Opinion
No. 07-4357-cv.
March 6, 2009.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.), it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR APPELLANT: Susan Chana Lask, Law Offices of Susan Chana Lask, New York, New York.
FOR APPELLEES: Peter Karanjia, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Benjamin N. Gutman, Deputy Solicitor General and Diana R. H. Winters, Assistant Solicitor General, of Counsel, on the brief), for Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, New York.
PRESENT: HON. AMALYA L. KEARSE, HON. PETER W. HALL, HON. DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
In this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff-appellant, Robert H. Rotering ("Rotering") appeals from a judgment, entered on January 5, 2009 by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, dismissing the complaint against New York State judges in their official capacities on various grounds pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), including lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, absolute judicial immunity, statute of limitations, and failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Rotering challenges all of the district court's rulings on appeal. We assume the parties' familiarity with the factual background, procedural history and issues raised in this appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see generally Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), and we need not address the other grounds of disposition.
Although a notice of appeal in this case was filed on October 9, 2007, an examination of the district court's docket revealed that the judgment was not entered by the Clerk of Court, resulting in an entry of the judgment shortly preceding the oral argument.
When reviewing the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Maloney v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 517 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2008). A complaint must be dismissed if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to [the Supreme] Court." Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n. 3 (2002). Four requirements must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff must have lost in the state court; (2) the federal plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment; (3) the federal plaintiff must invite the district court's review and rejection of that state-court judgment; and (4) the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the federal action commenced. McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)). We explained that the procedural requirements imposed by Exxon Mobil Corp. mean: (a) the federal suit must follow the state judgment; and (b) there must exist a common identity between the party defeated in a state court and the federal plaintiff. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 89. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar an action where a federal plaintiff brings an independent claim denying a legal conclusion in a state court action to which he was a party. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293. In that case jurisdiction exists "and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion." Id.
Here, the procedural requirements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are met because it is not disputed that Rotering lost in the state court and that the state-court judgment was rendered before the federal action commenced. Contrary to Rotering's contention that he does not seek review of an "injury from any state court judgment" but "seeks review of and then declaratory and prospective injunctive relief regarding the laws of this state alleged as unconstitutional, being Tropea v. Tropea [, 87 N.Y.2d 727, 643 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1996)]," his injury — his inability to relocate his children to North Dakota because of the allegedly unconstitutional burden of proof in relocation proceedings — was caused by the state court's judgment denying his relocation petition. Absent denial of Rotering's relocation petition, there would have been no injury to Rotering arising out of the legal standard employed by the state courts to determine relocation cases such as his. Notwithstanding that Rotering seeks a declaration that the standard used by the state courts to determine relocation petitions is unconstitutional and a permanent injunction prohibiting the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard when a custodial parent's rights are involved, Rotering's complaint clearly indicates that he challenges the state court's denial of his petition: "Defendant Amodeo['s] . . . decision[] denying relocation petition[] [does] not provide any constitutional standard . . .;" "In Plaintiff's relocation hearing, Defendant Amodeo never heard testimony from the non-custodial parent . . ., but instead held Plaintiff as the custodial parent to a burden that was not imposed upon the non-custodial parent;" "Defendant Amodeo's Order did not consider Plaintiff's constitutional rights to parent and travel, nor did it apply a constitutional standard of strict scrutiny before denying Plaintiff's Petition." With respect to the only injury he claims to suffer, Rotering seeks "entry of judgment declaring the September 4, 2003 order and decision of Defendant Hon. Amodeo is unconstitutional."
We have no doubt that in order to determine whether Rotering is entitled to the relief he seeks in this action, based on his constitutional challenge to the state-courts' legal standard for determining relocation petitions, the district court would need to review and reject the state-court's denial of his petition — a review prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87 (indicating that, assuming the remaining requirements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are satisfied, "plaintiffs are . . . subject to the Rooker-Feldman bar [where] they complain of an injury caused by a state judgment"). Rotering has failed to present any independent claim based on an injury that was not caused by the state-court judgment denying his relocation petition. See McKithen, 481 F.3d at 97-98. Therefore, because the plaintiff called upon the district court to overturn an injurious state-court judgment, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the instant action pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291-92.
We have considered all of Rotering's contentions on this appeal and have found in them no basis for reversal. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.