recognize corporations as persons in certain circumstances, there is no precedent to suggest that a corporation's personhood would apply in the context of a writ of habeas corpus. One cannot seek a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a corporation because a corporation cannot be detained or imprisoned.
At bottom, while we understand and appreciate Rowley's concerns for Ruth and Emily, we emphasize the need to exercise judicial restraint, so as to refrain from "substituting [our] notions of correct policy for that of a popularly elected Legislature." Zayre Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 372 Mass. 423, 433 (1977). "When the Legislature intends a statute to protect animals, it does so directly and unambiguously." Commonwealth v. J.A., 478 Mass. 385, 387 (2017). Here, G. L. c. 248, §§ 35-36, unambiguously refer solely to "person," and the term person has generally been synonymous only with human beings. See Cass, 392 Mass. at 801. Therefore, we see no reason to substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature, and we decline to hold that Ruth and Emily constitute "person[s]" for the purposes of G. L. c. 248, §§ 35-36. The order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
So ordered.
By the Court (Meade, Blake & Lemire, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: December 28, 2020.