Opinion
CV126025889S.
11-07-2012
Jayla RODRIQUEZ PPA Jessina Santos v. Norris TATE et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SYBIL V. RICHARDS, Judge.
The plaintiff, Jayla Rodriguez, through her mother and next best friend, Jessina Santos, commenced this negligence action against the defendants, Norris Tate and Transportation General, Inc., which was doing business as Metro Taxi (" Metro Taxi"). The plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained when she was struck by an oncoming vehicle after exiting a taxi cab that was owned by Metro Taxi and was being driven by Tate. The defendants filed an apportionment complaint against the plaintiff's mother pursuant to General Statutes § 52-102b. The defendants claim that any alleged injuries that the plaintiff sustained were caused by the apportionment defendant's own negligence in that she: (1) did not keep a proper and reasonable look out before exiting from the cab; (2) was inattentive while exiting the cab; and (3) exited the cab from the driver's side, where there was vehicular traffic, as opposed to exiting by the side of the road. The apportionment plaintiffs also filed an amended answer and special defenses to the plaintiff's complaint. The second special defense mirrors the allegations made in the apportionment complaint.
The apportionment defendant filed a motion to strike the apportionment complaint on the ground that the doctrine of parental immunity bars the apportionment of liability onto the mother of a minor child. On the same day, the apportionment defendant also filed a motion to strike the apportionment plaintiffs' second special defense on the same ground. The apportionment defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of each motion, to which the apportionment plaintiffs filed memoranda of law in opposition. The apportionment defendant, in turn, filed memoranda of law in reply.
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). " It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ... Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252-53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010). The court must " construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 120, 971 A.2d 17 (2009). " A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. at 498.
In support of her motions, the apportionment defendant argues that no person who is immune from liability can be made an apportionment defendant. She claims that the doctrine of parental immunity applies in this case to preclude her from being joined as a third-party defendant for the purpose of apportionment of liability.
The apportionment plaintiffs respond with the following arguments. Pursuant to § 52-572c, the doctrine of parental immunity is abrogated when a child sustains personal injuries resulting from the parent's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The term " operate" encompasses the use of a motor vehicle by an individual for some purpose or object of the user, which, in turn, includes traveling in the motor vehicle even if that individual is not driving it. Thus, while the apportionment defendant may not have been driving the taxi cab involved in this case, she was certainly using, and thereby operating, the motor vehicle within the scope and intent of the statute and the precedent aimed at protecting children from being injured by negligent parents in the operation of a motor vehicle.
In reply, the apportionment defendant maintains that other courts interpret the phrase " operation of a motor vehicle" as the actual driving of the vehicle. The apportionment defendant further contends that injuries sustained that are unrelated to the movement of a vehicle, or the circumstances of the movement of a vehicle, do not arise in the course of the operation of a motor vehicle. According to the apportionment defendant, none of the allegations in the apportionment complaint claim that the plaintiff sustained injuries that were related to the movement of a vehicle, or the circumstances of the movement of a vehicle, and as such, did not arise in the course of the operation of the motor vehicle. The apportionment defendant thus concludes that the doctrine of parental immunity is not abrogated.
The doctrine of parental immunity " bars an unemancipated child from suing his or her parents for personal injuries ... Under this doctrine a parent is not liable civilly to his child for personal injury inflicted during [the child's] minority ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc., 249 Conn. 634, 638, 732 A.2d 767 (1999). " The primary focus of the parental immunity doctrine in Connecticut is the protection of the relationship between the parent and the child. The protection of that relationship enables the parent to raise the child effectively without undue interference from the state." Ascuitto v. Farricielli, 244 Conn. 692, 701, 711 A.2d 708 (1998). " Courts should not unnecessarily involve themselves in the day-to-day exercise of parental discretion regarding the upbringing and care of children. To do so would undermine parental authority in the very personal endeavor of child rearing and inject the machinery of the state into an area where its presence might be the occasion for family discord ... Even in those jurisdictions that have, in part, abrogated parental immunity ... the overwhelming majority of them have specifically retained the doctrine in the area of parental supervision, or have at least recognized that the doctrine may have continued validity where the negligent act involves the exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the care and control of a minor child." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 706.
As a general matter, the doctrine of parental immunity can be applied not only to direct actions brought by a child against a parent, but also to actions brought by a third party against the parent for the apportionment of liability pursuant to § 52-102b. Section 52-102b(c) provides in relevant part: " No person who is immune from liability shall be made an apportionment defendant nor shall such person's liability be considered for apportionment purposes pursuant to section 52-572h." See also Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc., supra, 249 Conn. at 643-45 (holding that because the doctrine of parental immunity precluded the minor plaintiff from recovering damages from his father, the defendants also could not assert a third-party claim against the father for the apportionment of liability). " [P]arental immunity applies unless an exception can be identified ... and ... acts of parental discretion generally are afforded special protection." (Citation omitted.) Ascuitto v. Farricielli, supra, 244 Conn. at 706. One exception to the doctrine of parental immunity is found in General Statutes § 52-572c, which provides in relevant part: " In all actions for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle ... resulting in personal injury, wrongful death or injury to property, the immunity between parent and child in such negligence action brought by a parent against his child or by or on behalf of a child against his parent is abrogated." The primary issue in this matter thus becomes whether this exception applies so as to immunize the apportionment defendant from liability under § 52-102b. In order to answer that question, an analysis of the meaning of the phrase " operation of a motor vehicle" is in order.
The courts have confronted claims that § 52-572c abrogated parental immunity. For instance, in Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972), the court examined the scope of the parental immunity doctrine in a negligence action brought by a minor plaintiff against her mother. The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries that the minor plaintiff suffered after she exited a motor vehicle that was being driven by her mother and was struck by a vehicle while crossing the street. The mother raised the doctrine of parental immunity as a special defense, while the plaintiff contended that, pursuant to § 52-572c, the doctrine was abrogated in this case. Without analyzing the language of § 52-572c and whether the statute applied to the facts of this case, the court held that the mother still enjoyed parental immunity because, regardless of whether the mother was negligent in the operation of the motor vehicle, the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the entirely separate act of the mother allowing the child to cross the street unattended and without proper supervision. Id., at 51. " The named plaintiff recognizes that these were two separate acts and it was clearly the latter act, in no way related to the operation of a motor vehicle, which directly resulted in the named plaintiff's injury." Id. The court made clear, however, that " [s]ince no causal relationship existed between the named defendant's act of stopping her car in the traveled portion of the highway and the subsequent injury to the named plaintiff, it is not necessary ... to discuss the meaning of the words ‘ operation of a motor vehicle’ as used in [§ 52-572c]." Id., at 52.
Unlike the court in Ooms, the appellate court addressed the meaning of the phrase " operation of a motor vehicle" under § 52-572c in Jackson v. Jackson, 9 Conn.App. 290, 518 A.2d 666 (1986), cert. denied, 202 Conn. 804, 519 A.2d 1208 (1987). In this case, the minor plaintiff brought suit against his mother for personal injuries that he suffered when he roller skated into the bent antenna of a car that the defendant had parked in the driveway of the family home. It was not disputed that after the car had been parked, it stalled and could not be started again, and that the plaintiff's injuries were sustained two days after the car was parked. Id., at 291. The mother contended that the doctrine of parental immunity precluded suit against her, while the plaintiff argued that § 52-572c abrogated the doctrine. Thus, the issue in the case was whether the defendant was " operating" a motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute at the time that the plaintiff was injured. Id., at 291-92. The court first noted that " [t]he term ‘ operation’ has been held to include situations in which the vehicle is parked or standing still provided that such a position is incident to travel." Id., at 292. Nonetheless, the court found that " a stop incident to movement" was not the situation presented by this case. " [T]he record discloses that the car was disabled and had not been, nor could it be, moved by the defendant." Id. The court proceeded to analogize the language of § 52-572c to that of General Statutes § 31-293a, which " allows suits against fellow employees, as an exception to the inability of one employee to sue another employee, in cases arising under the workers' compensation act if there is ‘ negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle.’ " Id. Because both statutes use identical language in forming the exception, the court relied on cases interpreting the phrase " operation of a motor vehicle" under § 31-293a. Id. The court held that " [i]njuries sustained which are unrelated to the movement of the vehicle, or the circumstances of the movement of the vehicle, do not arise in the course of the operation of the motor vehicle." Id. The court concluded that " [a] car which is totally disabled cannot be said to have been operated." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Accordingly, the court ruled that the doctrine of parental immunity was not abrogated by § 52-572c. See also Rivera v. Fox, 20 Conn. .App. 619, 624, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 808, 576 A.2d 538 (1990) (" The general rule ... is that operation of a motor vehicle occurs when there is a setting in motion of the operative machinery of the vehicle, or there is movement of the vehicle, or there is a circumstance resulting from that movement or an activity incident to the movement of the vehicle from one place to another").
In this case, the apportionment plaintiffs allege that the plaintiff's purported injuries were caused by the apportionment defendant's negligence in that she: (1) did not keep a proper and reasonable look out before exiting from the taxi cab; (2) was inattentive to the plaintiff while exiting the cab; and (3) exited the cab from the driver's side, where there was motor vehicle traffic, as opposed to exiting by the side of the road. Based on these allegations, it is clear that the plaintiff's injuries were not a result of any movement of the vehicle, or circumstances resulting from movement of the vehicle, but rather, the entirely separate and independent event of her exiting the cab and entering the street after the defendant driver stopped the vehicle. Moreover, the apportionment plaintiffs never even allege that the plaintiff's injuries were the result of the operation of the vehicle. The apportionment plaintiffs' allegations simply concern the exiting of the cab and entering the road by the plaintiff and the circumstances surrounding that act, not the operation of the motor vehicle. In that sense, the facts of this case are not unlike those presented in Ooms. It is significant to note, however, that in Ooms, the minor's mother was the individual driving the vehicle, whereas in this case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant driver was behind the wheel of the vehicle. " [T]he court sees no good reason not to define ‘ negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle’ by relying on the way other jurisdictions have interpreted statutes analogous to § 52-572c or have created common law exceptions to the doctrine where ‘ operation’ of a motor vehicle is involved. In other words, what those other courts and legislatures and our legislature was getting at when they used this language was injury or damage caused by the negligent operation in the sense of driving of a motor vehicle by the parent." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Collins v. Zerio, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 11 6019365 (January 6, 2012, Miller, J.) [ 53 Conn. L. Rptr. 289]. Here, the apportionment plaintiffs do not allege that the plaintiff's injuries were in any way related to, or caused by, the driving of the vehicle by the apportionment defendant. Accordingly, § 52-572c does not apply to the facts of this case and, therefore, the doctrine of parental immunity is not abrogated under that statute.
The apportionment plaintiffs further contend, nevertheless, that the doctrine of parental immunity is also abrogated when the parent's negligent supervision, which resulted in the child's injuries, involved a breach of a duty owed primarily to the general public and only incidentally to the child. The apportionment plaintiffs maintain that the duty not to operate negligently a motor vehicle on public roads is one not so much inherent in the parent-child relationship, but rather one owed to the public at large. According to the apportionment plaintiffs, because the apportionment defendant breached her duty to the public to operate safely a motor vehicle on public roadways, thereby resulting in injuries to the plaintiff, the doctrine of parental immunity is abrogated.
These arguments fail for the same reason that § 52-572c is not applicable to this case. The apportionment plaintiffs' position that the parental immunity doctrine is abrogated because the apportionment defendant breached a duty owed to the public at large relies on the misguided premise that the apportionment defendant was operating a motor vehicle. The apportionment plaintiffs never allege that the apportionment defendant was operating the vehicle and, for the reasons discussed above, they fail to allege sufficient facts to support that conclusion. Therefore, the doctrine of parental immunity is not abrogated under the purported public duty exception.
Because the apportionment plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to abrogate the doctrine of parental immunity, they have failed to allege a legally sufficient cause of action against the apportionment defendant. Accordingly, the court grants the apportionment defendant's motions to strike the apportionment complaint and the apportionment plaintiffs' second special defense.