Opinion
2022-08914 Docket No. F-26975-15/16A
11-08-2023
In the Matter of Alexander ROSENKRANTZ, respondent, v. Julia ROSENKRANTZ, appellant.
Roven Law Group, P.C., New York, NY (Janice G. Roven of counsel), for appellant. Lawrence P. LaBrew, New York, NY, for respondent.
Roven Law Group, P.C., New York, NY (Janice G. Roven of counsel), for appellant.
Lawrence P. LaBrew, New York, NY, for respondent.
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P., LARA J. GENOVESI, BARRY E. WARHIT, LILLIAN WAN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Caroline P. Cohen, J.), dated October 12, 2022. The order, after a hearing, granted the father's petition to terminate his child support obligation on the ground of constructive emancipation.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the father's petition to terminate his child support obligation on the ground of constructive emancipation is denied.
The father and the mother, who divorced in 2001, are the parents of one child, born in 1997. The last time the father and the child communicated with each other was in the summer of 2015. Thereafter, the father filed a petition to terminate his child support obligation on the ground of constructive emancipation. In an order dated October 12, 2022, the Family Court, following a hearing, granted the father's petition. The mother appeals.
"It is fundamental public policy in New York that parents are responsible for their children's support until age 21" ( Matter of Kenneth H. v. Dawn P., 214 A.D.3d 731, 732, 184 N.Y.S.3d 399 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Family Ct Act § 413 ; Matter of Shisgal v. Abels, 179 A.D.3d 1070, 1072, 118 N.Y.S.3d 631 ). "However, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and [parental access] may forfeit any entitlement to support. A child's mere reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment" ( Matter of Shisgal v. Abels, 179 A.D.3d at 1072, 118 N.Y.S.3d 631 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 192–193, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71, 272 N.E.2d 567 ; Mitarotonda v. Mitarotonda, 171 A.D.3d 1040, 1040, 96 N.Y.S.3d 868 ). "[W]here it is the parent who causes a breakdown in communication with his or her child, or has made no serious effort to contact the child and exercise his or her parental access rights, the child will not be deemed to have abandoned the parent" ( Matter of Kenneth H. v. Dawn P., 214 A.D.3d at 732, 184 N.Y.S.3d 399 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Barlow v. Barlow, 112 A.D.3d 817, 818, 976 N.Y.S.2d 573 ). "The burden of proof as to emancipation is on the party asserting it" ( Matter of Kenneth H. v. Dawn P., 214 A.D.3d at 732, 184 N.Y.S.3d 399 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Shisgal v. Abels, 179 A.D.3d at 1072, 118 N.Y.S.3d 631 ).
Here, contrary to the father's contention, the evidence adduced at the hearing failed to demonstrate that he made serious efforts to maintain a relationship with the child during the relevant time period, or that the child actively abandoned her relationship with him (see Matter of Basile v. Wiggs, 156 A.D.3d 619, 621, 64 N.Y.S.3d 600 ; Matter of Gansky v. Gansky, 103 A.D.3d 894, 896, 962 N.Y.S.2d 255 ; Radin v. Radin, 209 A.D.2d 396, 396, 618 N.Y.S.2d 105 ). Since the father failed to satisfy his burden of proving constructive emancipation, the Family Court should have denied the father's petition.
The father's remaining contentions are without merit.
CONNOLLY, J.P., GENOVESI, WARHIT and WAN, JJ., concur.