Opinion
Rehearing Denied July 1, 1943.
Hearing Granted Aug. 5, 1943.
Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles County; John Gee Clark, Judge.
Action by Edna E. Ross and another against the City of Long Beach to recover taxes paid under protest. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
COUNSEL
Irving M. Smith, City Atty., and Joseph B. Lamb, Deputy City Atty., both of Long Beach, for appellant.
W. Ward Johnson and Frederic A. Shaffer, both of Long Beach, for respondents.
J. H. O’Connor, Co. Counsel, of Los Angeles, by Gordon Boller, Deputy Co. Counsel, of Los Angeles, for amicus curiae.
OPINION
McCOMB, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in an action to recover taxes paid under protest upon property owned by plaintiffs which they claim to be exempt from taxation under article XIII, section 1, of the Constitution of California.
The appeal is on the judgment roll alone.
The complaint is in the usual form for a refund of taxes paid under protest, and after alleging ownership by plaintiffs of the property described in the complaint alleges as follows: "That there is now, and at all times herein mentioned has been, located upon said real property a building, and the entire premises, both said real property and building, are now and at all times herein mentioned, and ever since February 28, 1941, have been exclusively possessed and occupied by Long Beach City High School District of Los Angeles County, California, and during all such times said premises has been used exclusively as and for a public school."
Defendant filed a general demurrer to the complaint which was overruled with permission to answer within ten days. Defendant having failed to answer within the time allowed by the trial court, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs in conformity with the prayer of their complaint.
Defendant contends that the trial judge should have overruled the general demurrer to the complaint for the reason that when private property is leased to a public school district and used by the district for school purposes, such property is not exempt from taxation as against the lessor under article XIII, section 1, of the Constitution of California.
Defendant’s contention is untenable in the instant case and is governed by the following pertinent rules of law:
1) When an appeal is taken on the judgment roll alone, the appellate court is confined in its review to the facts appearing upon the face of the record, and is precluded from considering any fact or facts not a part thereof. (Ward v. Ward, 15 Cal.2d 234, 236, 100 P.2d 773; 2 Cal.Jur. (1921) section 231, page 484; 2 McK.Dig. (1930) Appeal and Error, section 513, 514, page 340, et seq.)
2) When property is used exclusively for public school purposes it is exempt from taxation from the very moment such use commences. (Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitution of California; Mings v. Compton City School Dist., 129 Cal.App. 413, 417 et seq., 18 P.2d 967).
3) Rule 2, supra, applies regardless of who may hold the legal title to the property used exclusively for public school purposes. (Mings v. Compton City School Dist., supra, 129 Cal.App. 418, 18 P.2d 967.)
Under rule 1), supra, we are confined in the present review, to the facts which appear in the record. These facts are:
a) Plaintiffs owned the property described in the complaint and paid thereon, under protest, taxes which had been assessed by defendant.
b) The property upon which taxes had been paid had been used exclusively for public school purposes.
c) Proper claim had been filed with defendant for a refund of the taxes paid by plaintiffs.
Applying rules 2) and 3), supra, to the foregoing facts, it is clear that plaintiffs’ property was exempt from taxation since it was used exclusively for public school purposes.
Defendant’s and Amicus Curiae’s arguments, and their authorities in support thereof, to the effect that plaintiffs’ property was not exempt from taxation, are predicated on the assumption that plaintiffs leased to the Long Beach City High School District of Los Angeles the property described in the complaint. This assumption of fact is without support in the record. There is no allegation in the complaint, or in any other document in the judgment roll, showing that plaintiffs leased the property to the school district; for aught that appears here, plaintiffs may have donated the use of their property for school purposes.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. City of Wildwood, 1935, 118 Fla. 771, 160 So. 208; Washburn v. Goodheart, 1878, 88 Ill. 229; Turnverein Lincoln v. Board of Appeals, 1934, 358 Ill. 135, 192 N.E. 780; Travelers’ Insurance Co. v. Kent, 1898, 151 Ind. 349, 50 N.E. 562, 51 N.E. 723; Spohn v. Stark, 1926, 197 Ind. 299, 150 N.E. 787; Laurent v. City of Muscatine, 1882, 59 Iowa 404, 13 N.W. 409; County of Hennepin v. Bell (State v. Bell), 1890, 43 Minn. 344, 45 N.W. 615; State ex rel. Hammer v. Macgurn, 1905, 187 Mo. 238, 86 S.W. 138; Carteret Academy v. State Board, 1926, 102 N.J.L. 525, 133 A. 886; Corporation Commission v. Seminary Construction Company, 1912, 160 N.C. 582, 76 S.E. 640; South Dakota Sigma Chapter House Ass’n, etc., v. Clay, 1937, 65 S.D. 559, 276 N.W. 258; Norwegian Lutheran Church v. Wooster, 1934, 176 Wash. 581, 30 P.2d 381; and Conn v. Ringer, 6 Cir., 32 F.2d 639, are not here in point. The foregoing cases relied upon by defendant and Amicus Curiae are factually distinguishable from the instant case. In each of the cases cited the record disclosed that the owner of the property had received compensation for the use of his property, which fact as pointed out above is not present in this case. Therefore, if for no other reason, such cases are not of value in deciding the present case.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, P. J., and W. J. WOOD, J., concur.
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