Opinion
No. 3-388 / 02-1216
Filed September 10, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forLinn County, Thomas M. Horan, Judge.
Robert Ross appeals the denial of his motion for new trial following the trial on his claim for personal injury damages resulting from an automobile accident. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Joseph Johnston of Johnston Nathanson, P.L.C., Iowa City, for appellant.
Matthew Nagle, Corinne Butkowski, and May Reasner of Lynch Dallas, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vogel, JJ.
Plaintiff Robert Ross appeals the district court's denial of his motion for new trial, following a jury trial and a verdict in his favor, on his claim for personal injury damages resulting from an automobile accident. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages.
On December 11, 1998, sixty-three-year-old Robert Ross was a passenger in an automobile driven by Marlys McClenathan which was struck by a car driven by Brandi Tjaden and owned by Leo Tjaden. Ross subsequently filed an action against the Tjadens alleging "serious bodily injuries as a result of the collision." Trial was held and the jury, finding the accident a proximate cause of damages to Ross, awarded him a total of $29,762. That special verdict included $3,462 for past medical expenses, $21,300 for future medical expenses, and $5,000 for past pain and suffering. Ross moved the court for a new trial, contending the verdict was inadequate and inconsistent with the evidence at trial. The court summarily denied the motion. Ross appeals that ruling.
We review district court rulings on motions for new trials for abuse of discretion. Kalvik ex rel. Kalvik v. Seidl, 595 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). Iowa has long recognized the trial court's inherent power to grant a new trial where the verdict fails to administer substantial justice. Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 132, 144 (Iowa 1996). "A verdict should not be set aside as either too large or too small simply because the reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion. The court always has inherent power to set aside a verdict which fails to do substantial justice between the parties." Cowen v. Flannery, 461 N.W.2d 155, 157-58 (Iowa 1990) (quoting Kautman v. Mar-Mac Comm. Sch. Dist., 255 N.W.2d 146, 147-48 (Iowa 1977)).
On appeal, Ross first argues that because the jury awarded all of the future costs of a knee replacement, it is inconsistent to only have awarded a fraction of past medical expenses for the same knee. Second, he contends since the jury awarded past and future medical expenses, it is inconsistent to fail to award damages for loss of bodily function and pain and suffering. Third, he maintains a new trial should be granted where, as here, the total award is nearly equal to the special damages.
In Cowan, 461 N.W.2d at 158, our supreme court identified four scenarios involving appeals from motions for new trials based on claims of the inadequacy or inconsistency of the verdict. The court has (1) affirmed the court's granting of a new trial where the evidence material to the damage award is undisputed and the damage award was approximately equal or less than the special damages, (2) reversed the court's denial of a new trial where evidence material to the damage award is undisputed and the award was nearly equal or less than the special damages, (3) affirmed the trial court's denial of a new trial where the evidence of the cause or the extent of injury was disputed, and (4) reversed the granting of a new trial based on inadequate damages where the evidence as to the nature, extent, and severity of the injuries were disputed. Id., 461 N.W.2d at 160.
The Tjadens assert the facts of this case most closely approximate those in the third category as laid out in Cowan, in that the cause of or extent of the injury was disputed. They believe this conclusion is essentially outcome determinative and that we thus are required to affirm the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial. They note evidence allegedly supporting that both the cause and extent of Ross's injuries was disputed. For example, prior to the accident Ross had already suffered from arthritis to the knee. Dr. Fabiano, Ross's orthopedic surgeon, testified in his deposition that Ross's knee already had significant, chronic degeneration of the knee prior to the accident and that the accident aggravated that arthritis in the knee. He testified that it was possible Ross's arthritis would eventually become symptomatic and that he may need knee replacement at some point regardless of injuries sustained in the accident. Likewise, Dr. Hart, another orthopedic surgeon, diagnosed Ross with osteoarthritis of the left knee.
The Tjadens also point out the doctors presented varying estimates of the costs of performing the knee replacement surgery. Dr. Fabiano testified his fee for such a surgery would be $4,500, while Dr. Hart testified a surgical fee would run about $1,500; however, he based his fee on an estimated Medicare reimbursement rate.
Despite these alleged disputes in the evidence, we do not find such to be a mandate that we affirm the denial of the new trial. Conversely, nor has our supreme court "adopted an inflexible rule that every verdict awarding only damages for medical expenses in a personal injury action is inadequate as a matter of law." Id. at 159. Thus we are not bound by any hard and fast rule but rather look to the particulars of this case. Cowan does not require that each motion for a new trial fall neatly into one of its observed categories.
We instead address whether the jury's refusal to allow any recovery for future pain and suffering is supported by the evidence, given its award for future medical expenses. We note Dr. Fabiano testified that Ross experienced swelling and severe pain in the knee, but would just "rough it out" until he could have the knee replacement surgery. This testimony supports a conclusion that Ross would experience pain and suffering into the future. We conclude it is illogical and unsupported by the evidence to award past and future medical expenses required to relieve damage to a knee and then allow nothing for the concurrent pain and suffering. Considering it is readily apparent from the jury's verdict it allowed damages for Ross's prospective knee replacement, we find no reasonable basis for the jury to disallow recovery for his future pain and suffering for the same injury. See Neumann v. Serv. Parts Headquarters, 572 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (finding the jury's total failure to award pain and suffering damages illogical based on its award of medical expenses).
Moreover, we find unsupported by the evidence the jury's decision to award nothing for past or future loss of body. Because the jury awarded damages for the future medical expenses of a knee replacement surgery, it is illogical to have awarded no loss of body. Dr. Fabiano testified that the knee had degenerated, as a result of the accident, to the point where knee replacement surgery would be necessary. If there were no loss of body, as the jury's award concludes, there logically would have been no need for a knee replacement.
Because of these irreconcilable jury awards which clearly were inadequate, s ee Iowa R.Civ.P. 1.1004(4), and not sustained by sufficient evidence, s ee Iowa R.Civ.P. 1.1004(6), we conclude the trial court erred in refusing to grant the motion for new trial. We therefore remand for a new trial on the issue of damages only. See Brant v. Bockholt, 532 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1995) (ordering retrial on totality of damages issue, rather than on a single element of damages).