Summary
affirming transfer where shorter bus trip would result
Summary of this case from Trout v. Ohio Dept. of Ed.Opinion
No. 91-1051
Submitted April 14, 1992 —
Decided May 27, 1992.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 90AP-719.
Appellees Jeffery L. Drake, Barbara R. Drake, and Carmen C. Rudolph are the owners of a tract of land located in Perrysburg Township, Wood County, Ohio. The property is situated within the Rossford Exempted Village School District and borders, in part, on the Perrysburg Exempted Village School District. In 1986, the Drakes and Rudolph requested that appellant, Rossford Exempted Village School District Board of Education ("Rossford"), approve a transfer of the property from the Rossford Exempted Village School District to the Perrysburg Exempted Village School District. In accordance with R.C. 3311.24(A), Rossford forwarded this request to the appellee State Board of Education ("state board"). Following a hearing, the state board approved the requested transfer of territory.
Thereafter, Rossford filed an R.C. 119.12 appeal in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County seeking review of the state board's order approving the transfer. The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for further proceedings. Upon further appeal, this court, in Rossford Exempted Village School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 356, 544 N.E.2d 651, affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and, accordingly, the cause was returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
On remand, the trial court affirmed the state board's order, finding that it was supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and was in accordance with law. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding that the trial court did not "abuse its discretion" in affirming the state board's order.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Kolb, Kolb Kolb and Matt Kolb, for appellant.
Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, Christopher M. Culley and Lauren M. Ross, for appellee State Board of Education.
Norman C. Hartsel, for appellees Drake and Rudolph.
The issue in this appeal is whether the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review in affirming the judgment of the trial court. For the reasons that follow, we find that the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review and, accordingly, we affirm its judgment.
In Lorain City Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 260-261, 533 N.E.2d 264, 267, we stated that:
"In reviewing an order of an administrative agency, an appellate court's role is more limited than that of a trial court reviewing the same order. It is incumbent on the trial court to examine the evidence. Such is not the charge of the appellate court. The appellate court is to determine only if the trial court has abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion `"* * * implies not merely error of judgment, but perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency."' State, ex rel. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., v. Lancaster (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 191, 193, 22 OBR 275, 277, 489 N.E.2d 288, 290. Absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, a court of appeals must affirm the trial court's judgment. See Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 52 O.O.2d 376, 262 N.E.2d 685.
"The fact that the court of appeals * * * might have arrived at a different conclusion than did the administrative agency is immaterial. Appellate courts must not substitute their judgment for those of an administrative agency or a trial court absent the approved criteria for doing so."
The trial court, in affirming the order of the state board, reviewed the record and concluded that the state board's order was supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and was in accordance with law. In applying this standard of review, the trial court complied with the dictates of R.C. 119.12. The court of appeals, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the state board's order was supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and was in accordance with law. In utilizing this standard of review, the court of appeals clearly did not deviate from the standard set forth in Lorain, supra.
Pursuant to R.C. 119.12, the standard of review for the court of common pleas in considering the order of an administrative agency is whether the order is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.
The evidence before the state board in its consideration of the proposed property transfer involved the Drakes' interests in having their two children attend the Perrysburg schools. The Drake children were the only children living on the property under consideration for transfer and, at the time of the hearing, both children attended the Perrysburg schools on a tuition basis. The evidence showed that the Drake/Rudolph property is closer to the Perrysburg schools than to the Rossford schools and that, by attending the Perrysburg schools, the Drake children were able to engage in more extracurricular activities. The bus ride to the Perrysburg schools was shorter than the bus ride to the Rossford schools. Additionally, the evidence showed that Perrysburg is the focus of the Drake family's social, business and community life.
We find that the court of appeals was correct in determining that the trial court did not "abuse its discretion" in affirming the state board's order approving the transfer of property. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.