Opinion
16475 310482/09.
12-29-2015
Labseou ROONEY, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Mariam MADISON, et al., Defendants, George Abi–Nakad, et al., Defendants–Appellants.
Law Office of Craig P. Curcio, Middletown (Ryan Bannon of counsel), for appellants. Forde & Associates, Eastchester (James L. Forde of counsel), for respondent.
Law Office of Craig P. Curcio, Middletown (Ryan Bannon of counsel), for appellants.
Forde & Associates, Eastchester (James L. Forde of counsel), for respondent.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lucindo Suarez, J.), entered on or about April 9, 2015, which, to the extent appealed from, denied the motion of defendants-appellants George Abi–Nakad and Daniel Abinakad for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted and the complaint dismissed as to these defendants. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Although the testimony of defendant Daniel Abinakad, the driver of one of the vehicles in this three car collision, and that of his passenger, nonparty Timothy Braig, both deposed almost seven years after the accident, differ as to whether Abinakad's vehicle was first struck from the left or the right, as a vehicle suddenly merged into Abinakad's center lane, causing Abinakad to be propelled into the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger, under neither version is there evidence of Abinakad's negligence, and plaintiff has offered no evidence from which such negligence may be reasonably inferred (see Freeman v. Johnston, 84 N.Y.2d 52, 57, 614 N.Y.S.2d 377, 637 N.E.2d 268 1994 [“There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party ... If the evidence is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative ..., summary judgment may be granted”] [internal quotations and citation omitted], cert. denied 513 U.S. 1016, 115 S.Ct. 576, 130 L.Ed.2d 492 1994; Caban v. Vega, 226 A.D.2d 109, 111, 640 N.Y.S.2d 58 1st Dept.1996 ).
Conclusory allegations by plaintiff's counsel that Abinakad was speeding are insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Perez v. Brux Cab Corp., 251 A.D.2d 157, 160, 674 N.Y.S.2d 343 1998; Sanchez v. Lonero Tr., Inc., 100 A.D.3d 417, 953 N.Y.S.2d 194 1st Dept.2012 ). Moreover, “[s]peculation regarding evasive action that a defendant driver should have taken to avoid a collision, especially when the driver had, at most, a few seconds to react, does not raise a triable issue of fact” (Dearden v. Tompkins County, 6 A.D.3d 783, 785, 774 N.Y.S.2d 201 3d Dept.2004; see also Edwards v. Gaines Serv. Leasing Corp., 244 A.D.2d 279, 280, 664 N.Y.S.2d 445 1st Dept.1997 ).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments, and find them unavailing.