Opinion
02-CV-6041 (JG)
March 7, 2003
JOSEPH ROESCH, Sing Sing Correctional Facility, Ossining, New York, Petitioner Pro Se
WILLIAM L. MURPHY District Attorney, Staten Island, By: Anne Crick Assistant District Attorney, Attorneys for Respondents
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Joseph Roesch petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his conviction upon his pleas of guilty to certain sex offenses in the Supreme Court for Richmond County. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
BACKGROUND
Over a two-year period ending in 1998, Roesch recruited five boys, ranging in age from 10 to 16, to engage in deviant sexual activity. Under the guise of hiring them to become electrician's apprentices, he engaged in a "hiring process" that included inserting his fingers, his penis, and various objects into their rectums or mouths; requiring them to masturbate or to masturbate him; directing that they perform sex acts with an artificial penis, a vibrating vagina or a life size blow-up doll; taking nude, lascivious photographs of them; and requiring them to watch pornographic videos.
On July 3, 1998, a search warrant was executed at Roesch's apartment, located across the street from an elementary school in Great Kills, Staten Island. Numerous photographs depicting young males performing sexual acts were recovered, as well as, inter alia, job applications, pornographic videos, a vibrating vagina, assorted dildos, and a pair of handcuffs.
An investigation revealed that Roesech typically made contact with his victims through flyers he stapled on poles in South Beach, Staten Island. The flyers advertised an electrician's helper training program and contained his phone number. At the "interview," Roesch would inquire into the sexual experiences and thoughts of the children who came to him seeking work, and he eventually subjected many of them to the abuse described above.
Roesch was indicted for 100 counts of sodomy, sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child. Upon request of his counsel, he was examined in January and February 1999 by two psychiatrists to determine his fitness to stand trial. On February 8, 1999, the court adopted the psychiatrists' findings that Roesch understood the proceedings against him, was aware of the charges against him and of the plea offer that had been made, and was capable of participating in his defense.
On March 4, 1999, petitioner agreed to plead to five counts in exchange for a determinate sentence of 15 years. When Roesch appeared for sentencing on March 31, 1999, he informed the court that he wanted to withdraw his plea. He made a motion seeking that relief on April 20. 1999, asserting that his pleas of guilty were not knowing and voluntary because he was under the influence of Thorazine, Prozac and marijuana at the time he entered them. On May 7, 1999, the judge issued a written decision denying the motion on the ground that it had no factual or legal basis. Specifically, based on Roesch's demeanor and allocution, the court found that Roesch was "vigilant, alert and responsive" at the time of the plea. Respondent's Exhibits at 25. The court then adjudicated Roesch to be a second violent felony offender and sentenced him to the 15-year term.
Roesch appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, Second Department, claiming that (1) the guilty plea should be vacated because he had filed a motion claiming he was under the influence of a combination of drugs at the time of the plea and the court had failed to inquire whether he was on medication or drugs; and (2) the sentence was excessive under New York Law.
On December 17, 2001, the Appellate Division affirmed. It found that the trial court had properly denied, without a hearing, Roesch's motion to withdraw his plea. It found that the motion was based on the unsubstantiated claim that Roesch was incapacitated by drugs at the time of the plea, a claim that was contradicted by the outcome of the psychiatric examination conducted shortly before the plea and by the transcript of the plea itself, which demonstrated his lucid, rational and unequivocal responses. It further held that the sentence was not excessive. See People v. Roesch, 734 N.Y.S.2d 240 (2d Dep't 2001).
Roesch sought leave to appeal on both issues to the New York State Court of Appeals, which denied that application on April 2, 2002. See People v. Roesch, 98 N.Y.2d 640 (2002). Roesch filed the instant petition on November 12, 2002. He asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was under the influence of a combination of drugs at the time. He also asserts that, in this medical state, he gave into pressure exerted by the judge and defense counsel to take the plea.
DISCUSSION
A. The Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") has narrowed the scope of federal habeas review of state convictions where the state court has adjudicated a petitioner's federal claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). Under the AEDPA standard, which applies to habeas petitions filed after AEDPA's enactment in 1996, the reviewing court may grant habeas relief only if the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(l). The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "clearly established Federal law" to mean "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); see also Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law if a state court "identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [a] prisoner's case."Id. Under the latter standard, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Gilchrist, 260 F.3d at 93 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 411). Interpreting Williams the Second Circuit has added that although "[s]ome increment of incorrectness beyond error is required . . . the increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence." Id. (citing Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000)).
This standard of review applies whenever the state court has adjudicated the federal claim on the merits, regardless of whether it has alluded to federal law in its decision. As the Second Circuit stated inSellan v. Kuhlman:
[f]or the purposes of AEDPA deference, a state court "adjudicate[s]" a state prisoner's federal claim on the merits when it (I) disposes of the claim "on the merits, and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment. When a state court does so, a federal habeas court must defer in the manner prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) to the state court's decision on the federal claim — even if the state court does not explicitly refer to either the federal claim or to relevant federal case law.261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001).
In addition, a state court's determination of a factual issue is presumed to be correct, and is unreasonable only where the petitioner meets the burden of "rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1).
B. The Application of the Standard to Roesch's Petition
Roesch claims that he was under the influence of psychiatric medication and marijuana when he pled guilty. He was feeling "strange and paranoid," "scared and very confused," and thus his plea was neither knowing or voluntary. Pet. at 5, attachment to 5. He also asserts that he has no recollection of pleading guilty.
A guilty plea "is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970. In p leading guilty, a defendant "admits all of the elements of a formal criminal charge." Hayle v. United States,` 815 F.2d 879, 881 (2d Cir. 1987). Thus, a plea of guilty "differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive." Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
Before Roesch pled guilty on Match 4, 1999, he was adequately advised of the rights he would waive by doing so. Then, after being informed of the sentence he would receive, he was questioned in detail about several of his criminal acts; he admitted them all and pled guilty to the corresponding charges. Finally, the court and Roesch had the following colloquy:
THE COURT: With respect to each count of this indictment to which you have pleaded guilty, are you pleading guilty voluntarily?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: With respect to each count, are you pleading guilty of your own free will?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the job your attorney, Mr. Gallucci, has done for you in this case?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions at all that you want to ask the Court about the rights that you're giving up, the sentences you will receive, the sentence you could have received, any questions whatsoever; anything that you're not clear on?
THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: You're perfectly clear on everything that has occurred today, the rights that you're giving up, the sentence that you're going to get, the sentences you could have gotten?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Once again are you 100 percent fully satisfied with the work your lawyer, Mr. Gallucci, has done for you in the case?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Defendant's guilty pleas are accepted by the Court.
Respondent's Exhibits at 14-16.
Based on that colloquy, and on the physical observations it made during the proceeding, the state court found that Roesch's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. That factual finding is amply supported by the record. While it might have been preferable for the court to explicitly inquire as to whether Roesch had taken any medication or used any drugs prior to the plea, the failure to do so does not undermine the court's factual finding. Similarly, the belated claim that he was pressured into pleading guilty is flatly refuted by his solemn statements under oath that his pleas were voluntary.
CONCLUSION
In short, Roesch has failed entirely to rebut the factual finding that rejects his claims. Accordingly, his petition is denied. Because he has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability shall not issue.
So Ordered.