Opinion
1:23-CV-01084-LF-GJF
09-23-2024
DOMINIQUE ROMERO-VALDEZ, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. PARNALL LAW FIRM, LLC Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE JURY DEMAND
Laura Fashing United States Magistrate Judge
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiff Dominique Romero-Valdez's Motion for Leave to File Jury Demand, filed March 5, 2024. Doc 28. Defendant Parnall Law Firm, LLC (“Parnall”) filed a response on March 19, 2024 (Doc. 30) and Ms. Romero-Valdez filed her reply on April 2, 2024 (Doc. 32). Having considered the briefing and the relevant law, I GRANT the motion.
This case was removed to federal court December 6, 2023 (Doc. 1). On December 13, 2023, Parnall filed its answer and a counterclaim against Ms. Romero-Valdez. Doc. 7. Ms. Romero-Valdez filed her answer to Parnall's counterclaim on January 3, 2024. Doc. 10. Through a clerical error, Ms. Romero-Valdez filed an amended answer (Doc. 14) that included a jury demand on January 25, 2024, one day after the deadline to amend her pleading as a matter of course, see FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A); Doc. 28 at 2. Via email, defense counsel informed plaintiff's counsel that the amended answer was a day late and offered to not oppose the amendment if Ms. Romero-Valdez withdrew her jury demand. Doc. 32-1. Defense counsel also noted that Ms. Romero-Valdez could “separately ask the Court for leave to submit an untimely jury demand if [she] were so inclined.” Id. Plaintiff's counsel agreed to withdraw the jury demand. Id. Similarly, in February 2024 Ms. Romero-Valdez filed for leave to file a second amended complaint and untimely jury demand and then withdrew the motion after Parnall indicated that it would consent to the amended complaint but oppose the jury demand. See Doc 30 at 2; Docs. 20, 23.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) provides that “a party may demand a jury trial by . . . serving the other parties with a written demand . . . no later than 14 days after the last pleading directed to the issue is served.” That deadline lapsed, at the latest, on January 17, 2024, fourteen days after Ms. Romero-Valdez filed her answer to Parnall's counter-claim. However, Ms. Romero-Valdez moves for leave under FED. R. CIV. P. 39(b), which provides that the Court “may, on motion, order a jury trial on any issue for which a jury might have been demanded.” The Tenth Circuit has “held that, absent strong and compelling reasons to the contrary, a district court should exercise its discretion under Rule 39(b) and grant a jury trial,” Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. v. Burciaga, 982 F.2d 408, 409 (10th Cir. 1992), a principle that reflects the recognition that “the decision whether to try a case before a jury is not merely a technicality [but rather] implicates a fundamental constitutional right,” Bryant v. Washington Fed. Bank, Inc., No. CIV 20-1266 RB/KRS, 2023 WL 2244825, at *3 (D.N.M. Feb. 27, 2023); see also AMF Tuboscope, Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir. 1965) (“The constitutional right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment is a fundamental right and ‘the federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength.' ”) (citation omitted). In keeping with this principle, “district courts [in this circuit] routinely grant untimely jury demands.” Blanks v. Hypower, Inc., No. CV 12-440 JCH/ACT, 2012 WL 13076177, at *3 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2012); see also, e.g., Pruess v. Presbyterian Health Plan, Inc., No. CIV 19-0629 DHU/JFR, 2024 WL 1329434, at *2-3 (D.N.M. Mar. 28, 2024) (granting jury demand untimely by more than three years and filed after the close of discovery); Bryant v. Washington Fed. Bank, Inc., No. CIV 201266 RB/KRS, 2023 WL 2244825 (D.N.M. Feb. 27, 2023); Ombe v. New Mexico, No. CIV 140763 RB/KBM, 2017 WL 3393962 (D.N.M. Aug. 7, 2017); Gilkey v. ADT Sec., Inc., No. 11-1369-JAR, 2012 WL 1901287 (D. Kan. May 25, 2012).
No strong and compelling reasons justify the denial of Ms. Romero-Valdez's motion. Ms. Romero-Valdez's motion came only six weeks after the deadline to file a jury demand and before discovery has commenced. The delay, caused by repeated clerical errors, is regrettable, but shows no signs of bad faith. Moreover, Ms. Romero-Valdez's repeated attempts to file a jury demand prior to her motion put Parnall on notice that she sought a jury trial. Finally, Parnall offers no reasons that it would be prejudiced by a jury demand; in fact, it offers no reasons to deny the motion whatsoever besides the fact of the demand's tardiness. See Doc. 30; Meister v. Kansas City, No. 09-2544-EFM, 2011 WL 765887, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011) (“Lack of prejudice is a factor the court may consider in granting a motion for jury trial.”). I therefore GRANT Ms. Romero-Valdez leave to file her jury demand no later than Monday, October 7, 2024, and, after such demand is filed, will order a jury trial on any issue for which a jury might have been timely demanded.
IT IS SO ORDERED.