Opinion
NO. 4:02-CV-868-A
December 16, 2002
Memorandum Opinion and ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion of defendant James Dimon ("Dimon") to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The court, having reviewed the motion, as supplemented, the response of plaintiff, Patricia Roque, defendant's reply, and applicable authorities, concludes that the motion should be granted.
I. Background Basis of Motion
Dimon, a non-resident defendant, is the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of defendant Bank One, N.A. ("Bank One"), and is domiciled in Chicago, Illinois. Mot. at 2; Dimon Aff. ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that Dimon's relationship to this suit is as follows: "acting in the scope of his employment controlling and directing activities which were carried out and which either exceeded his authority, and or were actions declared unlawful, illegal and or unconstitutional by law." Compl. at 1.
Dimon points to this excerpt as plaintiff's concession that "whatever actions taken by Dimon relevant to this case were taken in his position as CEO." Mot. at 2. Dimon's affidavit details his limited connection with the state of Texas:
I have never traveled to Texas in connection with the subject matter of this lawsuit. To the best of my knowledge, in my individual capacity or in my capcity as CEO of Bank One, I have never met with, spoken with, or contracted with the Plaintiff, Patricia Roque. I have no personal knowledge of her loan with any Bank One entity or any personal knowledge of any of the allegations that she is raising against any Bank One entity. At the time the loan at issue was made, I was not employed by Bank One.
Dimon Aff. ¶ 4. Dimon asserts that the fiduciary shield doctrine operates to bar this court from assuming personal jurisdiction over him, and that plaintiff's complaint fails to allege grounds for sustaining personal jurisdiction over him. Mot. at 3-6.
II. Personal Jurisdiction Standard
When a non-resident defendant presents a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing thatin personam jurisdiction exists. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 930 (1994); Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985); D.J. Invs., Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg. Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff need not, however, establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence; prima facie evidence of personal jurisdiction is sufficient. WNS. Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1989); Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1982). The court may resolve a jurisdictional issue by reviewing pleadings, affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, exhibits, any part of the record, and any combination thereof. Command-Aire Corp. v. Ont. Mech. Sales Serv., Inc., 963 F.2d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1992). Allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are taken as true except to the extent that they are contradicted by defendant's affidavits. Wyatt, 686 F.2d at 282-83 n. 13 (citing Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 683 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1977)). Any genuine, material conflicts between the facts established by the parties' affidavits and other evidence are resolved in favor of plaintiff for the purposes of determining whether a prima facie case exists. Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 954 F.2d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 867 (1992); Bulhon v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990)
Personal jurisdiction over a non-resident may be exercised if (1) the non-resident defendant is amenable to service of process under the law of a forum state, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction under state law comports with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Wilson, 20 F.3d at 646-47; Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1166 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Smith v. DeWalt Prods. Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1984)). Since the Texas long-arm statute has been interpreted as extending to the limits of due process,see. e.g., Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Ltd. v. English China Clays. P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991), the only inquiry is whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant would be constitutionally permissible. Bullion, 895 F.2d at 215-16 n. 3;Stuart, 772 F.2d at 1189.
The same minimum contacts test applies under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments where there is no federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process. Point Landing. Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 427 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 97 (1987) ("absent specific congressional authority, a federal district court has no personal jurisdiction over a defendant who cannot be reached by the long-arm statute of the state in which the district court sits"). Accordingly, the court cites to Fourteenth Amendment cases herein as appropriate.
For due process to be satisfied, (1) the non-resident defendant must have "minimum contacts" with the forum state resulting from an affirmative act on the defendant's part, and (2) the contacts must be such that the exercise of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). plaintiff "can remain in court only if there is some basis for finding personal jurisdiction over the . . . named defendant." Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 254 (5th Cir. 1962)
The minimum contacts prong of the due process requirement can be satisfied by a finding of either "specific" or "general" jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant. Bullion, 895 F.2d at 216. For specific jurisdiction to exist, the foreign defendant must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state and the cause of action must arise from or be connected with such act or transaction.Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1985). Even if the controversy does not arise out of or relate to the non-resident defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum, general jurisdiction may be exercised when the non-resident defendant's contacts with the forum are sufficiently continuous and systematic as to support the reasonable exercise of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine. Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). When general jurisdiction is asserted, the minimum contacts analysis is more demanding and requires a showing of substantial activities within the forum state. Jones, 954 F.2d at 1068.
The second prong of the due process analysis is whether exercise of jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. In determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable such that it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the Supreme Court has instructed that courts look to the following factors: (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the interests of the forum state, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (citing WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
III. Analysis
Because Dimon is amenable to service, as the Texas long-arm statute has been interpreted as extending to the limits of due process, the court's analysis begins with whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dimon is constitutionally permissible. Dimon's affidavit shows that he is a resident of the state of Illinois, and has done nothing to subject himself to the jurisdiction of the state of Texas. Dimon Aff. ¶ 3. Putting aside rambling misstatements of the law, plaintiff has presented no evidence that Dimon has had any connection, let alone minimum contacts, with the state of Texas. Therefore, there is no basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Dimon.
In any event, Dimon, as Bank One's CEO, would be protected by the fiduciary shield doctrine. Stuart, 772 F.2d at 1197. This doctrine provides that "an individual's transaction of business within the state solely as a corporate officer does not create personal jurisdiction over that individual though the state has in personam jurisdiction over the corporation." Id. If Dimon had any contact with the state of Texas, it would have been in his capacity as Bank One's CEO. Merely because the court has jurisdiction over Bank One does not manufacture personal jurisdiction over Bank One's corporate officers, such as Dimon. While there are exceptions to the fiduciary shield doctrine where the corporate officer is the corporation's alter ego, or perpetuates a fraud, Stuart, 772 F.2d at 1197-98 n. 12, plaintiff has not shown that either applies to Dimon.
The court concludes that plaintiff has not carried burden of establishing that this court has jurisdiction person of Dimon.
IV. ORDER
For the reasons discussed,
The court ORDERS that Dimon's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction be, and is hereby, granted.
The court further ORDERS that all of plaintiff's claims and causes of action against Dimon be, and are hereby, dismissed.
The court determines that there is no just reason for delay in, and hereby directs, entry of final judgment as to the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Dimon.