Opinion
5:23-CV-303-TES-CHW
11-28-2023
CAESAR ROGERS, Plaintiff, v. SGT BRADDEUS WELLMAKER, et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Charles H. Weigle United States Magistrate Judge
In accordance with the Court's previous orders and instructions, pro se Plaintiff Caesar Rogers, an inmate in the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison in Jackson, Georgia, has paid the required initial partial filing fee for this action. Plaintiff's Complaint is now ripe for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e). Upon screening, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
I. Standard of Review
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) obligates the district courts to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Screening is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when the plaintiff is proceeding IFP. Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. When conducting preliminary screening, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are “held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (first alteration in original). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
II. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff's claims center on his contention that “[t]he Special Management Unit at Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison has persistently denied [him] medical care” as well as “the ability to use the grievance system to complain about this ongoing problem.” Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. More specifically, Plaintiff contends he was sprayed with OC spray on January 15, 2022, which caused “burns and irritation to [Plaintiff's] eyes, sinuses, and throat.” Id. Plaintiff requested medical attention, but Officer Wellmaker and Unit Manager George Ball refused this request. Id. When Plaintiff submitted a grievance about this issue, he received a response which falsely claimed he had been provided medical care for his exposure to the spray. Id.
Plaintiff also contends that he was denied medical attention after he was tasered on March 22, 2022. Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff contends CERT Officer Green tasered the back of Plaintiff's arm while it was protruding through Plaintiff's tray slot. Id. Plaintiff states he “required medical attention from the shock, which had burned [his] arm.” Id. Plaintiff alleges he sought treatment from CERT Officer Green, prison captain Kevin Greene, and Officer Wellmaker, but he did not receive any medical attention for approximately five days. Id.
On April 9, 2022, Plaintiff was again sprayed with OC spray and requested medical attention from unspecified individuals for “burns and irritation to [his] skin, eyes, sinuses, and throat.” Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff was not treated for 48 hours. Id. Plaintiff further contends that he received “inaccurate and delayed responses, or no response at all” to grievances filed about each of these incidents. Id. Plaintiff thus contends that Defendants' action and inaction with respect to his medical treatment violates his constitutional rights. As a result of these alleged violations, he requests monetary compensation. Id. at 11.
III. Plaintiff's Claims
A. Medical Treatment Claims
Plaintiff Complaint focuses primarily on his contentions that Defendants “persistently denied [him] medical care.” Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. Jail officials who are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs can violate the Eighth Amendment. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). “To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.” Id. A plaintiff must first “set forth evidence of an objectively serious medical need.” Id. For purposes of this analysis, a “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A serious medical need can also arise if “a delay in treating the need worsens the condition.” Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009). “In either case, ‘the medical need must be one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.'” Id. (quoting Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243).
The plaintiff must also “prove that the prison official acted with an attitude of ‘deliberate indifference' to that serious medical need.” Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243. To do this, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that (1) prison officials knew facts that would allow them “to draw the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed;” (2) prison officials drew that inference; (3) prison officials “nonetheless disregarded the risk of serious harm;” and (4) prison officials “conduct amounted to more than negligence of a specified degree.” Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th 1267, 1284 (11th Cir. 2023).
1. Failure to Provide Medical Treatment after OC Spray Incidents
Plaintiff first alleges that Defendant Wellmaker refused to provide him with medical care after he was sprayed with OC spray on January 15, 2022. Compl. 9, ECF No. 1.While the Eleventh Circuit has “said that exposure to pepper spray without adequate decontamination can constitute a serious medical need,” Barcelona v. Rodriguez, 847 Fed.Appx. 739, 742 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam), not every exposure automatically rises to this level. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that it is “the effects of prolonged exposure to pepper spray with inadequate decontamination and poor ventilation, not the immediate effects of the pepper spray,” that typically creates the serious medical need. Danley, 540 F.3d at 1311; see also McNeeley v. Wilson, 649 Fed.Appx. 717, 721-22 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Thus, exposure might amount to a serious medical need if the delay in decontamination worsens the prisoner's condition. See, e.g., Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2008) (prisoner sufficiently alleged exposure to pepper spray was serious medical need because he “suffered . . . lingering effects” from use of spray, “almost blacked out more than twelve hours after he had been sprayed as a cumulative result of his breathing problems during all of that time,” and suffered “chemical conjunctivitis and bronchospasms” due to delay in treatment). The exposure might also amount to a serious medical need if the prisoner's condition is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the need for medical attention. See id. (exposure to pepper spray constituted serious medical need where it caused symptoms including “difficulty breathing,” eyes that were “so swollen [the plaintiff] could hardly see,” breathing problems for more than 12 hours, and symptoms were so obvious that another inmate recognized them and attempted to get help for the plaintiff).
Plaintiff does not name Unit Manager Ball as a Defendant in this action. See Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.
In this case, Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered from any significant symptoms caused by prolonged exposure to pepper spray. At most, Plaintiff states that he experienced “burns and irritation.” Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. This conclusory statement is not enough to show that Plaintiff suffered from a serious medical need or that Defendants were aware of a significant risk to Plaintiff's health and disregarded it. See Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 596 Fed.Appx. 757, 767 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff's “deliberate indifference claim based on the decontamination delay he alleges cannot survive [defendant's] motion for summary judgment” where it “contain[ed] no allegation that the pepper spray or the delay in decontamination caused him injury, and no evidence in the record otherwise indicates that he suffered any harm as a result of the pepper spray”). Plaintiff has thus failed to state an actionable Eighth Amendment claim, and any such claims related to the January 15, 2022 OC spray incident should be dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff's allegations that he was denied treatment after he was sprayed with OC spray on April 9, 2022, also fail to state an actionable claim. In addition to failing to describe his injuries with facts sufficient to show that he suffered from a serious medical need, he has also failed to allege which named Defendants failed to provide him with medical care. As such, these claims should also be dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (dismissal of defendants appropriate where plaintiff failed to allege facts associating defendants with a particular constitutional violation).
2. Failure to Provide Medical Treatment after Taser Incident
Plaintiff's allegations that he was denied medical treatment after being tasered on March 22, 2022 also fail to state an actionable constitutional claim. Plaintiff simply states that the taser “burned [his] arm.” Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. “Courts sitting within this circuit have determined as a matter of law that minor burns do not constitute objectively serious medical needs for purposes of deliberate indifference.” Roebling v. City of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 7:14-CV-00151-SGC, 2015 WL 7433147, at *5-6 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 30, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 7:14-CV-00151-RDP, 2015 WL 7424120 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2015) (collecting cases); see also Hawyard v. Kile, Civil Action No. CV607-068, 2009 WL 2045925, at *8 (S.D. Ga. June 12, 2009) (finding that taser burn that “was not large or serious in nature” did not amount to an objectively serious medical need for purposes of deliberate indifference claim). Plaintiff's conclusory statement that his arm was burned, standing alone, does not show that Plaintiff had a serious medical need. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state an actionable claim concerning his taser burn, any such claims should be dismissed without prejudice.
B. Grievance Claims
Plaintiff also suggests that Defendants “denied [him] the ability to use the grievance system to complain about” his medical treatment. Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. To the extent this allegation can be construed as attempting to raise a due process claim against Defendants, it also fails to state an actionable claim. Plaintiff does not have any due process right to access a prison's grievance procedure or have those procedures properly followed. See, e.g., Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1177 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of prison's claims that he was denied use of the prison's grievance procedure); Dunn v. Martin, 178 Fed.Appx. 876, 878 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (prison officials' failure to respond to prisoner's letters and grievances and to follow prison regulations regarding grievance responses did not implicate due process concerns). Any such claims Plaintiff is attempting to raise in this action should therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Tilman E. Self, III, United States District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.