Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-6965
September 30, 2003
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs Jonathan Rowe's ("Rowe"), Joseph S. Cann's ("Cann") and Anthony Mayo's ("Mayo) (collectively "Plaintiffs") Motion for Class Certification, Defendant The Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Company's ("PCCBC" or "Defendant") Opposition thereto, Plaintiffs' Reply Brief and Defendant's Surreply Brief. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The three named Plaintiffs are African-American and are present or former employees of PCCBC. PCCBC is a company that is in the business of bottling, merchandising and delivering Coca-Cola licensed beverage products. On or around December 26, 2001 Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against PCCBC alleging a wide variety of racially discriminatory employment practices at PCCBC's primary bottling plant and warehouse. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that PCCBC has discriminated against African-Americans in each of the following areas of its business operations: 1) production; 2) warehouse; and 3) delivery. Plaintiffs also allege that PCCBC commits various other discriminatory practices that are global to the bottling and warehouse facilities. Each of the allegations are addressed in detail below:
The Court notes that Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification contains allegations that are different from Plaintiffs' Complaint. For purposes of deciding this Motion, the Court will only address the arguments raised in Plaintiffs' Motion.
With regard to production, Plaintiffs allege that PCCBC discriminates in its training of new Quality Control Technicians. With regard to warehousing, Plaintiffs allege that PCCBC discriminates in disciplining unproductive workers. With regard to delivery, Plaintiffs allege that PCCBC discriminates in assigning delivery routes and delivery loads.
A. Production Area Discrimination
Plaintiffs allege that PCCBC does not provide new Quality Control Technicians ("QC Technicians") with a standardized training program or a uniform means of demonstrating their proficiency. Plaintiffs assert that as a result, some trainees receive less training than others, and some trainees receive greater scrutiny than others. Plaintiffs claim that PCCBC's unstandardized training program creates a disparate impact on African-Americans.
In support of these allegations, named Plaintiff Mayo alleges that he was injured by PCCBC's unstandardized training program when he transferred to a QC Technician position. Mayo asserts that PCCBC discriminated against him by inadequately training him and by giving him only 2 ½ months to complete his training. After his training, Mayo committed three critical errors while performing his job. Defendant then informed Mayo that if he committed more errors he would risk termination. Mayo ultimately decided to return to his previous, lower paying, job rather than risk termination.
In further support of his allegations, Mayo names two African-American employees who did not finish QC Technician training, and two white employees who Mayo claims received longer training. Mayo also asserts that PCCBC treated one of the white employees more favorably when the white employee committed an error and was not formally reprimanded or threatened with termination.
B. Warehouse Discrimination
Plaintiffs allege that PCCBC has a facially neutral policy to discipline warehouse workers (specifically "pickers") who are not productive, and that the policy adversely impacts African-Americans. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that PCCBC disciplines "pickers" who are not productive, but that PCCBC has no objective policy that defines "productive." Plaintiffs claim that as a result, African-American "pickers" are disciplined even though they are working at the same rate as their white counterparts. To support these allegations, Plaintiffs claim that over the past year, the only two "pickers" who PCCBC formally disciplined for low productivity were both African-American, while PCCBC only gave informal warnings to two white "pickers" who were not productive.
"Pickers" are employees who assemble assortments of beverages as ordered by a customer. A "picker's" productivity is measured by the number of cases he/she picks over an interval of time.
C. Delivery Discrimination
Plaintiffs allege five types of discrimination with regard to the delivery area. Each of the five types is explained below:
1. Geographical Familiarity Policy
Plaintiffs claim that PCCBC discriminates against African-American Delivery Merchandisers by assigning delivery routes based on a driver's familiarity with the geographic territory. Plaintiffs allege that this facially neutral policy adversely impacts African-Americans. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that African-Americans are more likely to live in the inner-city; therefore, African-Americans are more likely to be familiar with the geographic territories of the inner-city routes, which Plaintiffs allege are lower-paying routes. As a result, Plaintiffs assert that PCCBC is more likely to assign lower-paying inner-city routes to African-Americans and higher-paying suburban routes to white drivers. To support these allegations, Plaintiffs claim that PCCBC hired named Plaintiffs Rowe and Cann and initially assigned them to inner-city routes.
2. Bulk "Extra" Route Discrimination
The position of Bulk Delivery Driver is separate and distinct from the Delivery Merchandiser position. Of the current 45 Bulk Delivery Drivers, the majority of them have set routes which PCCBC assigned on a bidding and seniority system. The remaining Bulk Delivery Drivers are "extra" drivers. PCCBC assigns the "extra" drivers to routes on a daily basis. The routes are assigned based on driver availability and start time as they coincide with customer needs with respect to order size and delivery date and time.
Plaintiffs allege that PCCBC assigns better routes to white "extra" drivers than to African-Americans "extra" drivers. Plaintiffs claim that white drivers receive routes that take longer and have the potential for more overtime. To support this claim, named Plaintiff Cann asserts that PCCBC has systematically assigned better routes to white drivers who are less senior than he.
3. "Lightening" Load Policy
The majority of Delivery Merchandisers have a fixed delivery route. However, because of variances in customer orders, there are daily variances in the number stops a driver makes and the number of cases a driver delivers. Under the collective bargaining agreement, PCCBC cannot require any driver to make more than 20 stops per day in a full, five-day work week. In order to minimize the need for overtime, adhere to the collective bargaining agreement and accomplish daily deliveries in an efficient manner, dispatchers may even out the loads of drivers by "lightening" the load of one driver and shifting additional stops to other drivers. Shifting and "lightening" loads can have an affect on compensation because PCCBC pays Delivery Merchandisers a base hourly rate and a commission for each case delivered.
Plaintiffs claim that African-Americans are adversely impacted by load "lightening." Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that African-Americans make less money than white drivers because their loads are "lightened" and shifted to white drivers. To support this claim, named Plaintiff Rowe asserts that his load has been systematically lightened to his detriment and to the benefit of white drivers.
4. Selection of Delivery Merchandiser Trainers
Trainers are Delivery Merchandisers who are chosen to help train new drivers. New drivers spend the first two weeks driving on a truck with a trainer. Trainers are chosen based on the following three criteria: 1) good audit scores. 2) good attendance; and 3) good attitude. Plaintiffs allege that trainers can earn overtime compensation because it takes trainers longer to perform their routes as a result of the training.
Plaintiffs claim that PCCBC's trainer selection process adversely affects African-Americans because "good attitude" is a subjective criteria that PCCBC uses to keep African-American drivers from becoming trainers. In support of these allegations, named Plaintiff Rowe asserts that PCCBC has never chosen him as a trainer despite that his audit scores are similar to all other drivers' audit scores.
5. "Helper" Policy for Injured Drivers
Plaintiffs allege that PCCBC has a policy of assigning "helpers" to assist drivers who are injured. Plaintiffs claim that PCCBC is more likely to assign helpers to white drivers than African-American drivers. To support this claim, Plaintiffs assert that named Plaintiff Rowe injured his back on the job and that PCCBC denied Rowe's request for a helper. Rowe alleges that because of this injury, and because he could not get a helper, he took a smaller, lower paying route so that he could handle the route on his own. In order to show a disparity in treatment, Plaintiffs further state that PCCBC assigned a helper to Jerry Meyers, a white driver, when he claimed his girlfriend was stalking him.
D. Discrimination Across All Areas of PCCBC
Plaintiffs claim that PCCBC commits the following three types of discrimination globally throughout PCCBC.
1. Manipulation of Seniority Dates
PCCBC has a policy that states that a worker loses his/her seniority if he/she transfers to a different department. Plaintiffs allege that PCCBC has loosened this policy for white employees but has strictly enforced this policy for African-American employees. In support of this allegation, Plaintiffs claim that PCCBC permitted a white employee, Edwin Layton, to try out a new position for nine months without losing his seniority. Plaintiffs further allege that PCCBC strictly applied this policy to Charles Lester, an African-American, and that Lester lost ten years of seniority.
2. PCCBC's Policy Regarding Injured Employees
Plaintiffs allege that PCCBC has an unwritten policy of permitting supervisory personnel to commence investigations of workplace injuries before an injured worker is allowed to seek medical attention if the supervisor believes that the worker is exaggerating his/her pain. Plaintiffs claim that the lack of a written policy creates a "breeding ground for discrimination" because sometimes an investigation is commenced and sometimes one is not commenced.
To support these allegations, Plaintiffs assert that named Plaintiff Mayo was injured by this policy. Specifically, Mayo alleges that he was assisting with cleaning a soda spill when he started to experience shooting pains in his back. Mayo claims that he asked for medical attention, but that his supervisor wanted to investigate the injury because he did not believe Mayo was injured. Mayo alleges that PCCBC disciplined, terminated and ultimately reinstated him because of this incident.
3. Subjective Application of Disciplinary Rules
The Teamsters Local 830 collective bargaining agreement states that when a supervisor is contemplating discipline against an employee, the supervisor may only consider the employee's conduct over the preceding twelve months. Plaintiffs claim that in practice, PCCBC feels free to go beyond the twelve month period and will look at the entire file of an employee. Plaintiffs claim that this policy is "ripe for selective enforcement."
II. PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED CLASS
Plaintiffs are seeking to certify a class that would include all current and former African-American members of Teamsters Local 830. Plaintiffs attempt to further refine the class by seeking certification only "to resolve the degree to which Defendant's practices adversely impact Class members' compensation." Lastly, Plaintiffs only seek class certification based on a disparate impact theory of discrimination.
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs propose a class that would consist of all former, current and future African-American employees of PCCBC. The Court will decide the class certification issue based on the proposed class in Plaintiffs' motion and brief.
III. LEGAL STANDARD AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
To obtain class certification, plaintiffs must satisfy the four prerequisites of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) along with a showing that the action is maintainable under one of the subsections of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b).Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor. 521 U.S. 591, 613-614 (1997). As proponents of the putative class, plaintiffs have the burden of establishing a right to class certification. Davis v. Romney. 490 F.2d 1360. 1366 (3d Cir. 1974). The trial court may only certify a class if it is satisfied, after rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been satisfied. General Telephone Co. Of The Southwest v. Falcon. 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
A. Class Certification: Rule 23(a)
Rule 23(a) states, "one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). The requirements of Rule 23(a) are meant to assure both that class action treatment is necessary and efficient and that it is fair to the absentees under the particular circumstances. Baby Neal v. Casey. 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. Class Certification: Rule 23(b)(2)
Plaintiffs seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which states, "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 23(a)(1) — Numerosity
Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. In the "Legal Argument" section of their Brief, Plaintiffs broadly and generally state that "the proposed class has hundreds of members" and that "there are approximately 200 class members." (Pl. Br. at 30-31.) However, Plaintiffs do not offer any support for these assertions. In the "Pertinent Fact" section of Plaintiffs' Brief (approximately 27 pages before their legal argument on numerosity) Plaintiffs submit that there are approximately 130 current class members and over 200 class members if former employees are counted. (Pl. Br. at 3.) In support of this assertion, Plaintiffs attach a copy of Defendant's EEOC-1 Report for the year 2000.
Plaintiffs have not met their burden by merely submitting one EEOC-1 Report from the year 2000. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in December, 2001 and this Motion in March, 2003. In the interim, Plaintiffs conducted extensive class discovery, yet their only support for numerosity is an EEOC-1 Report from the year 2000, which was already a year old when the Complaint was filed. The Court has reservations that an EEOC-1 Report from 2000 is an accurate portrayal of PCCBC's current workforce. Additionally, even if the 2000 EEOC-1 Report accurately reflects the current workforce, Plaintiffs have failed to identify which job categories on the Report are included in the proposed class, how they calculate a class of 130 current employees and how they calculate a class of over 200 employees when former employees are included. Furthermore, in response to Plaintiffs' claims of numerosity, PCCBC has provided Work Force Analysis Reports from January 2002. These detailed reports contradict Plaintiffs' broad assertions of numerosity, and they show that the proposed class is possibly significantly smaller than 130 current employees.
The EEOC-1 Report states that PCCBC has 148 African-American male employees and 44 African-American female employees. However, the report lists nine different job categories, and Plaintiff does not explain which job categories, if any, are part of the proposed class. The Court can only assume that some of the job categories are not part of the proposed class because Plaintiffs assert that the class consists of approximately 130 employees, yet the EEOC Report shows that PCCBC employed 192 African-Americans in 2000.
Based on all of these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not satisfied Rule 23(a)(1). However, given the limited information supplied to the Court, the Court is not making a finding that the proposed class is small enough that joinder is practicable. Rather, the Court is merely finding that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing that the proposed class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Even if Plaintiffs were able to come forward with additional evidence to support their assertions, class certification would be denied for the reasons discussed below.
B. Rule 23(a)(2), (a)(3) and (4) — Commonality, Typicality and Adequate Representation
Plaintiffs have not satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2), (a)(3) or (a)(4), which are all related to some degree. "The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge." General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon. 457 U.S. 147, 158 (1982). "Both serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence." Id. "Those requirements therefore also tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation requirement." Id.: See Baby Neal v. Casey. 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994).
Commonality evaluates the sufficiency of the class itself. Baby Neal. 43 F.3d at 56. "Class treatment makes no sense if there are no common issues; the trial court would gain nothing but logistical headaches from the combination of cases for trial." Id. at 55. "Typicality asks whether the named plaintiffs' claims are typical, in common-sense terms, of the class." Id. Adequacy of representation considers whether the named Plaintiffs' interests are sufficiently aligned with the absentees' interests. In re General Motors Corp., 55 F.3d 768, 800 (3d Cir. 1995).
For the following reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2), (a)(3) and (a)(4):
1. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation with regard to warehouse discrimination, seniority date manipulation or subjective application of disciplinary rules because Plaintiffs have not suffered any of these types of discrimination.
Plaintiffs allege that PCCBC has discriminated against the proposed class in the following three areas of its operations: (1) production; (2) warehousing; and (3) delivery. (Pl. Br. at 1.) Plaintiffs spend a significant amount of their Brief describing the alleged discrimination that takes place in each area, including the warehouse area. Specifically, regarding the warehouse area, plaintiffs contend that warehouse employees suffer discrimination from a "lack of objective standards" with regard to discipline for unproductive workers. (Pl. Br. at 6.) However, none of the named Plaintiffs currently work, or have ever worked, as a warehouse employee.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "a class representative must be part of the class and `possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class members." East Texas Motor Freight System. Inc. v. Rodriguez. 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977). None of the named Plaintiffs have ever alleged, nor can they allege, that they have suffered from discrimination regarding discipline in the warehouse area. Plaintiffs do allege that they have suffered discrimination in the areas of production and delivery — but not warehousing. As explained in Plaintiffs' Brief, the types of alleged discrimination are vastly different in each of the three main areas. As a result, the named plaintiffs have no commonality or typicality with the absent warehouse class members. Furthermore, Plaintiffs are not adequate representatives for the warehouse class members because none of them have a claim, nor can any of them advance a claim, for discrimination regarding discipline in the warehouse area.
Plaintiffs allege that production area workers suffer discrimination in the training of QC Technicians, and that delivery employees suffer discrimination regarding the assignment of routes and delivery loads.
The same deficiency is true for Plaintiffs' allegation of seniority date manipulation discrimination. Plaintiffs spend multiple pages of their Brief explaining how PCCBC discriminated against Charles Lester, an African-American Delivery Merchandiser, when it allegedly stripped Lester of ten years of seniority when he transferred out of the delivery area and then back into the delivery area at a future date. However, there is not a single allegation in Plaintiffs' Brief that any of the named Plaintiffs ever suffered from discrimination regarding seniority date manipulation. As a result, there is no commonality or typicality with any of the absent class members who allegedly suffered from this type of discrimination. Additionally, Plaintiffs cannot adequately represent these employees, because none of them have a claim, nor can any of them advance a claim, for this type of discrimination.
Local 830's Collective Bargaining Agreement has a policy that states that an employee loses his/her seniority when he/she transfers to a different department. (Def. Br. at 22.)
Lastly, Plaintiffs make a vague and general allegation of discrimination regarding "undisciplined application of PCCBC's disciplinary rules." (Pl. Br. at 22.) Again, Plaintiffs do not offer any allegations that any of the named Plaintiffs ever suffered this type of discrimination. For reasons similar to those discussed above, Plaintiffs do not have commonality or typicality with employees who have suffered this type of discrimination, nor are they adequate representatives.
2. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation with regard to their allegations of discrimination in the production area.
In an effort to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs only seek class certification based upon a disparate impact theory of discrimination. (Pl. Br. at 27.) Under a theory of disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant has a practice or policy which, though demonstrably neutral or even benign in any discriminatory intent, nevertheless disproportionately adversely impacts an entire protected class. Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone. 628 F.2d 267, 273-74. (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). "As is now well recognized, the class action commonality criteria are, in general, more easily met when a disparate impact rather than disparate treatment theory underlies a class claim."Id. at 274. "The disparate impact `pattern or practice' is typically based upon an objective standard applied evenly and automatically to affected employees: an intelligence or aptitude test, an educational requirement, a physical requirement." Id. (citations omitted) "Both the existence and the `common reach' of such objectively applied patterns or practices are likely to be indisputable from the outset, so that no real commonality problems for class action maintenance arise in this regard."Id. The evidence in these cases usually focuses on statistical disparities. NAACP v. City of Bayonne. 134 F.3d 113, 121 (3d Cir. 1998).
Plaintiffs allege the following discriminatory policy in the production area: "PCCBC's policy is to offer regular production employees the opportunity to become QC Technicians based on seniority; however, the Defendant does not provide new QC trainees with either a standardized training program or a uniform means of demonstrating their proficiency." (Pl. Br. at 3.) Plaintiffs further claim that this policy has an adverse impact on African-Americans because some trainees receive longer training that others, and some trainees receive greater scrutiny than others.
In support of this allegation, named Plaintiff Mayo alleges that he entered QC Technician training after he won a bid based on seniority. (Pl. Br. at 5.) Mayo claims that PCCBC inadequately trained him and only gave him 2 ½ months to complete his training. (Id.) After committing three critical errors, Mayo asserts that PCCBC "terminat[ed] Mayo's services in the QC area and return[ed] him to the rotating (and lower-paying) job in the production area." (Pl. Br. at 5.) To further support these claims, Mayo alleges that two white employees were given longer training than he was given, one of the white employees was treated more leniently when he made one mistake on the job, and that two other African-American employees did not finish the QC Technician training.
Despite this claim of "termination," the evidence shows that PCCBC gave Mayo the following ultimatum: you may continue as a QC Technician, but if you commit more errors, you will be terminated, OR, go back to your previous job and not risk termination. Mayo decided to return to his previous job.
Plaintiffs do not attempt to show how Mayo's claims of production area
discrimination meet each of the requirements of Rule 23(a). Rather, Plaintiffs broadly assert that they are seeking class certification based solely on a theory of disparate impact, and that the lack of a standardized training program is a facially neutral policy that disparately impacts the entire proposed class.
Mayo's claims, if true, fall within the theory of disparate treatment, not disparate impact. Plaintiffs have identified Mayo and possibly two other African-American employees who have been subjected to the alleged discrimination. It is clear from Mayo's deposition testimony that he claims PCCBC intentionally discriminated against him, and possibly two other employees, because of their race. The following excerpts demonstrate his claims of intentional discrimination:
Q. You are claiming as I understand your complaint, that the company's decision to offer you the choice of either resigning from the [QC Technician] position or being fired was based on your race; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know why it was Mr. Wah [an African-American] didn't make it through the [QC Technician training] process?
A. Only from what Mr. Wah told me.
Q. And what did he say to you?
A. Mr. Wah said to me they stacked the odds against me.
Q. Anything else?
A. He just said, you know, things, like, you know, they asked me to do things that they didn't ask no one else to do. And they put pressure on me pushing, that they weren't putting on other people.
Q. Okay. And what about Mr. Peal [an African-American], did he tell you why he didn't make it through the training process?
A. Mr. Peal said similar to the things that Mr. Wah said with the addition of Mr. Peal said to me, if I stay there, I know that they will find a way to fire me, and so in order for me to keep my job, I am going to get out of here.
Plaintiffs' testimony is evidence of disparate treatment, not disparate impact. Mayo's testimony, if true, could possibly prove PCCBC intentionally discriminated against Mayo and two other African-American employees because of their race; however, it does not show, or even allege, that there is a facially neutral policy that adversely impacts an entire class of protected people. Mayo even states that he believes PCCBC made decisions based solely on his race. Despite extensive class discovery, Plaintiffs have offered no other evidence that would show that there is a facially neutral policy that adversely impacts an entire class of protected people, and Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to meet their burden of showing how Mayo's claims are common and typical of the entire proposed class.
The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs do not have to prove a prima facie case in their motion for class certification; however, the mere fact that a plaintiff alleges racial discrimination is not enough to justify class certification. East Texas Motors Freight Systems Inc., 431 U.S. at 405-06. When a plaintiff seeks to certify a class based on disparate impact, class action and merit inquiries essentially coincide. Stastny. 628 F.2d at 274. To answer the procedural questions of commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation, in effect requires answering the substantive question of whether, under disparate impact, there exists the requisite pattern or practice sufficiently and comparably affecting an identifiable class of protected employees. Id.
As explained, despite extensive class discovery, Plaintiffs do not make even the slightest showing of a facially neutral policy that adversely impacts an entire class. Rather, Plaintiffs make several allegations that, if true, would tend to prove intentional discrimination-not disparate impact. Plaintiffs seek class certification based solely on disparate impact, and they seek to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) based solely on allegations of disparate impact. Plaintiffs, however, have only attempted to show that Mayo, and possibly two other African-American employees, have suffered intentional discrimination. As a result, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Mayo's claims of production area discrimination are common and typical of the entire proposed class.
Mayo did his QC Technician training during the first half of 1997. (Def. Br. at 8-9.) From the time period of early 1997 until Plaintiffs filed their brief in March, 2003, Plaintiffs have only identified Mayo and possibly two other employees who have suffered this type of alleged discrimination. Additionally, Plaintiffs have made no showing whatsoever that African-Americans systematically receive less QC Technician training and/or inferior QC Technician training, nor have they made any showing that PCCBC disciplines African-American QC Technician trainees harder than white QC Technician trainees.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that the requirements of Rule 23(a) have been met, and the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. Because the Court has found that Rule 23(a) has not been satisfied, the Court will not address whether Rule 23(b)(2) has been satisfied, and the Court will not address every one of Plaintiffs' remaining allegations of discrimination. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 30th day of September, 2003, upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Docket No. 24), Defendant's Opposition thereto (Docket No. 25), Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum (Docket No. 27) and Defendant's Surreply thereto (Docket No. 28), it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification is DENIED.