Opinion
B302402
08-03-2020
ROXANA ROJAS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GLENAIR, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern, Andrew Sokolowski, Tagore Subramanian and Debra J. Tauger for Plaintiff and Appellant. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Jesse A. Cripps and Elizabeth A. Dooley for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC505602) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., and Amy D. Hogue, Judges. Reversed with directions. Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern, Andrew Sokolowski, Tagore Subramanian and Debra J. Tauger for Plaintiff and Appellant. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Jesse A. Cripps and Elizabeth A. Dooley for Defendant and Respondent.
Almost four years after overruling a demurrer to appellant Roxana Rojas's only viable cause of action, the trial court reversed course, sua sponte reconsidered its earlier order, sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissed Rojas's complaint. The trial court determined Rojas's first amended complaint did not relate-back to her original complaint and, therefore, Rojas's claim was time-barred. Rojas appeals the trial court's order dismissing her complaint with prejudice.
We conclude the trial court erred when it determined the relation-back doctrine did not apply here. Based on our independent review of the original complaint, we conclude application of the relation-back doctrine is proper here and saves Rojas's one cause of action against respondent Glenair, Inc. (Glenair). Consequently, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
1. Complaint
On April 11, 2013, Maria Perez filed a putative class action complaint against Glenair (complaint) alleging a variety of wage and hour causes of action. The complaint is a "form" type complaint that plaintiff's counsel has used in other wage and hour actions. The complaint did not allege whether Perez was employed by Glenair at the time she filed the complaint. However, the complaint alleged Perez and all potential class members were either at the time of filing or within the preceding four years employed by Glenair. The complaint also specified the alleged injuries Perez and the putative class members suffered as well as the requested relief.
The complaint alleged the following ten causes of action: (i) failure to provide required meal periods, (ii) failure to provide required rest periods, (iii) failure to pay overtime wages, (iv) failure to pay minimum wage, (v) failure to pay all wages due to discharged and quitting employees, (vi) failure to maintain required records, (vii) failure to furnish accurate itemized statements, (viii) failure to indemnify employees for necessary expenditures incurred in discharge of duties, (ix) unfair and unlawful business practices, and (x) penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).
For each cause of action, the complaint specified the Labor Code sections and Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders (wage orders) or Business and Professions Code section Glenair allegedly violated. Each cause of action included examples or other specifics as to how Glenair as the defendant allegedly violated the applicable code sections and wage orders. Rather than recite verbatim all of the causes of action here, we highlight a few examples of the complaint's factual allegations.
The first cause of action for failure to provide required meal periods alleged Glenair "required, permitted or otherwise suffered [Perez] and CLASS MEMBERS to take less than the 30-minute meal period, or to work through them, and have failed to otherwise provide the required meal periods to [Perez] and CLASS MEMBERS" and Glenair failed "to compensate [Perez] and CLASS MEMBERS who were not provided with a meal period . . . one additional hour of compensation at each employee's regular rate of pay for each workday that a meal period was not provided."
The third cause of action for failure to pay overtime wages alleged Glenair failed to pay overtime wages "by, among other things: failing to pay overtime at one and one-half (1½) or double the regular rate of pay as provided by [the applicable code sections and wage orders]; requiring, permitting or suffering [Perez] and CLASS MEMBERS to work off the clock; requiring, permitting or suffering [Perez] and CLASS MEMBERS to work through meal and rest breaks; illegally and inaccurately recording time in which [Perez] and CLASS MEMBERS worked; failing to properly maintain [Perez's] and CLASS MEMBERS' records; failing to provide accurate itemized wage statements to [Perez] for each pay period; and other methods to be discovered."
The fourth cause of action for failure to pay minimum wages alleged similar examples of Glenair's alleged wrongdoing as those alleged in the third cause of action.
The ninth cause of action for unfair and unlawful business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (section 17200) incorporated all of the preceding allegations and further alleged Glenair "repeatedly over a significant period of time, and in a systematic manner, to the detriment of [Perez] and CLASS MEMBERS" violated the specified Labor Code sections and wage orders thus constituting an unfair and unlawful business practice under section 17200. The remaining causes of action similarly included examples (some with more detail than others) as to how Glenair allegedly violated the code sections and wage orders.
2. First Amended Complaint and the Court's August 29, 2014 Order
As it turned out, Perez had filed for bankruptcy before filing the complaint. Consequently, she lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The trial court granted leave to amend the complaint and, on February 14, 2014, plaintiffs' counsel filed a first amended complaint naming Rojas as plaintiff (first amended complaint). The parties agree that other than substituting in Rojas as the plaintiff, the first amended complaint was the same as the complaint.
Glenair filed a demurrer, arguing the first amended complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. In particular, Glenair explained Rojas had not worked at Glenair during the four years preceding the filing of the first amended complaint and, therefore, all her causes of action were time-barred. In opposition, Rojas argued among other things the relation-back doctrine applied such that the first amended complaint was deemed to have been filed as of the date the complaint was filed. Using the complaint's filing date, Rojas argued her causes of action were timely.
On August 29, 2014, the trial court ruled on Glenair's demurrer (August 29 order). The court held the relation-back doctrine applied, stating the first amended complaint "rests on the same general set of facts, involves the same injury, and refers to the same instrumentality of injury as the original complaint. The substitution of Rojas for Perez as the named Plaintiff does not enlarge the time period covered by the original complaint or Glenair's potential liability. The relation-back doctrine is thus applicable."
At the time of the hearing, Judge Strobel was substituting for the assigned judge, Judge Wiley, who was sitting on assignment to the Court of Appeal.
However, as the trial court noted, that did not end the inquiry. The court concluded further that even with application of the relation-back doctrine, most of Rojas's causes of action were time-barred because her employment with Glenair ended more than three years before the complaint was filed. A three-year statute of limitations applied to the first through eighth causes of action and a one-year statute of limitations applied to the tenth cause of action, thus barring those claims as to Rojas. However, a four-year statute of limitations applied to the ninth cause of action for unfair and unlawful business practices under section 17200. Therefore, the ninth cause of action was timely.
The trial court overruled the demurrer as to the ninth cause of action, sustained the demurrer as to the first through eighth and the tenth causes of action, and granted Rojas leave to amend to add additional named plaintiffs who had worked at Glenair during the relevant time periods.
3. Second Amended Complaint
Shortly after the trial court's August 29 order, Rojas filed a second amended complaint adding as plaintiffs Andrew Castillo and David Castillo, both of whom had worked at Glenair during the relevant time periods. In addition to adding the Castillos as plaintiffs, the second amended complaint deleted three earlier causes of action (failure to maintain required records, failure to furnished accurate itemized statements, and PAGA penalties). Otherwise, the second amended complaint was the same as the first amended complaint. It did not clarify that Rojas was a party only to the section 17200 cause of action.
The Castillos are not parties to this appeal. We addressed their earlier appeal stemming from this same underlying action in Castillo v. Glenair, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 262 (Castillo), in which the Castillos challenged the trial court's order granting summary judgment as to their wage and hour causes of action. Summary judgment was based on the settlement and release of claims brought in a separate class action (the Gomez action) against the temporary staffing company (GCA) that had placed the Castillos to work at Glenair. (Castillo, at pp. 266-267.) The Castillos were Gomez class members. Our opinion explained the Castillos' claims against Glenair "involve[d] the same wage and hour claims, for the same work done, covering the same time period as the claims asserted in Gomez. Thus because Glenair is in privity with GCA (a defendant in Gomez) and is an agent of GCA, the Gomez settlement bars the Castillos' claims against Glenair as a matter of law." (Id. at p. 267.) Rojas was not a party to the Castillos' appeal. (Id. at p. 269, fn. 1.)
4. Third Amended Complaint
Following the filing of the second amended complaint, the parties stipulated, and the trial court granted leave, to allow plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint. The third amended complaint was filed on January 7, 2015, and clarified Rojas was a party only to the section 17200 cause of action. Otherwise and for present purposes the third amended complaint was effectively the same as the second amended complaint.
Glenair filed a motion to strike portions of the third amended complaint. In part, Glenair sought to strike Rojas from the third amended complaint entirely, claiming the relation-back doctrine did not apply and did not save the one cause of action to which Rojas was still a party (i.e., the section 17200 claim). On March 25, 2015, the trial court (Judge Wiley) rejected Glenair's argument, noting the court had already considered and rejected the relation-back argument in its August 29 order. The court stated, "We are done with that issue at the pleading stage. If the Court's reasoning on August 29, 2014 erred, the remedy was appellate recourse."
Glenair filed its answer on April 2, 2015.
5. Glenair's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and the Trial Court's Sua Sponte Motion to Reconsider its August 29 Order
In November 2017, Glenair filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing new case law supported the position that the relation-back doctrine did not apply and Rojas's one cause of action was time-barred. In particular, Glenair claimed the Third District's decision in Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 590, 599 (Scholes) compelled the conclusion that the first amended complaint could not relate back to the complaint. Following the reasoning of Scholes, supra, at pages 598-599, Glenair claimed the complaint was "devoid of any factual allegations specific to Glenair or its wage and hour practices" and the " 'totality of these material deficiencies leave nothing to which the first amended complaint can be compared to or to which they can relate back.' " Glenair sought judicial notice of 33 complaints Rojas's counsel had filed in other lawsuits that alleged identical allegations, only changing the plaintiff's and defendant's names. If, as Glenair argued, the relation-back doctrine did not apply, Rojas's one remaining claim was time-barred. Glenair urged the trial court to reconsider its earlier August 29 order and instead find Rojas's one cause of action barred.
In February 2018, the trial court denied Glenair's motion, finding Scholes was not new law. Rather, the court determined Scholes "reiterated" and "applied existing law" set forth in Davaloo v. State Farm Insurance Co. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 409, 414 (Davaloo).
Nonetheless, on its own motion, the trial court announced it would "reconsider its relation-back ruling in light of the Davaloo rule." The court was concerned its earlier ruling on the relation-back doctrine "might have been erroneous." The court stated the complaint "contained no factual allegations specific to Glenair. Instead, it is rote boilerplate." The court took judicial notice of the 33 complaints submitted by Glenair, concluding the "complaint was a generic form" and "[t]his routine pleading practice amounts to saying, 'We are suing you now. We (and you) will find out why later.' "
6. Order Reversing the August 29 Order
On May 15, 2018, after receiving briefing from the parties and hearing argument from counsel, the trial court concluded the relation-back doctrine did not apply. The court, therefore, vacated and reversed its August 29 order. The court found the complaint contained "no factual allegations specific to Glenair. Rather the author cast it in entirely generic terms, applicable to any employee working for any employer." The court stated the complaint did not "elaborate on the nature of [plaintiffs'] claims. Did Glenair prohibit employees from taking any meal breaks at all? Did Glenair fail to relieve its employees of all duties during meal breaks? Did Glenair provide meal breaks that were shorter than 30 minutes? Did Glenair fail to adopt an appropriate policy on meal breaks, or did Glenair pressure employees to work during meal breaks in spite of a lawful meal break policy? [The] complaint lacks all explanation." The trial court stated further, "The vacuity of [the] complaint makes it versatile. By saying nothing particular to a case, this language becomes a form document to use in every wage-and-hour case. Perez's attorneys could use, and have used, the same language against any defendant employer. . . . [¶] It is as though [the] complaint said, 'I am suing you because, on information and belief, you did wrong. To find out how, you must commence discovery.' " The court considered this case more akin to Davaloo and Scholes than to the case on which Rojas relied, Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 274 (Pointe San Diego). The court concluded the complaint's "generic allegations did not put Glenair on meaningful notice of the nature of [the] claims."
The trial court held because the "complaint is free of content," the first amended complaint "does not relate back to the date on which Perez filed her complaint." Without application of the relation-back doctrine, all of Rojas's causes of action were untimely. Thus, on its own motion to reconsider the August 29 order, the trial court sustained Glenair's demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend.
7. Order of Dismissal and Appeal
On October 28, 2019, the trial court entered its order dismissing the first amended complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
"On appeal from an order dismissing a complaint after the sustaining of a demurrer, we independently review the pleading to determine whether the facts alleged state a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citations.] We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, 'treat[ing] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded,' but do not 'assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.' " (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 414.) "In reviewing the complaint, we must assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded by the plaintiff and matters properly judicially noticed." (Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 274.) "We liberally construe the pleading with a view to substantial justice between the parties." (Davaloo, at p. 414.)
2. Relevant Legal Principles
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10 requires civil complaints to contain "[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language." (§ 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) "This fact-pleading requirement obligates the plaintiff to allege ultimate facts that 'as a whole apprise[] the adversary of the factual basis of the claim.' " (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 415.)
"The requirement that the complaint allege ultimate facts forming the basis for the plaintiff's cause of action is central to the relation-back doctrine and the determination whether an amended complaint should be deemed filed as of the date of the original pleading. [Citation.] An amended complaint relates back to a timely filed original complaint, and thus avoids the bar of the statute of limitations, only if it rests on the same general set of facts and refers to the same 'offending instrumentalities,' accident and injuries as the original complaint." (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 415.) "An amended complaint relates back to an earlier complaint if it is based on the same general set of facts, even if the plaintiff alleges a different legal theory or new cause of action." (Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.) "However, the doctrine will not apply if the 'plaintiff seeks by amendment to recover upon a set of facts entirely unrelated to those pleaded in the original complaint.' " (Ibid.)
Similarly, "[j]ust as a plaintiff who changes the essential facts upon which recovery is sought is not entitled to the benefits of the relation-back doctrine, so too a plaintiff who files a complaint containing no operative facts at all cannot subsequently amend the pleading to allege facts and a theory of recovery for the first time and claim the amended complaint should be deemed filed as of the date of the original, wholly defective complaint: Going from nothing to something is as much at odds with the rationale for allowing an amended pleading to relate back to the filing of the original documents as changing from one set of facts to a different set." (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 416.) Courts have eschewed a bright-line rule as to when an original complaint is so deficient that the relation-back doctrine cannot apply. (Scholes, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 599, aff'd. on other grounds in Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1094; Davaloo, at pp. 417-418.) Instead, courts considered the "totality of the deficiencies in the original complaint, rather than any single defect. The totality of these material deficiencies leave nothing to which the . . . amended complaint can be compared to or to which they can relate back." (Scholes, at p. 599; Davaloo, at p. 417.)
Thus, the relation-back doctrine "requires courts to compare the factual allegations in the original and amended complaints." (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 416.) "In determining whether the amended complaint alleges facts that are sufficiently similar to those alleged in the original complaint, the critical inquiry is whether the defendant had adequate notice of the claim based on the original pleading. 'The policy behind statutes of limitations is to put defendants on notice of the need to defend against a claim in time to prepare a fair defense on the merits. This policy is satisfied when recovery under an amended complaint is sought on the same basic set of facts as the original pleading.' " (Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.) Put another way, " '[t]he criterion of relation-back is whether the original complaint gave the defendant enough notice of the nature and scope of the plaintiff's claim that he shouldn't have been surprised by the amplification of the allegations of the original complaint in the amended one.' " (Id. at p. 279.)
Finally, when considering a relation-back claim, "courts should consider the 'strong public policy in this state that cases should be decided on their merits.' " (Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)
3. The relation-back doctrine applies here.
Rojas argues the complaint adequately described the claims alleged as well as the requested relief, thus putting "Glenair on notice of the essential nature of Perez's claims." Rojas further argues that, rather than Davaloo and Scholes, this case is most akin to Pointe San Diego, where the relation-back doctrine applied to save an amended complaint. Glenair counters the complaint did not give adequate notice of the claims alleged. Rather, according to Glenair, the complaint was a " 'generic form' complaint," the allegations of which did not pertain specifically to Glenair but were " 'rote boilerplate.' " As such, Glenair argues, there was nothing to which the first amended complaint could relate back, and Rojas's claim is time-barred. Glenair argues this case is like Davaloo, where the relation back doctrine did not apply.
We agree with Rojas. Applying our independent review, we conclude the complaint satisfies the relation-back standard articulated by Davaloo and followed by both Scholes and Pointe San Diego. The complaint here is unlike the clearly deficient complaints at issue in Davaloo and Scholes and more akin to the complaint at issue in Pointe San Diego, where the relation-back doctrine was held to apply.
Despite Glenair's efforts to convince us otherwise, the complaint here simply is not comparable to the complaints at issue in Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th 409. Davaloo involved two complaints simultaneously filed against the plaintiffs' insurance company seeking relief for alleged property damage caused by the Northridge earthquake. (Id. at p. 411.) Neither of the original complaints in Davaloo included ultimate facts, such as the address of the property at issue (other than stating it was in California), the policy number or terms of the relevant insurance policy, whether a claim had been made on the policy, or whether the defendant insurance company had taken any action on a claim if one had been made. (Id. at pp. 412, 417.) In addition, the allegations of the original complaints were contradictory. For example, on the one hand, each complaint alleged the defendant insurance company had denied the existence of an insurance policy but, on the other hand, also alleged the insurance company withheld money it agreed was owed and altered reports so as to pay less damages. (Id. at p. 418.) Finally, the complaints stated the plaintiffs' names in the caption only and in the body of each complaint actually alleged uncertainty as to the identity of the plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 412, fn. 6.)
The defendant insurance company demurred, arguing the complaints were uncertain and failed to state a cause of action. (Id. at p. 412.) Before the trial court ruled on the demurrers, the Davaloo plaintiffs filed first amended complaints, which added property addresses and insurance policy numbers. (Id. at p. 413.) The insurance company again demurred, claiming the amended complaints did not relate-back to the original complaints and, therefore, were time-barred. (Ibid.) The trial court agreed, sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, and dismissed the actions. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed. (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 421.) The Davaloo court described the original complaints as "the functional equivalent of no complaint at all," "alleg[ing] nothing more than the Northridge earthquake caused harm to a resident or residents of Los Angeles County." (Id. at p. 417.) The court noted the "pleading inconsistencies in the original complaints highlight the absence of sufficient factual allegations to apprise [the defendant] of the nature of the disputes at issue." (Id. at p. 418.) Considering the "totality of the deficiencies in the original complaints, rather than any single defect alone," the court explained "the complete lack of factual allegations in the original complaints [made it] impossible to conclude the first amended complaints are based on the same general set of facts as the original complaints." (Id. at p. 417.) "Although there can be no bright-line rule as to when a complaint is so deficient to preclude relation back . . . , the original complaints here—with all their deficiencies—are plainly insufficient." (Id. at pp. 417-418.)
The original complaint in Scholes, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th 590, was similarly devoid of factual allegations and plainly insufficient. In Scholes, the plaintiff Vincent Scholes sued his neighbor and his neighbor's insurance company after a fire at the neighbor's property caused damage to Scholes's property. (Id. at p. 592.) Scholes's original complaint alleged "a cause of action for '[d]ispute compensation on insurance claim' " and sought relief for " 'compensation for property loss.' " (Id. at p. 598.) The original complaint alleged " '[d]efendants have accepted liability, dispute amount of damages from fire.' Nothing else [was] listed in or attached to the original complaint." (Ibid.) Over time, Scholes filed a first, second, and third amended complaint. In his second amended complaint, Scholes alleged for the first time a trespass cause of action, which he expanded into three trespass-related causes of action in his third amended complaint. (Id. at pp. 594, 597.) Scholes's trespass causes of action were untimely unless the second amended complaint related back to the original complaint. (Id. at p. 597.) The trial court held it did not and dismissed the action. (Id. at p. 595.)
Earlier this year, our Supreme Court affirmed the Scholes decision but did not address the relation-back issue. (Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1094.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed. (Scholes, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 603.) The court explained Scholes's original complaint was "devoid of factual allegations" and failed to allege ultimate facts. (Id. at p. 598.) The court stated, "The original complaint does not identify the property at issue or specify the damages suffered; it merely lists 'loss of use of property' and 'property damage.' The complaint fails to specify the date, origin, or scope of the fire. The original complaint does not set forth the relationship between the parties or any duties owed to Scholes by [his neighbor]. Nor does the original complaint specify any causes of action except for checking the box for 'Property Damage.' Nothing in the original complaint sets forth any factual basis for Scholes's subsequent claims for negligent trespass, intentional trespass, or unnatural activity trespass. It is impossible even to infer the nature of any dispute between Scholes and [his neighbor]." (Ibid.) Following Davaloo, the Scholes court relied "on the totality of the deficiencies in the original complaint, rather than any single defect" (id. at p. 599) and held Scholes's original complaint failed to put the defendant "on notice of any cause of action against it" (id. at p. 601). The court concluded, "This void prevents the amended complaint from relating back to the original complaint." (Ibid.)
We do not disagree with the legal principles of the relation-back doctrine as stated and applied in Davaloo or Scholes. However, we cannot agree the case before us is similar to either Davaloo or Scholes. Here, there is no dispute the first amended complaint "rests on the same general set of facts and refers to the same 'offending instrumentalities,' accident and injuries as the original complaint." (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 415.) Indeed, other than Rojas replacing Perez as the named plaintiff, the first amended complaint is, in Glenair's words, "identical to" the complaint. That fact alone distinguishes this case from both Davaloo and Scholes.
As the parties agree, the relevant inquiry then is whether the complaint included sufficient "ultimate facts" (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 415) such that Glenair "had adequate notice of the claim[s] based on the original pleading" (Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 277). We conclude the complaint adequately notified Glenair of the claims alleged against it. Contrary to the complaints in both Davaloo and Scholes—which were utterly devoid of relevant factual allegations—the complaint here included the required ultimate facts. For example, the complaint alleged Glenair had violated a variety of clearly specified statutes and wage orders, gave examples of how Glenair allegedly violated those laws and wage orders, defined the parameters of the putative class, alleged Perez had worked for Glenair within the relevant time frame, and articulated the alleged injuries suffered and the damages sought. Given the specificity of the allegations, we cannot agree with the trial court's assessment of the complaint as in effect alleging only, " 'I am suing you because, on information and belief, you did wrong. To find out how, you must commence discovery.' " It is not reasonable to believe Glenair was in the dark as to what was being alleged.
Glenair's current position seems at odds with its position in Castillo, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th 262. While part of our focus in the Castillo appeal was whether Glenair was an agent of the staffing agency (GCA) that settled the Gomez action, we would not have reached the agency issue had we not relied on Glenair's position that the claims in the settled Gomez action were the same as those raised by the pleadings here. Now in the instant appeal, Glenair argues the complaint failed to give adequate notice of the allegations against Glenair. It seems inconsistent for Glenair to argue now that the complaint was so vague as to be meaningless, but in Castillo argue those same "meaningless" claims (albeit in the third amended complaint) were the same as the claims raised and settled in the Gomez action such that the Castillos were barred from asserting them in this case.
According to Glenair, it is significant the complaint included boilerplate language and was used repeatedly as a form complaint by plaintiff's counsel. Echoing the trial court's assessment below, Glenair claims the " 'generic form' complaint 'contained no factual allegations specific to Glenair.' " We disagree. First, the allegations are specific to Glenair. As explained above, the complaint repeatedly alleged "DEFENDANTS" violated the specified laws and wage orders and gave concrete examples how those alleged violations occurred. Glenair is a defendant. Thus, each allegation referencing "DEFENDANTS" is specific to Glenair. Second, we are unaware of a rule that the relation-back doctrine does not or cannot apply when a form complaint is involved. The relevant inquiry is not how often a complaint is or has been used, but rather whether the complaint—form or otherwise—alleges ultimate facts adequate to put the defendant on notice of the claims made against it. (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 415; Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.) Glenair seems to equate "form" complaints with "generic" and uninformative complaints. But, as this case illustrates, the two are not always the same. Thus, although the complaint suffered deficiencies (not the least of which was Perez having been in bankruptcy), employed boilerplate language in parts, and was a form complaint used repeatedly by counsel, it is simply not possible to describe the complaint as "the functional equivalent of no complaint at all." (Davaloo, at p. 417.)
Finally, we agree with Rojas that this case presents a stronger argument for application of the relation-back doctrine than that presented in Pointe San Diego, where the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and found the relation-back doctrine applied to save an otherwise untimely amended complaint. (195 Cal.App.4th at p. 268.) The original complaint there was a form complaint on which plaintiffs had checked the box next to " 'General Negligence' " and claimed " 'within the last year' " the named defendants, " 'as Plaintiffs' attorneys, failed to use due care in the handling of Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. et al. v. Palomba Weingarten, et al. litigation.' " (Id. at pp. 271, 277.) No further factual detail was given regarding the alleged legal malpractice. In subsequent amended complaints, however, the plaintiffs added "substantially more detail with respect to the nature of the malpractice claims." (Id. at p. 271.) Relying on Davaloo, the trial court sustained the defendant law firm's demurrer without leave to amend, finding the relation-back doctrine inapplicable "because the original complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations." (Id. at p. 273.)
The Court of Appeal reversed. Although the Pointe San Diego court agreed with the reasoning of Davaloo, it found the cases distinguishable. (Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 280-281.) Despite the " 'bare bones' nature" of the Pointe San Diego original complaint, the court concluded the "complaint placed [the law firm] on notice of the identity of the plaintiffs and the nature of their claims. The complaint referred to the specific litigation in which [the law firm] had represented plaintiffs and alleged that [the law firm] had failed to use due care in the handling of that litigation. Although the complaint did not detail the specifics of the claim, [the law firm] had superior knowledge of its conduct and the manner in which it may have breached the standard of care. [The law firm] had sufficient information to be apprised of the factual basis for the claim-its acts and omissions during its representation of plaintiffs in the [subject] litigation—and to take steps to preserve the necessary relevant information for defense of this claim and timely notify its malpractice carrier of the claim." (Id. at p. 281.)
The same if not more can be said about the sufficiency of the complaint here, which as discussed above included significantly more factual allegations than the original complaint in Pointe San Diego. Similarly, Glenair like the law firm defendant in Pointe San Diego has "superior knowledge of its conduct and the manner in which it may have [violated the specified laws and wage orders]." (Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.)
Because we conclude the relation-back doctrine applies here, we need not and do not address the parties' arguments regarding leave to amend.
DISPOSITION
The October 28, 2019 order is reversed. The trial court is directed to reinstate the cause of action for unlawful business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 and to conduct further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein. Appellant Roxana Rojas is entitled to her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(3), (5).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J. We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
HOFFSTADT, J.