Summary
finding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim where the medical services the plaintiff sought to treat his cirrhosis and hepatitis C were for his disability and he was not denied the services because he had a disability
Summary of this case from Palacios v. Cnty. of San DiegoOpinion
Civil No. 03CV1110J (LSP).
February 8, 2005
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Before the Court is Defendant California Department of Corrections' ("the CDC") November 19, 2004 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Carlos Rosado's ("Plaintiff") First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). [Doc. No. 98.] Specifically, the CDC seeks to dismiss the sole claim against it for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Plaintiff opposes. Both parties are represented by counsel. The Court has determined that the issues presented are appropriate for decision without oral argument under Civ. L.R. 7.1.d.1. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS the CDC's Motion to Dismiss.
Background
This action's factual background is summarized in the Court's December 8, 2004 Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Part and Denying in Part. [Doc. No. 108.] In short, Plaintiff is an inmate at Centinela State Prison who has been diagnosed with advanced stage cirrhosis and hepatitis C. On October 8, 2004, Plaintiff filed his FAC against the CDC and various individuals, which includes a claim against the CDC for its alleged failure to accommodate Plaintiff's particular medical and dietary needs. [Doc. No. 82.] Primarily, Plaintiff wishes for the CDC to arrange for and facilitate his placement on a liver transplant list.Legal Standard
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. See North Star Int'l. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal of a claim under this rule is appropriate only where it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).
In reviewing the motion, the Court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see also Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Instead, the Court must determine "whether conclusory allegations follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff." Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992).
Discussion
In his FAC, Plaintiff claims that the CDC violated Title II of the ADA by "failing to provide Rosado with the medication, medical procedures, medical diagnosis, food and nourishment, and other accommodations made necessary by his disability, and by forcing Rosado to work in the prison yard despite knowing that his condition warranted reduced physical activity." (FAC ¶ 2.) Plaintiff also specifically alleges that the CDC "failed to make reasonable accommodations" for his disability, by "failing to have Rosado evaluated for a liver transplant, failing to place him on the liver transplant list, and failing to provide him with a modified diet recommended by his physicians[.]" (FAC ¶ 65.)
The CDC argues that Plaintiff's Title II ADA claim for failure to provide necessary accommodations warrants dismissal because the statute does not create a federal medical malpractice cause of action. Rather, the CDC explains, Plaintiff's claim is more appropriately stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or state tort law, as Plaintiff has asserted against the other Defendants. Alternatively, the CDC contends that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts establishing a protected disability. Additionally, the CDC claims that the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff is barred by a consent decree from a prior class action suit, Armstrong v. Davis, No. 94cv2307 (N.D. Cal. filed June 29, 1994).
A. ADA Disability Discrimination
Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from discriminating on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a disability discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege the following: (1) the plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's services, programs or activities; (3) who was excluded or otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; (4) solely by reason of the disability. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).
Consistent with the liberal federal pleading standard articulated in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), alleging a viable § 12132 claim does not appear to require much particularity. In Stevens v. Harper, where two youth correction inmates filed an ADA claim against the correctional facility, the Northern District of California court denied the facility's motion to dismiss, even though the inmates had not provided any details about their individual disabilities or the nature of the services or programs to which they had allegedly been denied access. 213 F.R.D. 358, 375 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2002). The court found it sufficient that they had alleged the facility failed to accommodate their disabilities which resulted in their being unable to participate in certain programs. Id.
Although the pleading standard may be low, a plaintiff still must clearly allege that discrimination occurred. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that state prisoners may raise 42 U.S.C. § 12132 claims against state prisons for discrimination based on their disabilities. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997). However, the ADA does not create a federal cause of action for prisoners challenging the medical treatment provided for their underlying disabilities. Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of Northwest Indiana, 104 F.3d 116, 121-22 (7th Cir. 1997). The allegation that a prison failed to provide medications that were prescribed to the prisoner has been found not actionable under Title II of the ADA. See Galvin v. Cook, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12871, *7-8 (D. Or. July 14, 2000). Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has in no uncertain terms declared that "the [ADA] would not be violated by a prison's simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners." Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996). Chief Judge Posner further noted, "the courts have labored mightily to prevent the transformation of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause into a medical malpractice statute for prisoners. We would be exceedingly surprised to discover that Congress had made an end run around these decisions in the Americans with Disabilities Act." Id.
Here, assuming without finding that Plaintiff has alleged a statutorily protected disability, the FAC does not allege that Plaintiff was discriminated against or that he was excluded from receiving services because of that disability. Instead, Plaintiff merely claims that he was denied accommodations for his disability. Plaintiff does not allege disparate treatment or that the lack of accommodations prevented him from participating in some prison program or activity. As the Seventh Circuit posited, "Disabled people often cannot participate in programs and activities unless special attention is given to their medical needs. But incarceration, which requires the provision of a place to sleep, is not a 'program' or 'activity.' Sleeping in one's cell is not a 'program' or 'activity.'" Id.
In his Opposition, Plaintiff argues, "Only those inmates having [sic] requiring relatively inexpensive medical treatment receive proper and constitutionally mandated care. In contrast, inmates whose particular disabilities give rise to expensive medical necessities are merely informed that 'incarceration prohibits [the treatment that they require].'" (Opp'n at 5.) In other words, Plaintiff suggests that the CDC's alleged policy of denying organ transplants to prisoners is equivalent to discrimination against those prisoners who are more sick in favor of those whose medical needs are not as significant.
This careful wording does not transform Plaintiff's complaint about the quality and extent of his access to medical care into a disability discrimination claim. The benefits and services Plaintiff wishes to receive are for his disability; it is illogical to say that he is being denied medical services because he has a disability. Moreover, Plaintiff is not arguing that those who are less sick received the same services he was denied; and he is not claiming that those without protected disabilities were excused from working in the yard while those with disabilities, such as himself, were required to work. As such, the Court agrees with the CDC that Plaintiff's allegations are inappropriately framed under the ADA. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a viable Title II claim.
B. ADA Protected Disabilities and Injunctive Relief
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot allege a valid ADA claim even assuming he can establish that he suffers from a protected disability, the Court need not address the CDC's alternative challenge to the FAC. Additionally, the Court need not reach the issue of relief since liability cannot be demonstrated.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a valid claim for ADA disability discrimination against the CDC. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the CDC's Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff's second claim as set forth in the FAC.
IT IS SO ORDERED.