Opinion
A146928
07-26-2017
JORDAN ROSENBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. M&T BANK (formerly known as HUDSON CITY SAVINGS BANK), Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. CGC-14-539989)
I.
INTRODUCTION
This is the third appeal by appellant Jordan Rosenberg (Rosenberg) challenging adverse trial court rulings dismissing his actions brought for lack of personal jurisdiction against the defendants/respondents in those respective actions. In his first appeal (Rosenberg v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc. (Feb. 6, 2013, A133504) [nonpub. opn.], we affirmed the trial court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over Springpoint Senior Living, Inc. (Springpoint) and Hudson City Bancorp, Inc. (Hudson), the latter being the parent company of respondent M&T Bank (formerly known as Hudson City Savings Bank) (referred to in this opinion as "M&T"). In the second appeal (Rosenberg v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc. (Oct. 16, 2015, A142709 [nonpub. opn.]), we again affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the same action (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, 2014, No. CGC-10-505893) for lack of jurisdiction as to Springpoint, Hudson, and certain employees of Hudson who had been sued in their individual capacities. This third appeal is from the dismissal of Rosenberg's action against M&T for lack of personal jurisdiction in a new action (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, 2015, No. CGC-14-539989) brought by Rosenberg. We again affirm the ruling and dismissal by the trial court.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 4, 2014, Rosenberg filed a first amended complaint (FAC) in San Francisco Superior Court (No. CGC-14-539989) containing 10 causes of action brought against M&T. Generally, the claims arise from several checks issued by M&T from a bank account associated with Rosenberg's mother, Estelle Rosenberg, who lived in Monroe Village, New Jersey. As a result of certain alleged defalcations relating to these checks by M&T, Rosenberg sought restitution, compensatory and punitive damages of "not less than $131,132.04 and not more than $100,000,000.00." The complaint also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. M&T was served by mail with a summons and complaint at its Paramus, New Jersey address.
M&T appeared specially and filed both a demurrer to the FAC, and a motion to quash summons and to dismiss the FAC. The grounds for the latter were based on lack of both general and specific jurisdiction over M&T, and the doctrine of res judicata. As to the merits of the jurisdiction issue, M&T argued that it was not subject to general personal jurisdiction because California was not its "home," nor did it have "continuous and systematic" contacts with this state sufficient to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction over the bank.
As to the alternative of specific jurisdiction, M&T contended Rosenberg had failed in his burden to show that the bank had purposely availed itself of benefits of doing business in California, that the dispute arose from M&T's conduct in California, and that an assertion of jurisdiction over it in this case would "comport with fair play and substantial justice." As to the alternative res judicata defense, M&T asserted Rosenberg was not entitled to relitigate the issue of jurisdiction, which had been decided adversely to him two prior times during the nearly four years the parties had been litigating this dispute.
In opposition, Rosenberg submitted a seven-page declaration setting forth his version of events surrounding his mother, Springpoint, which owned Monroe Village where Ms. Rosenberg lived, and M&T. Virtually the entire recitation of facts related to events occurring in New Jersey. The only mention of any M&T contact with California during the more than five years covered by his narrative was his assertion that the checks underlying this dispute were sent to him in California by M&T—one in 2002, and several others mailed to him after his return to California in late 2003, after Rosenberg went to his mother's bank in New Jersey and used her power of attorney to close her accounts there.
As to the 2002 check, Rosenberg's declaration avers that his mother went to the bank and had a check drawn in Rosenberg's name "and sent, or had the bank send, this check to Rosenberg." Also, although the declaration states the second transaction occurred in late 2003, his memorandum in opposition to the motion states that the later event occurred in 2004.
Attached to Rosenberg's declaration were four pages of what he represented to be Hudson's undated "SEC document 10[-]K" filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On page three of that document, Hudson describes the "Market Area" reach of its banking business as follows: "Through our branch offices, we have operations in the New York metropolitan market area (which we define to include New York, New Jersey and Connecticut)." The section went on to describe in more detail what type of services are provided in these three states and added: "We also open deposit accounts through our internet banking service which allows us to serve customers throughout the United States. As of December 31, 2014, we also had $109.2 million of deposits that were opened through our internet banking service." Nowhere does the document describe when Hudson began offering Internet banking services, if it did so when the challenged transactions with the Rosenberg's occurred, whether M&T (as opposed to Hudson) offered any Internet banking services, or to what extent such services were available to California residents at any time. Of course, none of the interactions between the Rosenbergs and M&T took place over the Internet.
Attached to M&T's motion to quash was a declaration by Dennis Valentovic, a senior vice president of retail banking for M&T. In it, Valentovic stated that M&T had no banking offices in California, had no employees in this state, and paid no taxes to this state. He further averred that M&T did not actively solicit business in California, and that while it had a Web site, one cannot open a checking account via the Web site.
Valentovic also confirmed that, while a small percentage of its account holders (.197%) list California addresses, that was likely the result of customers opening an account in one of M&T's East Coast offices and then subsequently moving to California. M&T owned no property in California, although it did hold some old mortgage loans on properties in California that were purchased as part of a secondary market investment pool. M&T had since "culled out" those investments from its pool as a result of a business decision not to be involved in the California loan market.
Lastly, Valentovic declared that the events alleged in the FAC all took place in New Jersey. As to the checks referenced by Rosenberg, one was written by Ms. Rosenberg, a New Jersey resident, in August 2002 from her own money market account. The second check was presented by Rosenberg to the bank for withdrawal utilizing a power of attorney for his mother at a branch of M&T in Monroe, New Jersey in early 2004. The third check was received from Rosenberg at M&T's branch office in Monroe Township, New Jersey, and it was processed there.
On September 4, 2015, the trial court granted M&T's motion to quash. In doing so, the court held: "The [m]otion to quash is granted. 'When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the factual basis that would justify the exercise of jurisdiction.' Dorel Industries, Inc. v. Sup[erior] C[ou]rt (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273. Plaintiff fails to show that defendant [M&T] had any contacts with California to warrant the exercise of general or specific jurisdiction over [M&T]. The Court denies plaintiff's request to conduct jurisdictional discovery." The pending demurrer was deemed moot in light of the court's jurisdictional findings.
Rosenberg filed a notice of appeal from this ruling on November 23, 2015.
III.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Rosenberg contends the trial court erred in granting M&T's motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction. He argues: (1) the trial court erred in utilizing an incorrect standard of review when ruling on M&T's motion to quash; (2) M&T had sufficient contacts with California to be subject to both general and specific jurisdiction in the forum state; and (3) the trial court erred in denying Rosenberg's request for jurisdictional discovery.
In response, M&T challenges all of Rosenberg's arguments and contends the trial court's decision also should be affirmed based on the doctrine of res judicata, an alternative ground raised below. We agree the trial court did not err in considering and deciding the motion to quash, and we affirm the trial court court's ruling and dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction over M&T.
Because we affirm on this basis we need not, and do not, decide the alternative res judicata ground not relied on by the trial court in granting the motion to quash.
A. Personal Jurisdiction Overview
When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction by a motion to quash, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the factual bases for justifying jurisdiction in the forum state. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (Vons); see also Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 273 (Pavlovich); Viaview, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 209-210 (Viaview).) "If the plaintiff meets this initial burden," it is then up to the defendant to show " 'that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.' [Citation.]" (Pavlovich, at p. 273.)
On appellate review, when the facts giving rise to jurisdiction conflict, the trial court's factual determinations are not disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. (Dorel Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273 (Dorel); Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 540 (Sonora Diamond).) If there are no conflicts in the jurisdictional facts, the question of personal jurisdiction is one of law, and the reviewing court engages in independent review of the record. (Sonora Diamond, at p. 540.)
In the present case, Rosenberg argues the trial court erred by utilizing an incorrect standard of review when ruling on M&T's motion to quash. Specifically, he contends the preponderance of the evidence standard is not supported by the legal authority cited in the trial court's decision. However, Rosenberg fails to cite any relevant supporting legal authority to justify his assertion that a preponderance of the evidence standard is the incorrect standard when ruling on a motion to quash. Instead, Rosenberg bases his argument solely on the fact that the trial court cited Dorel, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at page 1273, which states the preponderance of the evidence standard is used when ruling on a motion to quash, but cites to two decisions that do not contain the words "preponderance of the evidence" within their text. (See Dorel, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1273, citing Vons, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449; Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 273.)
Although Rosenberg is correct that neither Vons nor Pavlovich expressly contain any language stating preponderance of the evidence is the correct standard, it is well established that preponderance of the evidence is indeed the standard of review used to determine personal jurisdiction. (See, e.g., Viaview, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 209-210; Snowney v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062 (Snowney); In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110 (In re Auto.).) Not only is there a long list of supporting legal authority that utilizes this standard of review, but Rosenberg also fails to point to a single binding decision that contradicts this long-standing legal precedent. As a result, we disagree with Rosenberg's contention, and conclude that the trial court employed the proper standard of review when ruling on M&T's motion to quash.
B. General Jurisdiction
California's "long-arm" statute allows California courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis that is not inconsistent with the state and federal Constitutions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) As a result, in order for a state court to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, it must comport with the requirements set forth in the due process clause of the federal Constitution. (Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 (Internat. Shoe).) To satisfy due process, a nonresident defendant must have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state, such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend " ' "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." ' " (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 445, quoting Internat. Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at p. 316.)
Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 445.) The extent to which a California court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the nature and quality of a defendant's contacts with the forum state. (Shisler v. Sanfer Sports Cars, Inc. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1258 (Shisler).) General jurisdiction over a defendant-corporation is proper, if the forum state is one " 'in which the corporation is fairly regarded at home.' [Citation.]" (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 (Daimler).) For a corporation, that means general jurisdiction is appropriate under the following set of limited circumstances: (1) "the place of incorporation;" (2) the "principal place of business;" and (3) every state in which " 'affiliations with the State are so "continuous and systematic" as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.' [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 760-761, fn. omitted, quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 919, 924-925 (Goodyear); see also Internat. Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at p. 317 ["continuous and systematic"].)
However, a finding of "continuous and systematic" contacts by a nonresident is generally reserved for an "exceptional case." (Daimler, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 761, fn. 19.) Continuous and systematic contacts have been found to mean, "maintaining an office and employees in the forum, use of forum bank accounts, and the marketing or selling of products in the forum state." (Shisler, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259, citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 415.)
For example, in Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437 (Perkins), the defendant was a mining company incorporated in the Philippines whose mining operations were completely halted during World War II. (Id. at pp. 447-448.) During the war, the company's president moved to Ohio where he kept an office, maintained company files, and oversaw various company activities. (Ibid.) The plaintiff sued the defendant in Ohio on a claim that neither arose in Ohio, nor was related to the corporation's activities in that state. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the Ohio court could exercise general jurisdiction over the corporate defendant because the company president "carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company." (Id at p. 448, italics added.)
By contrast, in Shisler, the court did not find general jurisdiction over a nonresident car dealership because the defendant was not registered to do business in California, never intentionally directed its marketing at California residents, and had sold only 10 cars to California residents over a 32-year period. (Shisler, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259.) Although the defendant maintained an interactive Web site that stated the dealership shipped vehicles "worldwide," the court found its contact with the state was not continuous and systematic. (Ibid.)
In addition, when determining general jurisdiction, a court must examine a corporation's business activities in their entirety and not just its activities in the forum state. (Daimler, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 762, fn. 20.) Thus, "[a] corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them." (Ibid.)
Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude Rosenberg has failed to show that exercising general jurisdiction over M&T is proper. First, M&T is not a California corporation, nor is its principal place of business located in the forum state. Instead, M&T is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New Jersey. Typically, these facts alone are enough to prove that M&T is not "at home" in the forum state. (Daimler, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 760; see also Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 924 [noting that the "paradigm forum" for the exercise of general jurisdiction is a corporation's domicile, place of incorporation, and principal place of business].)
Moreover, M&T's affiliations with California also were in no way continuous and systematic such that California could be considered its "home." In this regard, M&T's lack of activity in the forum state are closer to the facts in Shisler than the "exceptional case" example in Perkins. M&T has no branches, offices or employees in California and does not solicit business in California via mail, phone or internet. In addition, only 0.197 percent of its total account holders list California addresses; likely a result of an account holder opening an account in one of M&T's East Coast branches and subsequently moving to California. Lastly, even though M&T does hold mortgage loans for California properties, the loans account for only .09 percent of M&T's total loans and were acquired through either the secondary market as part of wholesale investment pools or an acquisition of a predecessor bank.
Furthermore, Rosenberg's sole argument for general jurisdiction rests on the contention that Hudson, M&T's parent company, has Internet banking services that allow it to serve customers throughout the United States. Rosenberg cites Hudson's SEC Form 10-K filed with the SEC in 2011, which states that: "We also open deposit accounts through our internet banking service which allows us to serve customers throughout the United States. As of December 31, 2011 we had $291.7 million of deposits that were opened through our internet banking service."
However, nowhere does the document describe when Hudson began offering Internet banking services, or if it did so, when the challenged transactions with Rosenberg occurred. In addition, Rosenberg's interactions with M&T did not take place over the Internet and it is unknown if M&T (as opposed to its parent company) has ever offered Internet banking services, or to what extent such services at any time were available to California residents.
Lastly, even if M&T did have an interactive Web site, which was available to California residents, that would still not be enough to establish jurisdiction. Recently, in Burdick v. Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 8, 20, the reviewing court held that jurisdiction over a defendant is not proper simply because it maintained a Web site that was widely accessible in all jurisdictions. (Ibid.) The court stated that " ' "a person's act of placing information on the Internet" is not sufficient by itself to "subject that person to personal jurisdiction in each State in which the information is accessed." [Citation.] Otherwise, a "person placing information on the Internet would be subject to personal jurisdiction in every State," and the traditional due process principles governing a State's jurisdiction over persons outside of its borders would be subverted. [Citations.]' " (Ibid.) Thus, postings that are accessible by anyone who is interested in them, and are not specifically directed at the forum state, do not support exercising jurisdiction over the defendant. (Ibid.; see also Viaview, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 218.)
Therefore, we conclude that M&T is not subject to general personal jurisdiction because California was not its "home," nor did it have "continuous and systematic" contacts with this state sufficient to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction.
C. Specific Jurisdiction
Alternatively, if the nonresident defendant does not have sufficient contacts in the forum state to establish general jurisdiction, the defendant may still be subject to specific jurisdiction. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446.) " 'A court may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if: (1) "the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits" [citation]; (2) "the 'controversy is related to or "arises out of" [the] defendant's contacts with the forum;' " and (3) " 'the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and substantial justice." ' " [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1062; Vons, at pp. 446-447; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472-473, (Burger King).)
We first determine whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California. " ' "The purposeful availment inquiry . . . focuses on the defendant's intentionality. [Citation.] This prong is only satisfied when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs [its] activities toward the forum so that [it] should expect, by virtue of the benefit [it] receives, to be subject to the court's jurisdiction based on" [its] contacts with the forum.' " (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1063, quoting Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.)
" 'The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.' " (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 474-475.) "This 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts . . . ." (Id. at p. 475.)
Thus, under the "minimum contacts" theory, a nonresident defendant purposefully avails themselves in one of five ways: (1) " ' "purposefully direct[s]" [its] activities at residents of the forum' "; (2) " ' "purposefully derive[s] benefit" from' its activities in the forum"; (3) " 'create[s] a "substantial connection" with the forum' "; (4) " ' "deliberately" has engaged in significant activities within' the forum"; or (5) " 'has created "continuing obligations" between [itself] and residents of the forum.' " (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1063; Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 472-473, 475-476.)
Rosenberg contends that M&T purposely availed itself of the privileges of doing business in the forum state by selling cashier's checks to Rosenberg in California, and thus it: (1) purposely derived a benefit from the business transaction as a result of the banking fees and interest it earned; and (2) created a continuing obligation to cash the checks at Rosenberg's demand.
However, even if Rosenberg's contentions are true, there are no facts in the record to indicate M&T's conduct relating to Rosenberg's cashier's checks was anything more than a response to "unilateral activity" by either Rosenberg and his mother. First, Rosenberg did not present any evidence that M&T solicited the sale of any cashier's checks owned by Rosenberg. Rather, the first check was written by Rosenberg's mother, a New Jersey resident, from her own money market account. The second check was presented by Rosenberg to the bank for withdrawal utilizing a power of attorney for his mother at M&T's Monroe, New Jersey branch. The third check was processed in M&T's Monroe Township, New Jersey branch and subsequently mailed to California, as a response to a letter unilaterally sent by Rosenberg. Such unilateral activity by Rosenberg is not an appropriate consideration for establishing purposeful availment nor enough to justify an assertion of specific jurisdiction.
Secondly, M&T's business transactions have de minimus ties to California, nor are they purposefully directed toward California residents. As previously stated, M&T has no branches, offices or employees in California, and has very few account holders with California addresses. M&T at one point did hold some old mortgage loans on California properties, but has since "cull[ed] out" those investments from its pool as a result of a business decision not to be involved in the California loan market. These contacts with California are so attenuated that finding specific jurisdiction would go against the defendant's due process rights and offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. For that reason, we cannot find that M&T has "purposely availed" itself to the forum state.
D. The "Effects Test"
Alternatively, Rosenberg also asserts a purposeful availment argument under the "Effects Test" established in Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783 (Calder). In Calder, a California actress sued a Florida-based reporter and publisher in California state court over an allegedly libelous published article. (Id. at pp. 785-786, 788.) The nonresident defendants moved to quash service of process, claiming they lacked minimum contacts with California. (Id. at pp. 784-785.) Even though the defendants' article focused on the plaintiff, the court found the "defendants relied on phone calls to 'California sources' for the information in their article; they wrote the story about the plaintiff's activities in California; they caused reputational injury in California by writing an allegedly libelous article that was widely circulated in the State; and the 'brunt' of that injury was suffered by the plaintiff in that State." (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1123 (Walden); Calder, at pp. 788-789.) Based on the "effects" of the reporter's conduct in California, the Calder court found that California was "the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered" and held that specific jurisdiction over the defendant was proper. (Calder, at p. 789.)
In Walden, the court interpreted Calder to mean that, "mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact with the forum State. The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant's conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way." (Walden, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 1125.)
Although Calder involved a libel claim, courts have also applied the effects test to other intentional torts and business torts. (See Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 270, citing IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG (3d Cir. 1998) 155 F.3d 254, 259-260, 261 [courts must consider Calder in intentional tort cases]; Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne (10th Cir. 1995) 46 F.3d 1071, 1077 ["Courts have also applied Calder to business torts."].)
In the present case, Rosenberg claims that M&T purposely availed itself through the effects test by cancelling two cashier's checks, fraudulently stealing their value, and transferring that value from California to New Jersey. However, the crux of Rosenberg's argument is centered on the fact that both he and the cashier's checks are located in California. As Walden's interpretation of the Calder "effects test" makes clear, "mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum" (Walden, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 1125), and here even if we consider the cancelling of the cashier's checks to be a fraudulent conversion, it is not the sort of effect that connects M&T to California in any meaningful way. Rosenberg lost access to the value of the cashier's checks, not because anything independently happened in California, but rather because Rosenberg decided to reside in California at the time when M&T cancelled the cashier's checks. As a result, the effects of M&T's actions are not connected to the forum state in any way that makes them a proper basis for finding purposeful availment or specific jurisdiction.
In addition, Rosenberg has also failed to prove that the dispute arose from M&T's conduct in California. As previously stated, all of the actions relating to Rosenberg's cashier's checks took place in M&T's New Jersey branches, and not in California. Thus, because M&T had no contact with California in regards to Rosenberg's cashier's checks, this dispute did not arise from M&T's contact with the forum state.
Because Rosenberg fails to prove the first two prongs, this court does not need to address the third prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis. Only after "a plaintiff has shown the requisite minimum contacts to support jurisdiction, the burden shifts to defendant to show jurisdiction is not reasonable." (Integral Development Corp. v. Weissenbach (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 576, 591.) --------
Therefore, we conclude Rosenberg failed in his burden to show that M&T: (1) purposely availed itself of the benefits of doing business in California; (2) that the controversy arose from M&T's conduct in California; and (3) that an assertion of jurisdiction over M&T would "comport with fair play and substantial justice." As a result, we must we affirm the trial court's ruling in granting the M&T's motion to quash.
D. Jurisdictional Discovery
Lastly, Rosenberg contends the trial court erred by denying his request for further jurisdictional discovery.
Generally, prior to a trial court's ruling on a motion to quash, "[a] plaintiff attempting to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is entitled to an opportunity to conduct discovery of the jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain its burden of proof." (In re Auto., supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 127, citing Magnecomp Corp. v. Athene Co. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 526, 533; Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894, 911 (Goehring).) To prevail on a motion for jurisdictional discovery, "the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction. [Citation.]" (In re Auto, at p. 127.) However, "[t]he granting of a discovery request 'lies in the discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse.' " (Goehring, at p. 911, quoting Beckman v. Thompson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 481, 487.)
In the present case, Rosenberg fails to point to any further discovery that might have led to the production of evidence necessary to establish jurisdiction over M&T. As a result, we see no manifest abuse in the trial court's discretion and affirm the trial court's ruling to deny the Rosenberg's motion for jurisdictional discovery.
IV.
DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the ruling and dismissal by the trial court. Costs on appeal are awarded to M&T.
/s/_________
RUVOLO, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
REARDON, J. /s/_________
STREETER, J.