Opinion
Civil Action 23-1662-KSM
06-07-2023
MEMORANDUM
Marston, J.
Plaintiff Graham B.C. Roman is a pretrial detainee at Chester County Prison (the “Prison”), where he has been incarcerated since August 29, 2021. He brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the County of Chester, the Prison, and multiple Prison officials. (See Doc. No. 17 at 4-8.) As relevant here, Roman alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights when they moved him from cell to cell five times in three days for no penological reason, denied him access to the Prison's grievance process, and denied him necessary dental care. (See id. at 8, 11-12.)
Currently before the Court is Roman's motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 24.) He asks the court to “stop the ongoing campaign of harassment” committed against him by Defendants. (Id. at 8.) He identifies three alleged injuries: (1) the “continued maliscioucely [sic] evil act of moving plaintiff from cell to cell with no penological or security based reason in upwards of (5) moves in two day periods all due to his attempt to receive administrative remedy,” (2) “the interference of plaintiff's right to use the protected conduct ‘grievance system' by openly violating 37 Pa. Code § 95.223(4),”and (3) Defendants' refusal to provide “treatment or delaying said dental care in excess of 21 months causing ongoing injury to a disabled inmate with osteogen[e]sis imperfecta[, i.e.,] ‘Brittle Bones.'” (Id. at 9.) For the reasons discussed below, the motion is denied.
I.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 this court has the power to “grant preliminary injunctions to enjoin harmful conduct.” ASI Bus. Sols., Inc. v. Otsuka Am. Pharm., Inc., 233 F.Supp.3d 432, 437 (E.D. Pa. 2017); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a). Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 allows the court to grant a preliminary injunction with respect to prison conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). “Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted only in limited circumstances.” Arrowpoint Cap. Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 793 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). And a prisoner's request for injunctive relief, in particular, “must ‘be viewed with great caution' because of the ‘intractable problems of prison administration.'” Milhouse v. Fasciana, 721 Fed.Appx. 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995)).
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must present evidence showing: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.” Arrowpoint Cap. Corp., 793 F.3d at 318-19 (quotation marks omitted). If a party fails to establish likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm-what the Third Circuit has referred to as the “gateway factors” of this test-then the Court need not consider whether all four factors balance in favor of granting preliminary relief. See Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[A] failure to show a likelihood of success or failure to demonstrate irreparable injury must necessarily result in the denial of a preliminary injunction.”).
To that end, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove with evidence that the first two preliminary injunction elements are satisfied. See Scutella v. Erie Cnty. Prison, Case No. 1:19-cv-245, 2020 WL 571065, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2020) (“The party requesting the injunction has the burden of introducing evidence to support the first two factors.”). Success on the merits must be likely but need not be more likely than not; irreparable harm must be more likely than not. See Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179. “In general, to show irreparable harm a plaintiff must demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.” Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Scutella, 2020 WL 571065, at *3 (“[A] court may not grant preliminary injunctive relief unless ‘the preliminary injunction is the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.'” (quoting Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F.A. Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989))). “The requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable-not merely serious or substantial ....” ASI Bus. Sols., Inc., 233 F.Supp.3d at 437 (quotation marks omitted).
II.
As stated above, Roman seeks a preliminary injunction that prohibits Defendants from moving him from him between cells without a penological reason, forbids them from interfering with his ability to file a grievance, and mandates that they let him see a dental specialist. Because Roman has not satisfied the gateway preliminary injunction factors, his request is denied.
First, Roman has not shown that he is likely to suffer immediate, irreparable injury in connection with his being moved from cell to cell. See Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Absent a showing of irreparable harm, a plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, even if the other three elements are found.” (quotation marks omitted)); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that the moving party must demonstrate “the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted”). In the Amended Complaint, Roman alleges that he was “moved (18) times in under (17) months,” with “around 5 moves” occurring because of Roman's conduct and “(13) moves were based on provided retaliation that's continued since 06/08/2022.” (Doc. No. 17 at 18; see also id. at 20 (identifying February 23, 2023 as the most recent move).) He also identifies a single instance when he was moved between five cells in the span of two or three days in late February 2023. (Id. at 20.) This incident, which also constitutes the most recent move, occurred more than three months ago, and Roman has not alleged, let alone put forth evidence to suggest, that he is likely to be moved again in the near future. See Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B&B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969) (A preliminary injunction “may not be used simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury.”); see also Boyd v. Larson, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-cv-01789, 2017 WL 1904278, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017) (“The mere possibility of a future placement in restrictive housing does not constitute immediate, irreparable harm.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Roman has not shown he is likely to suffer imminent injury. See Cont'l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980) (“The requisite for injunctive relief has been characterized as a clear showing of immediate irreparable injury or a presently existing actual threat.” (cleaned up)); Synthes, Inc. v. Gregoris, 228 F.Supp.3d 421, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“Any irreparable harm must be imminent.”).
Even if Roman could satisfy this element, the Court finds the risk of ham to Defendants weighs against issuance of a preliminary injunction. See Boyd, 2017 WL 1904278, at *4 (“[T]he possibility of harm to the defendants in the event that preliminary relief is erroneously granted appears to be substantial. ‘Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a state's prison or jail, appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief. The federal courts are not alleged overseers of the day-to day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.'” (quoting Chruby v. Kowaleski, Civil Action No. 11-225J, 2012 WL 12875986, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2012)); Njos v. Argueta, Civil Action No. 3:CV-12-1038, 2013 WL 1497430, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2016) (“We also find that the Plaintiff is requesting relief in the form of Court intervention and management while he is in prison, i.e. directing USP-Lewisburg to classify him as ‘rec alone' status, and directing USP-Lewisburg as to what Unit to house him in. The Court will not generally interfere with prison administration matters such as USP-Lewisburg's decision as to what Unit and classification is proper for Plaintiff.”). The Court denies Roman's motion for a preliminary injunction on this issue.
Second, the Court finds that Roman has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits or a threat of immediate, irreparable injury to the extent his claim is based on prison officials' alleged interference with the grievance process. In the Amended Complaint, Roman claims that this injury gives rise to a Fourteenth Amendment violation and is therefore cognizable under § 1983. (Doc. No. 17 at 8.) The Court disagrees. Section 1983 is a vehicle through which individuals can bring suit for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Because “prison inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance process,” Roman's allegation that Prison officials denied him access to that process cannot give rise to a claim under § 1983. Jackson v. Gordont 145 Fed.Appx. 774, 777 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Bickel v. Vechecco, C. A. No. 09-115 Erie, 2011 WL 915689, at *1, n.1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2011) (“Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied his constitutional right to a grievance process, however, a prisoner has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure. As such, any claim Plaintiff makes arising from the denial of an effective grievance system at Erie County Prison should be dismissed, sua sponte, for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” (collecting cases)).Accordingly, Roman has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, and his motion is denied on this issue as well.
Third, Roman asks the Court to mandate that the prison allow him to see a dental specialist. Because the prison allowed Roman to see a dentist in late April 2023 and has agreed to let him see a specialist, the Court denies as moot his request for a preliminary injunction as to this claim. Roman alleges in multiple filings that he saw a dentist on April 26 and 27, 2023. (See Doc. No. 8 at 20 (recording date as April 26, 2023); see also Doc. No. 17 at 22 (stating dental appointment was on April 27, 2023); id. at 21 (stating he saw a dentist both days).) That dentist “sent emails to the Director Tim Mulrooney to inform him of [Roman's] irreparable injuries” and need for specialized dental treatment related to his diagnosis of “Osteo[g]enesis I[m]perfecta.” (Doc. No. 10 at 1.) The Prison then “approved [Roman's request] to see a[n] outside dentist,” and officials are currently looking for an appropriate specialist. (Id.) Because Roman's own submissions show that the prison has agreed to let Roman see a dental specialist, the Court denies as moot Roman's request for preliminary injunction as to this issue.
III.
Roman's motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction is denied. An appropriate order follows.