Opinion
21-P-991
10-19-2022
JENNIFER M. ROVENKO v. GENEVIEVE M. MARTIN
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The parties to this appeal, Jennifer M. Rovenko and Genevieve M. Martin, were legally married in 2014 and, after a trial in the Probate and Family Court, were divorced in 2021. On appeal, Martin challenges two facets of the judgment of divorce nisi: first, the judge's award of general term alimony to Rovenko for an indefinite period, based on the judge's conclusion that the parties had engaged in an economic marital partnership beginning in 1999, see G. L. c. 208, §§ 48, 49 (c); second, the portion of the judge's order that made each party responsible for her own student loan debt, notwithstanding the otherwise equal division of the marital assets and liabilities.
Our analysis focuses on Martin's first argument and specifically, on the judge's conclusion that the parties entered into an economic marital partnership well before 2014.
Assuming without deciding that the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish that the parties entered into an economic marital partnership at some point before their marriage, we are unable to determine whether the judge here conducted the mandatory review of the factors set forth in G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1) before coming to the conclusion that such a partnership existed as of June 1999. See Duff-Kareores v. Kareores, 474 Mass. 528, 535 (2016) (judge must consider statutory factors to determine existence of economic marital partnership). Thus, we vacate so much of the judgment that established the amount and duration of alimony. Given the interrelationship between the award of alimony and the division of the parties' assets and liabilities, we likewise vacate the portion of the judgment allocating the parties' student loan debts.
Rovenko's request in her brief for an order striking Martin's brief and dismissing the appeal for procedural noncompliance does not comply with Mass. R. A. P. 15 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1627 (2019), and is denied.
Discussion.
1. Alimony.
The Alimony Reform Act (act) permits a judge to award general term alimony -- defined as "the periodic payment of support to a recipient spouse who is economically dependent" -- based on the length of the parties' marriage. G. L. c. 208, §§ 48, 49. Although the length of the marriage is defined as "the number of months from the date of legal marriage to the date of service of a complaint or petition for divorce," the act grants a judge broad discretion to "increase the length of the marriage if there is evidence that the parties' economic marital partnership began during their cohabitation period prior to the marriage." G. L. c. 208, § 48. See Duff-Kareores, 474 Mass. at 535.
To determine whether the parties were participating in an economic marital partnership for the purposes of the act, "the judge must consider all relevant, statutorily specified factors," including those set forth in G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1). Duff-Kareores, supra at 535, 535-536. Those factors are:
"(i) oral or written statements or representations made to third parties regarding the relationship of the persons; (ii) the economic interdependence of the couple or economic dependence of 1 person on the other; (iii) the persons engaging in conduct and collaborative roles in furtherance of their life together; (iv) the benefit in the life of either or both of the persons from their relationship; (v) the community reputation of the persons as a couple; or (vi) other relevant and material factors."G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1).
Here, the judge found that "[i]n June of 1999, the parties moved into an apartment together and set up a joint bank account. The parties only had joint bank accounts, and no individual accounts, from this point forward. Additionally, the parties lived together from 1999 until their separation in April of 2019. Accordingly, the Court finds that the parties have been in an economic marital partnership, pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 48, since June of 1999." This finding reflects the judge's consideration of some of the relevant statutory factors but does not include the "express findings indicating that [the judge] weighed each of the required factors and did not consider any irrelevant factors" (emphasis added) . Heins v. Ledis, 422 Mass. 477, 481 (1996). To be sure, the judge's findings include other facts that could be relevant to the existence and duration of an economic marital partnership here -- for example, that beginning in 2006, the parties made multiple interstate moves together as Martin obtained jobs in her field of engineering; they took student loans beyond their need for tuition and used the extra loan funds to pay off high-interest credit card debt acquired jointly; and they bought a home together in Massachusetts in 2012. It is not clear, however, whether those findings or the other evidence in the record about the parties' premarital relationship played a role in the judge's determination of the fact and duration of the parties' economic marital partnership. Contrast Connor v. Benedict, 481 Mass. 567, 575 (2019) (judge made findings that parties cohabited for seven years during which time disabled wife relied on husband's health insurance and salary, parties shared in purchase and renovation of house, husband represented wife to his employer as his "domestic partner" and held out wife's son as his own in an obituary).
Likewise, there is undisputed evidence that, if credited by the judge, could also support the existence of an economic marital partnership predating the parties' marriage -- inferentially, the parties made their relationship known at least to their families. See G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1) (i), (v); Connor v. Benedict, 481 Mass. 567, 574 (2019), quoting Duff-Kareores, 474 Mass. at 534 ("[a]n economic marital partnership is premised, in part, on the parties' conduct 'in furtherance of their life together' and their 'community reputation . . . as a couple'").
We conclude that additional findings are required to support the judge's conclusion that Rovenko met her burden of proving the existence and duration of an economic marital partnership predating the parties' legal marriage. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment as to alimony and remand the case to the judge for further proceedings.
2. Student loan debts.
Where we vacate the judgment as to alimony, we also vacate the judgment as to the contested division of the parties' student loan debts. "Although alimony and property division serve different purposes, they are interrelated remedies that cannot be viewed apart." Sampson v. Sampson, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 366, 369 (2004), quoting D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass.App.Ct. 488, 508 (2004).
We do not intend by this statement to "blur the distinction between alimony and property division." Heins, 422 Mass. at 483, quoting Inker, Alimony and Assignment of Property: The New Statutory Scheme in Massachusetts, 10 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1, 11 (1975).
Given our conclusion, we need not address Martin's challenge to the allocation of the parties' student loan debts.
Conclusion.
Those portions of the judgment that relate to alimony and property division are vacated, and those matters are remanded to the Probate and Family Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion including, if the length of the marriage is revised, reconsideration of the amount and duration of alimony, if necessary, the division of the parties' property, including the allocation of the parties' student loan debts. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.