Opinion
No. 05-04-01647-CR
Opinion Filed May 3, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-01464-JH. Affirmed.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, FRANCIS, and LANG.
OPINION
The trial court convicted Willie Earl Rose of five offenses arising from his flight from Garland police officers who were attempting to arrest him for a parole violation. In this opinion, we affirm appellant's conviction for aggravated assault of a public servant. Appellant's appeals of his convictions for three robbery offenses and one offense of evading arrest or detention using a motor vehicle are addressed in a separate opinion. Appellant was charged with intentionally and knowingly threatening Officer C.M. Hataway with imminent bodily injury while using and exhibiting a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2005). After finding appellant guilty and receiving his pleas of true to two enhancement paragraphs, the trial court assessed punishment for this offense at confinement for twenty-five years. On appeal, appellant brings two issues challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to show that he intentionally or knowingly threatened Hataway and that he used a deadly weapon. In reviewing appellant's challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Viewed under the appropriate standard, the evidence shows Garland police officers C.M. Hataway, Jerry Houzrcka, and T.D. High were dispatched to arrest appellant at his parole office. The officers were informed that appellant was known to have "violent tendencies." Hataway and Houzrcka entered the office while High stopped nearby to assist the driver of a disabled transit bus. Before Hataway and Houzrcka could arrest him, appellant left the building and bolted across the parking lot. Hataway ordered appellant to stop, and he identified himself as a Garland police officer. Appellant reached his car and climbed inside before the officers could catch up, but Hataway managed to prevent him from closing the door. While Hataway and appellant struggled over the driver's door, Houzrcka tried the locked passenger door. Fearing for Hataway's safety, Houzrcka broke out the passenger window and sprayed appellant with pepper spray. Both officers drew their firearms, but did not fire them because Hataway was not endangered when appellant drove away. Hearing the commotion, High joined the other officers in pursuing appellant. Each uniformed officer drove a separate, marked, patrol car with siren and flashing lights activated. The officers' on-board video cameras captured the pursuit, and a videotape combining the three tapes was admitted into evidence at trial. None of the officers had any doubt that appellant knew they were police officers and that they were trying to apprehend him. Appellant led the officers on a short chase through congested traffic at speeds between seventy and one hundred miles-per-hour. During the pursuit, appellant ran a red traffic light and collided with Herbert Shearer's car in the intersection. The force of the collision caused Shearer's car to spin, and Shearer suffered minor injuries. Motorists Reginald Dale Burrow and Keisha Vice were stopped at the intersection. After appellant abandoned his wrecked car, he opened Burrow's pickup truck door, grabbed Burrow's arm, and twice told Burrow, "Give me your truck." Appellant struggled with Burrow, but was unable to dislodge him from the truck. Appellant then ran to Vice's black Camaro, opened her door, ordered her to "get out of the car," and pulled her out with enough force to leave marks on her arm. Before appellant could leave in Vice's Camaro, Hataway stopped his patrol car about twenty-to-twenty-five feet in front of the Camaro at an angle to the stolen car. Appellant then "peeled out" and rammed Hataway's vehicle on the right, rear panel, pushing the police car out of the way. The collision caused scrapes on Hataway's car, cracked the bumper, and knocked out the car's video camera. Shortly before the collision, Hataway had looked up, and he saw the Camaro approaching. Hataway testified at trial that the Camaro was a deadly weapon. Hataway feared imminent bodily injury because he thought that the Camaro's size and "fast engine" could cause serious damage to both his vehicle and himself. After leaving the scene of the collisions with Shearer and Hataway, appellant collided with a utility box and wrecked the Camaro. He then ran down the road, trying to open the doors of vehicles stopped in traffic. Appellant opened the door to Gabriel Perez's Firebird, grabbed Perez's coat, and tried to pull him out of the car. As appellant and Perez struggled, High's patrol car collided with Perez's door, thus blocking appellant from stealing the Firebird. After a short footchase, High and Houzrcka apprehended appellant. In his first issue, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because the evidence does not prove that he intentionally or knowingly threatened Hataway nor does it prove that Hataway felt threatened before the collision. See Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (assault requires showing of intent to cause reasonable apprehension of imminent bodily injury); Edwards v. State, 57 S.W.3d 677, 680 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. ref'd) (aggravated assault requires proof that defendant intended to cause apprehension of imminent bodily injury and victim was aware of the peril). Appellant interprets the evidence as showing he collided with Hataway while trying to turn and escape, he did not ram Hataway's vehicle as the officers described, and he had no intent to cause Hataway fear of imminent bodily injury. Appellant points out that High testified the collision occurred while appellant was turning. Appellant also points to testimony from Shearer and Burrow describing appellant as going around Hataway's car to make his escape. Finally, appellant contends that the prosecutor during closing argument, conceded that Hataway was not rammed, by admitting that it was "probably a brushing blow," and appellant made "slight contact, goes around the car." A person acts intentionally when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in conduct or cause a result. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003). A person acts knowingly if he is aware of the nature of his conduct, that the circumstances surrounding his conduct exist, or that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause a result. See id. at § 6.03(b). Intent can be inferred from one's acts, words, and conduct. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). The trial court could reasonably infer from the circumstances appellant's intent to threaten Hataway. In order to effectuate his escape, appellant caused two auto accidents, endangered the lives of himself, the pursuing officers, and the general public, and robbed three citizens. While it is true that Hataway, High, Shearer, and Burrow perceived the events in the intersection differently in some respects, the trial court was empowered to resolve those discrepancies in the State's favor. See Joseph v. State, 897 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). The prosecutor's comments that Hataway sustained only a brushing blow and slight contact, were not so clear, definite, and unambiguous as to constitute judicial admissions. See Shaffer v. State, 184 S.W.3d 353, 359-60 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed). We conclude that the officers' testimony describing appellant as having rammed Hataway's vehicle, combined with the circumstantial evidence suggesting appellant would go to any length to escape, is legally sufficient to show appellant acted intentionally or knowingly in threatening Hataway. Likewise, the evidence shows Hataway perceived his peril. Hataway pulled up, looked over, and saw the Camaro coming toward him. Hataway perceived the threat directed at him, and he feared imminent bodily injury. See Edwards, 57 S.W.3d at 680. See also McGowan v. State, 664 S.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984) (concluding defendant who stabbed two people was guilty of aggravated assault by threat for the victim who saw the knife and was apprehensive but not guilty as to victim who was attacked from behind and never experienced apprehension before the assault). We overrule appellant's first issue. In his second issue, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that he used or exhibited the Camaro as a deadly weapon because Hataway's car suffered only slight damage, Hataway was not injured in the collision, and he intended to escape rather than to hurt or threaten Hataway. We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient. A deadly weapon may be "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2005). A motor vehicle may be used in such a manner that it becomes a deadly weapon. See Tyra v. State, 897 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). An actor's use of an object as a deadly weapon does not require that the actor intend to injure or kill the victim. See Bailey v. State, 38 S.W.3d 157, 158-59 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Rather, it is sufficient if the actor's conduct shows he intended to use the deadly weapon in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. See id. Viewed under the appropriate standard, the evidence shows appellant accelerated rapidly and rammed Hataway's vehicle. The assault on Hataway took place in the midst of an extended, violent flight from arrest. Although escape may have been appellant's primary intention, colliding with Hataway's car with sufficient force to push the car out of the way shows he intended to use the Camaro in a manner capable of causing Hataway serious bodily injury or death. Thus, we conclude appellant used the Camaro as a deadly weapon to threaten Hataway with imminent bodily injury. We overrule appellant's second issue. We affirm the trial court's judgment.