Opinion
22-CV-10565 (LTS)
01-03-2023
CARLOS ROSARIO JR., Plaintiff, v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, Defendant.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action against Santander Consumer USA under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667. He alleges that Defendant violated his rights in connection with a consumer loan for a vehicle, which has been repossessed.
By order dated December 15, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Carlos Rosario alleges the following facts. On September 17, 2018, at Performance Toyota, he entered into a contract for consumer credit with Santander Consumer USA. (ECF 2 at 5.) He was “misled” and “not provided with full disclosure.” (Id.) On June 22, 2021, Plaintiff's vehicle was repossessed, but he was “able to recover [his] property.” (Id.)
On February 11, 2022, Plaintiff sent Santander Consumer USA two letters by certified mail: a “debt validation letter,” and a letter directing Santander Consumer USA to “cease and desist” unspecified actions, and offering it an “opportunity to cure.” (Id.) On March 28, 2022, Plaintiff sent Santander Consumer USA and Performance Toyota, by certified mail, a “notice of rescission,” which he states was an exercise of his rights established by the TILA. On June 3, 2022, Plaintiff's vehicle was again repossessed, and he was “coerced into payment.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff asserts that Santander Consumer USA violated his rights under the FDCPA.
Moreover, because Santander Consumer USA reported derogatory information to credit reporting agencies, Plaintiff was unable to secure an apartment. (Id.) Plaintiff also lost his job when his vehicle was repossessed because he had no means of transportation. (Id.)
Plaintiff seeks damages and to recover “all payments” that he made on the loan.
DISCUSSION
A. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
The FDCPA applies to consumer debt “arising out of . . . transaction[s] . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5); Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 930 F.Supp.2d 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he FDCPA is triggered when the obligation is a debt arising out of a consumer transaction”). The FDCPA prohibits those who qualify as “debt collectors” from using deceptive and misleading practices, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, or engaging in “conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
The FDCPA defines a debt collector as: (1) a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts; (2) a person who regularly collects debts owed to another; or (3) a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); See also Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1718 (2017) (“Everyone agrees that the term [debt collector] embraces the repo man-someone hired by a creditor to collect an outstanding debt.”).
Section 1692d provides examples of the type of conduct that the FDCPA prohibits, including violence, or threats of violence, or other criminal means; use of obscene or profane language “the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader”; the publishing of a list of consumers who refuse to pay debts; or “[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass” the person called. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that his car was repossessed twice and that Defendant Santander Consumer USA violated the FDCPA. These allegations, on their own, are insufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA. As an initial matter, it is not clear that Defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the statute. It appears that Santander Consumer USA originated the loan. “[T]hose who seek only to collect for themselves loans they originated generally do not” qualify as debt collectors. Henson, 137 S.Ct. at 1721.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts about what Defendant did or failed to do that violated the FDCPA. He does not allege, for example, that Defendant Santander Consumer USA continuously called him, threatened violence, published information that he had failed to pay his debt or did anything with the intent to harass, oppress, or abuse him, in violation of Section 1692d. Although Plaintiff alleges that he suffered serious harms arising from the repossession of his vehicle, including the loss of his job, he does not explain what actions Defendant took that are prohibited under the FDCPA. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim against Defendant for violating his rights under the FDCPA.
B. Truth in Lending Act
The purpose of the TILA is to require creditors to divulge meaningful credit terms to consumers. McAnaney v. Astoria Fin. Corp., 357 F.Supp.2d 578, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The TILA requires “lenders to disclose to consumers certain material terms clearly and conspicuously in writing, in a form that consumers may examine and retain for reference.” Cardiello v. The Money Store, Inc., No. 00-CV-7332, 2001 WL 604007, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 29 Fed.Appx. 780 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 2002). An auto loan generally is a closed-end credit transaction. The TILA's disclosure requirements for closed-end credit transactions are found in 15 U.S.C. § 1638.Closed-end consumer credit transactions require, for example, accurate disclosure of the finance charge or the consumer's cost of credit, 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(3), and disclosure of the total of payments after all scheduled payments have been made by the consumer, 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(5).
A “closed-end credit transaction” is defined as a transaction other than an open-ended consumer credit transaction. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(10). An open-ended consumer credit transaction is one where the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions; may impose a finance charge from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance; and allows the extension of credit to the consumer during the term of the plan to the extent that any outstanding balance is repaid. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “misled” him and that he was “not provided with full disclosure.” (ECF 2 at 5.) It is unclear from these allegations what Defendant did to mislead Plaintiff or what information it failed to disclose. Plaintiff's allegations are thus insufficient to state a claim under the TILA.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts sufficient to state a valid claim under the FDCPA or the TILA, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights; how, when, and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
Plaintiff may wish to consider contacting the New York Legal Assistance Group's (NYLAG) Legal Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this court. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order. The clinic is currently available only by telephone.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 22-CV-10565 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.