Opinion
No 53424-6-I
Filed: May 31, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No. 02-2-08833-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 11/13/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Terry Lukens.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Susan Mary Johnson, Attorney at Law, Larson Hart Shepherd, 600 University St Ste 1730, Seattle, WA 98101-3150.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Deborah Lynn Carstens, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, 1601 5th Ave Ste 2300, Seattle, WA 98101-1618.
Stacey Fitzpatrick, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, 1601 5th Ave Ste 2300, Seattle, WA 98101-1618.
Jerret E. Sale, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, 1601 5th Ave Ste 2300, Seattle, WA 98101-1618.
Gerald Rose sued Seventh-day Adventist Pastor Terry Campbell and the Western Washington Corporation of Seventh-day Adventists, the North Pacific Union Conference Association of Seventh-day Adventists, and the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists ('the Church') for the harm he suffered when he learned his wife conspired to murder him. Rose alleged Pastor Campbell was liable for severe emotional distress and loss of income caused by (1) his negligent counseling of Rose's wife Teresa, that resulted in her conspiring to murder him and (2) breach of his fiduciary duty to warn Rose that Teresa planned to kill him. Rose alleged the Church was liable for damages on two theories: (1) vicarious liability for Pastor Campbell's negligence, and (2) negligent supervision and retention. On summary judgment, the trial court dismissed Rose's lawsuit against Pastor Campbell and the Church on two alternative grounds. The court concluded the essential nature of Rose's claims against Pastor Campbell was a cause of action for the abolished tort of alienation of affections. The court also ruled the First Amendment barred Rose's claims against the Church because the court had to interpret the counseling tenets of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in order to determine liability. We affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss Rose's lawsuit.
FACTS
In December 1991, Gerald Rose and Teresa were married in Hawaii. Sarah Starling, Teresa's eight-year-old daughter from a previous marriage, lived with them. According to Teresa, the marriage was troubled from the start with frequent bitter arguments. Rose also admitted the marriage began a rapid decline shortly after they were married. In August 1993, the family moved from Hawaii to Bellevue because of Rose's job.
After moving to Bellevue, Rose and Teresa became active members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Issaquah. In 1995, Terry Campbell became the pastor of the Issaquah Seventh-day Adventist Church. In fall of 1995, Pastor Campbell met with Rose, Teresa and Sarah at the church to discuss family counseling. The following week, Pastor Campbell told Rose and Teresa that family counseling would be too confrontational. Thereafter, Rose and Teresa participated in individual pastoral counseling with Pastor Campbell at the Church. Teresa met with Pastor Campbell from 1995 until March 1999. After Pastor Campbell diagnosed Teresa with multiple personality disorder in 1995, he referred her to Steve Altabef, a licensed mental health counselor, for mental health counseling. Teresa also participated in group therapy sessions at the Church with other women Pastor Campbell had diagnosed with multiple personality disorder. Rose met with Pastor Campbell every week or every other week from approximately 1996 until late 1998. According to Rose, Pastor Campbell pitted the couple against each other, demonizing Rose and convincing them their marriage was irretrievably damaged. Pastor Campbell told Rose that Teresa had a multiple personality disorder and she 'was not the person he had married.' Pastor Campbell also said Rose 'would never have physical relations with her again.'
CP at 771.
CP at 771. In later counseling sessions Pastor Campbell asked Rose if he wanted to leave the marriage or get a divorce but Rose told him that 'he would not give up on his marriage or run out on Terry Rose.' CP at 771.
In January 1999, Sarah's boyfriend Jason McDaniels moved in with the Roses. Thomas Mullins-Coston, another friend of Sarah's, frequently visited at the house.
On March 10, 1999, Sarah's body was found in a park. Sarah had been strangled and stabbed to death. McDaniels and Mullins-Coston were arrested for the murder and later charged with murder in the first degree of fifteen-year-old Sarah. During the investigation into Sarah's murder, the police learned Teresa had conspired to murder Rose with Sarah and her friends McDaniels and Justin Hanson.
According to McDaniels, Teresa asked him to kill Rose in exchange for $10,000, Rose's car and plane tickets to Hawaii. One night in mid-February 1999, Teresa and Sarah left to go to the mall, leaving McDaniels and Hanson at the Roses' house. McDaniels and Hanson planned to strangle Rose with a rope when he returned home that evening. They abandoned their plan when Rose entered the house through the front door instead of the garage, as he usually did.
Teresa was arrested on March 26, 1999. On March 30, Rose filed a petition for dissolution. On March 31, Teresa and Hanson were charged with conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree. The lead detective, Detective Scott Strathy, testified that he spent approximately two years investigating the facts surrounding the criminal charges and conducted a number of interviews. During the course of the investigation, Detective Strathy determined that Pastor Campbell was not involved in the conspiracy to murder Rose and the Church did not have any knowledge of Teresa's plan to murder Rose.
Teresa admitted she knew about the plan to kill Rose and admitted she told McDaniels he could have the car, but denied any participation in the plan. Teresa pleaded not guilty and asserted a diminished capacity defense based on mental disorders and abuse she suffered during her marriage to Sarah's father. According to Teresa's expert witnesses, she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and battered woman syndrome. In addition, one of the experts believed Pastor Campbell's counseling negatively impacted the marital relationship and played a role in Teresa's dysfunction leading to her involvement in the conspiracy to kill Rose. In October 2000, Teresa entered an Alford plea to conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree. The court found Teresa's mental disorder was insufficient to establish a defense but imposed an exceptional sentence downward of 30 months based on the expert testimony.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
On August 8, 2002, Rose sued Pastor Campbell and the Church alleging severe emotional distress and loss of income as a result of Pastor Campbell's negligent counseling and breach of his fiduciary duty to warn Rose that Teresa planned to kill him. Rose alleged the Church was vicariously liable for Pastor Campbell's conduct and it negligently supervised and retained Pastor Campbell. After the lawsuit was filed, the parties engaged in extensive pre-trial discovery including interrogatories, requests for production and depositions. Under the case scheduling order, the discovery cutoff was October 27, 2003. When Pastor Campbell filed for bankruptcy protection, the trial court stayed the claims against him.
On August 15, 2003, the Church filed a motion for summary judgment dismissal of Rose's vicarious liability claims for Pastor Campbell's negligent counseling and failure to warn, and his claim for negligent supervision and retention. The Church argued Rose's lawsuit was barred by the First Amendment and by the free exercise clause of the Washington State Constitution, and the essential nature of the claims was a cause of action for the abolished tort of alienation of affections barred under Lund v. Caple, 100 Wn.2d 739, 675 P.2d 226 (1984). The trial court dismissed the lawsuit against the Church, and Rose appeals.
ANALYSIS
On review of summary judgment, this court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Reynolds v. Hicks, 134 Wn.2d 491, 495, 951 P.2d 761 (1998). Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Green v. American Pharmaceutical Co., 136 Wn.2d 87, 100, 960 P.2d 912 (1998). Once the moving party shows an absence of any issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of facts essential to its case. Ingersoll v. DeBartolo, Inc., 123 Wn.2d 649, 654, 869 P.2d 1014 (1994). If the nonmoving party fails '?to establish the existence of an element essential to a party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial'' then the court should grant summary judgment. Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 770 P.2d 182 (1989) (quoting, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). The court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Com. Council, 146 Wn.2d 370, 381, 46 P.3d 789 (2002). Only when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion on the evidence should the court grant summary judgment. Smith v. Safeco Ins. Co., 150 Wn.2d 478, 485, 78 P.3d 1274 (2003).
Rose claims the Church is vicariously liable for Pastor Campbell's negligent counseling and failure to warn Rose of a foreseeable risk of harm, and the Church negligently supervised and retained Pastor Campbell as the pastor of the Issaquah Seventh-day Adventist Church. Vicarious Liability
An employer is vicariously liable for injuries caused by the negligence of its employee when that negligence occurred within the scope of employment. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 53, 59 P.3d 611 (2002). Vicarious liability is derivative and depends on the liability of the agent to the injured plaintiff. Id. If Pastor Campbell is not liable for Rose's damages, the Church is not liable.
The trial court dismissed Rose's claims on summary judgment because the nature of the claims was a cause of action for alienation of affections, which was abolished by the Court in Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wn.2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980); see also Lund, 100 Wn.2d 739.
The Wyman Court gave the following reasons for eliminating the cause of action:
The underlying assumption of preserving marital harmony is erroneous; the judicial process is not sufficiently capable of policing the often vicious out-of-court settlements; the opportunity for blackmail is great since the mere bringing of an action could ruin a defendant's reputation; there are no helpful standards for assessing damages; and the successful plaintiff succeeds in compelling what appears to be a forced sale of the spouse's affections.
Wyman, 94 Wn.2d at 105.
The elements of the tort of alienation of affections are:
(1) an existing marriage relation;
(2) a wrongful interference with the relationship by a third person;
(3) a loss of affection or consortium; and
(4) a causal connection between the third party's conduct and the loss.
Lund, 100 Wn.2d at 745 (quoting Carrieri v. Bush, 69 Wn.2d 536, 542, 419 P.2d 132 (1966)).
In Lund, a husband sued a pastor and church alleging that sexual relations between his wife and the pastor was a breach of the pastor's professional duties as a counselor resulting in emotional distress to his wife and damage to the marital relationship. The Court looked beyond the complaint's description of the husband's claim to determine whether the nature of his allegations was a cause of action for the abolished tort of alienation of affections. The Court concluded that because Lund claimed his wife's extramarital relationship with the pastor damaged the Lunds' marital relationship, it was an alienation of affections action that was prohibited under Wyman.
The Church in its summary judgment motion also relied on Lien v. Barnett, 58 Wn. App. 680, 794 P.2d 865 (1990). The facts in Lien were nearly identical to those in Lund: a husband sued a pastor and church alleging that the pastor's sexual advances toward his wife constituted a breach of the pastor's professional duties and caused his wife to feel pressure and guilt, which led to the couple's divorce. This court in Lien concluded that the lawsuit was 'in essence a substitution for an abolished alienation of affections action that as a matter of public policy is barred.' Lien, 58 Wn. App. at 685.
Here, as in Lund, the Church argued that the nature of the claims against Pastor Campbell for negligent counseling and failure to warn was that Pastor Campbell damaged Rose's marital relationship resulting in Teresa's plan to kill him. In support of its summary judgment motion, the Church submitted several of Rose's discovery responses describing the harm and damages he suffered. For example, in answer to Pastor Campbell's interrogatories, Rose stated:
Karil Klingbeil, MSW, reported to the Department of Corrections, in connection with a pre-sentence report prepared for Terry Rose that 'records confirmed Pastor Terry Campbell met in a counseling capacity with Terry Rose and Jerry Rose separately, and the separate counseling sessions, pitted the two partners against each other, demonizing Jerry Rose, and convincing both Terry Rose and Jerry Rose that their marital relationship was irreconcilably damaged.' Ms. Klingbeil also expressed her belief that 'Terry Rose's professional relationship with Terry Campbell as an employer and counselor, crossed boundaries, and became personal, and played a role in Terry Rose's dysfunction which led to her involvement with the instant offense.' The offense referred to is Terry Rose's participation in a conspiracy to have Jerry Rose murdered.
CP 435-36.
In response to the Church's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, Rose stated:
Plaintiff is contending that Defendant's employee, Terry Campbell, became involved in a counseling triangle with the Plaintiff and Teresa Rose. He counseled both on marital issues, and additionally separately treated Teresa Rose for what he told her was a multiple personality disorder. Over the course of his involvement with the Roses, Campbell was instrumental in causing emotional and mental dysfunction that led to Teresa Rose's involvement in a conspiracy to have the Plaintiff murdered. As an obvious consequence of learning about Teresa Rose's involvement in the conspiracy to have the Plaintiff murdered, the Plaintiff felt that the marriage was irretrievably damaged and subsequently dissolved their marriage.
CP at 774-745; see also CP at 621, where this passage was quoted in the trial court's supplemental memorandum opinion on summary judgment.
Based on the pleadings and record, the court concluded the crux of Rose's complaint was that, as a result of Pastor Campbell's negligent counseling, his wife was alienated from him to such an extent that she wanted to kill him, and therefore his claims were barred under Lund.
While this case may not be the more traditional situation where a counselor alienates affections by having a sexual relationship with the spouse that has been counseled, it is actually the ultimate alienation of affections where, as a result of the counseling, the spouse goes one step beyond terminating the marital relationship — she decides to kill the alienated spouse.
CP at 608.
The court also ruled Rose's claims were barred by the First Amendment. Plaintiff contends that the Defendants are liable for negligent supervision and on a vicarious liability theory, both of which arise out of the counseling relationship between Pastor Campbell and Mr. and Mrs. Rose, relying inter alia, on C.J.C. v. Archdiocese of Yakima, 138 Wn.2d 699, 985 P.2d 262 (1999). The case before me, however, is much closer to the facts of and conclusions reached in S.H.C. v. Lu, 113, Wn. App. 511, 54 P.3d 174 (2002), which I find to be controlling.
In order to find liability of the Defendants, I would have to 'entangle [myself] in the religious percepts and beliefs' of the Seventh Day Adventist religion and its practices. There is no way that a civil court can avoid interpreting the counseling tenets of that religion in determining whether the Defendants were negligent in their supervision and retention of Pastor Campbell. As in S.H.C., the First Amendment bars the liability that Plaintiff seeks to impose.
CP at 622-23.
On appeal, Rose does not challenge the trial court's decision that his negligent counseling claim against Pastor Campbell is a claim for alienation of affections barred by Lund. Instead, Rose focuses solely on the claim that Pastor Campbell had a special relationship with Teresa and breached his fiduciary duty to warn Rose of the foreseeable danger that Teresa would conspire to kill him. Rose contends the trial court erred in concluding the nature of his failure to warn claim was the abolished tort of alienation of affections and that it was also barred by the First Amendment.
In order to prove a claim for negligence, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, breach of that duty, resulting injury, and proximate cause between the breach and the injury. Reynolds, 134 Wn.2d at 495. The threshold determination in any negligence case is whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Webstad v. Stortini, 83 Wn. App. 857, 865, 924 P.2d 940 (1996). Whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a plaintiff is a question of law. Id. When no duty of care exists, a defendant cannot be subject to liability for negligent conduct. Id.
As a general rule, a person has no duty to protect others from the criminal acts of a third party. Peterson v. State, 100 Wn.2d 421, 426, 671 P.2d 230 (1983). But a fiduciary duty may exist where there is a special relationship with either the third party or the foreseeable victim of the third party. Id. Whether a legal fiduciary duty exists is a question of law. S.H.C. v. Lu, 113 Wn. App. 511, 524, 54 P.3d 174 (2002) (citing Miller v. U.S. Bank of Wash., 72 Wn. App 416, 426, 865 P.2d 536 (1994)).
Rose relies on Peterson to argue Pastor Campbell's counseling relationship with Teresa created a special relationship that created a duty to warn Rose of the foreseeable risk that Teresa would try to kill him. Critical to the premise of Rose's argument is his contention that Pastor Campbell was a therapist who was providing mental health counseling to Teresa.
Rose relies on an ambiguous statement in Pastor Campbell's notes from a session with Teresa on November 5, 1998, which says, 'Doesn't want me too [sic] be a part/Death of Jerry,' to argue Pastor Campbell knew Teresa would try to kill him. CP at 492.
In Peterson, the court held a psychiatrist's relationship with a patient in a state mental hospital created a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect persons foreseeably endangered by the patient's release into the community, including possibly warning the intended victim or notifying law enforcement officials. Peterson, 100 Wn.2d at 427. Rose contends that like the psychiatrist in Peterson, Pastor Campbell was acting as Teresa's mental health provider, and this relationship gave rise to a duty to warn him of foreseeable harm.
Contrary to Rose's contention, the evidence in the record establishes that Pastor Campbell was providing spiritual counseling to Teresa as the pastor of the church, not mental health counseling. In an interview with Detective Strathy, Pastor Campbell said he provided spiritual counseling to Teresa. Pastor Campbell in his declaration unequivocally states he provided spiritual counseling to Teresa based on the tenets of the Church, and did not provide counseling to her for multiple personality disorder or any other mental health issue. It is undisputed that Pastor Campbell referred Teresa to a licensed mental health counselor and she engaged in counseling with the mental health counselor separate and apart from the spiritual counseling with Pastor Campbell. Teresa states in her declaration that all of her counseling sessions with Pastor Campbell were spiritual in nature.
The only evidence Rose relies on to contend that Teresa's counseling sessions with Pastor Campbell were not spiritual is his declaration in opposition to summary judgment. In his declaration, Rose states that his sessions with Pastor Campbell were not spiritual in nature. Rose presents no competent evidence to contradict Teresa and Pastor Campbell's statements in their declarations that Teresa's counseling sessions with Pastor Campbell were spiritual in nature. Rose cannot establish under Peterson that Pastor Campbell had a fiduciary duty based on a special relationship with Teresa.
Rose did not attend and has no personal knowledge about Teresa's counseling sessions with Pastor Campbell. See Meadows v. Grant's Auto Brokers, Inc., 71 Wn.2d 874, 878-79, 431 P.2d 216 (1967) (An affidavit must demonstrate Campbell's personal knowledge of facts.).
Alternatively, Rose argues that even if Teresa's counseling was spiritual, Pastor Campbell had a duty to warn Rose of a foreseeable risk of harm based on the standard of care that applies to a professional mental health counselor. Relying on Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998), Rose contends Pastor Campbell held himself out as capable of treating serious psychological disorders and therefore a professional standard of care applies.
In Sanders, a minister had a sexual relationship with two church members who were receiving marriage counseling from him. The church members alleged the minister committed malpractice and breached his fiduciary duties as a marriage counselor. The case proceeded to trial against the minister but not the church. The jury found that although the minister occasionally discussed scripture in his counseling sessions his counseling was essentially secular in nature. The jury also found the minister held himself out as a professional marriage counselor. On appeal, the court concluded the First Amendment did not bar liability against the minister. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 337.
'?In the spiritual counseling context, the free exercise clause is relevant only if the defendant can show that the conduct that allegedly caused plaintiff's distress was in fact part of the belief and practices of the religious group.'' Sanders, 134 F.3d at 338 (quoting Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988)).
Here, although there is evidence that Pastor Campbell held himself out as having secular counseling experience, the unrefuted evidence establishes his counseling with Teresa was spiritual, not secular. Sanders does not support application of a professional standard of care, or the existence of a duty to warn based on a special relationship, under the facts in this case. And because Pastor Campbell's counseling was essentially spiritual and religious, the court would need to impermissibility choose between competing interpretations of church doctrine to determine whether Rose's claim for breach of duty to warn gives rise to liability. C.J.C., 138 Wn.2d at 728; S.H.C., 113 Wn. App. at 516 n. 3.
In C.J.C., the Supreme Court held the church had a special relationship and a duty to prevent harm to the children entrusted to its care based on knowledge of inappropriate previous sexual contact by a church elder with a child. In S.H.C., this court concluded there was no similar special relationship between a church leader and an adult.
The First Amendment bars liability for allegedly tortious conduct where the conduct is part of the religious beliefs and practices of the defendant's religion and is essentially spiritual, not secular, in nature. Cf. C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wn.2d 699, 728, 985 P.2d 262 (1999). 'The First Amendment does not provide churches absolute immunity to engage in tortious conduct. So long as liability is predicated on secular conduct and does not involve the interpretation of church doctrine or religious beliefs, it does not offend constitutional principles.' (citing Sanders, 134 F.3d at 336.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religious, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.'
The undisputed evidence establishes that personal counseling between a pastor and parishioners is a central tenet of the Seventh-day Adventist religion and is a significant part of the job responsibilities of a pastor. The declaration of John Freedman, the President of the Washington Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, states that spiritual counseling is an important part of each pastor's ministry, and religion is inherent in all pastoral counseling. Freedman also states that the general philosophy of Seventh-day Adventists is that spiritual counseling may be appropriate even if a person has a mental or psychological illness. A report from the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists states:
We quickly grant that all mental (as well as physical) illness is a by-product of sin, and may be said, in the ultimate sense, to be caused by Satan. But a knowledge of certain forms of mental illness is extremely helpful, because apparently some mental illnesses are primarily caused by biochemical, environmental, genetic factors; abuses of alcohol and/or other drugs; and simply physical illness. (Again, in some instances, Satan may also become involved more directly.)
CP at 698.
The Seventh-day Adventist Minister's Handbook includes a chapter on counseling, which states that strict confidentiality within the counseling relationship is required. The Handbook also directs ministers to pray with their counselees.
Here, because Pastor Campbell's counseling of Teresa was spiritual and cannot be judged based on secular tenets, this court would have to examine the religious doctrine of the Seventh-day Adventist Church to determine whether Pastor Campbell's counseling of Teresa created a special relationship giving rise to a duty under Peterson. Under C.J.C. and S.H.C., such an inquiry would violate the First Amendment. We conclude that Pastor Campbell did not have a fiduciary duty and the Church is not vicariously liable for Rose's damages.
On appeal, the Church also contends that Art. I, sec.11 provides broader protection than the First Amendment and Rose's claims were barred under the religious free exercise clause of the Washington State Constitution, but the Church fails to present any argument regarding how the analysis of the issues in this case would differ under the state constitution. Accordingly, we decline to separately address the state constitution issue. See, e.g., Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wn.2d 779, 798, 935 P.2d 1272 (1997).
Negligent Supervision and Retention
Rose also alleges his damages were caused by the Church's negligent supervision and retention of Pastor Campbell. Negligent supervision creates a limited duty to control an employee for the protection of a third person, even when the employee is acting outside the scope of employment. Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 48, 929 P.2d 420 (1997).
Employer liability for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision arises from this duty. An employer is generally not liable for negligent supervision of an employee unless the employer knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the employee presented a risk of danger to others. Niece, 131 Wn.2d at 48-9.
'These causes of action are based on the theory that 'such negligence on the part of the employer is a wrong to [the injured party], entirely independent of the liability of the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior.'' Niece, 131 Wn.2d at 48 (quoting Scott v. Blanchet High Sch., 50 Wn. App. 37, 43, 747 P.2d 1124 (1987)).
A claim for negligent supervision of a church employee is barred under the First Amendment if a court has to examine religious doctrine to determine whether the church acted reasonably. S.H.C., 113 Wn. App. at 523. Here, supervision and discipline of pastors is governed by Seventh-day Adventist church doctrine. The Church Manual states:
In S.H.C., this court held that a claim for negligent supervision and retention was barred by the First Amendment because the court would have to examine religious doctrine to determine whether a Temple was negligent in its supervision and retention of a Temple leader. S.H.C., 113 Wn. App. at 523.
Those who hold responsible positions in the church may have faults in common with other people and may err in their decisions, but, notwithstanding this, the church of Christ on earth has given to them an authority that cannot be lightly esteemed.
CP at 739.
The Church instructs its members to '?[o]bey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves: for they watch for your souls, as they that must give account, that they may do it with joy, and not with grief: for that is unprofitable for you.'' In dealing with erring members, and with pastors who are having problems, the Church instructs its members to follow the instructions contained in Matthew 18 and to allow them the opportunity to repent.
CP at 739.
Matthew 18:15-18 instructs:
Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. CP at 728.
Men have no right to surmise evil in regard to their fellow men. Church members have no right to follow their own impulses and inclinations in dealing with fellow members who have erred. They should not even express their prejudices regarding the erring, for thus they place in other minds the leaven of evil.'
CP at 728. The same principles that govern resolution of differences among members apply to settlement of grievances against the church.
Church doctrine also includes specific provisions regarding discipline of ministers, including what types of offenses warrant disciplinary action and what modes of discipline are available.
See CP at 752.
Rose contends that because the Washington Conference's authority over Pastor Campbell is established by substantial evidence in the record, the court need not look to religious doctrine to determine whether the Church negligently supervised Pastor Campbell. But even if the Washington Conference has authority over Pastor Campbell by virtue of the employer-employee relationship, it is necessary to interpret the religious doctrine regarding supervision and discipline of pastors to determine whether the Church negligently supervised Pastor Campbell. Because there are no neutral principles of law governing Rose's negligent supervision and retention claim, the trial court correctly concluded this claim was barred by the First Amendment.
It is undisputed that Western Washington Corp. of Seventh-day Adventists was the only Church entity with authority over Pastor Campbell.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss Rose's lawsuit against the Church.
APPELWICK and COX, JJ., Concur.