Opinion
HHDCV156063469S
10-18-2016
Aida Rodriguez v. State of Connecticut Department of Labor
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Kevin G. Dubay, J.
FACTS
On November 4, 2015, the plaintiff, Aida Rodriguez, filed a two-count complaint against the defendants, Resa Spaziani and the State of Connecticut, Department of Labor. Count one of the complaint, sounding in negligence, alleges the following against Spaziani. On or about July 22, 2014, at about 4:43 p.m., the plaintiff was operating a 2012 Hyundai sedan traveling east through a parking lot. At the same time, Spaziani, an employee of the State of Connecticut, was operating a 2011 Ford Escape, owned by the State of Connecticut, and stopped in a parking space in the parking lot. As the plaintiff approached Spaziani, Spaziani backed out of the parking space and drove directly into the rear passenger's side of the plaintiff's vehicle. As a result of Spaziani's negligence, the plaintiff suffered injuries and losses. Count two, sounding in vicarious liability, incorporates the aforementioned facts and alleges the additional following facts against the defendant. Spaziani drove the vehicle with the authorization of, and/or as the agent of, and/or as an employee acting within the scope of employment with the defendant, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-183 .
On April 14, 2016, the plaintiff withdrew the action against Resa Spaziani, therefore, the action only remains pending as to the State of Connecticut, Department of Labor. Hereinafter, the State of Connecticut, Department of Labor will be referred to as the defendant.
On May 27, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendant also filed a memorandum in support and attached the following exhibits: 1) the plaintiff's responses to the defendant's request for interrogatories and production; 2) the State of Connecticut Workers' Compensation Physician's Permanent Impairment Evaluation; 3) the State of Connecticut WC-30C Form; and 4) the affidavit of Lauren Stabile, a Human Resources Associate in the Department of Labor's Human Resources Department. On July 7, 2016, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support with no exhibits attached. On July 8, 2016, the defendant filed a surreply. The matter was heard at short calendar on July 11, 2016.
DISCUSSION
" [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820-21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). " When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).
A. Sovereign Immunity
The defendant argues that its motion for summary judgment should be granted on the ground that the plaintiff's claim is barred by sovereign immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 52-556. Specifically, the defendant argues that § 52-556 is the only statute that authorizes suit against the State for injuries caused by the negligent operation of a state-owned and insured vehicle, and because workers' compensation benefits are available to a state employee, § 52-556 is inapplicable and the Workers' Compensation Act is the state employee's exclusive remedy. The plaintiff counters that § 52-556 creates an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity and although § 52-556 was not specifically listed in the plaintiff's complaint, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that failure to cite the specific statute is not fatal to the claim as long as the defendant is apprised of the nature of the claim.
Section 52-556 provides that " [a]ny person injured in person or property through the negligence of any state official or employee when operating a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state against personal injuries or property damage shall have a right of action against the state to recover damages for such injury."
The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that § 52-556 is inapplicable to the plaintiff because she is a state employee, suing the State on the ground of vicarious liability, and can receive workers' compensation. In Sullivan v. State, 189 Conn. 550, 550-51 n.7, 457 A.2d 304 (1983), the court held that " [t]here is no cause of action against the state on the ground of vicarious liability under § 52-556 when brought by a state employee or his representative . . . When the legislature enacted § 52-556 in 1927, granting a cause of action to the general public against the state for negligent operation of motor vehicles by state employees, the state already had submitted itself to certain claims by its employees under the Workmens' Compensation Act. Since the state had already expressly delineated its liability to employees, we decline to read the subsequent enactment of § 52-556 as expanding the rights of those employees to include a second cause of action against the state . . . [T]he legislature did not intend § 52-556 to authorize an additional cause of action for state employees or their representatives who are eligible for workers' compensation." In Lauren Stabile's affidavit she avers that the plaintiff currently is an employee of the defendant and was an employee at the time of the accident on July 22, 2014. In the defendant's request for interrogatories and production, the plaintiff admits that she filed two workers' compensation claims and that payments have been made towards her medical expenses through workers' compensation coverage. Thus, although § 52-556 expressly abrogates sovereign immunity, it does not apply in this case because the plaintiff is a state employee eligible for workers' compensation. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is, therefore, granted on this ground and workers' compensation benefits is the plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
Also in Lauren Stabile's affidavit, she asserts that the plaintiff received monetary compensation for injuries and losses she claims to have sustained as a result of the motor vehicle accident on July 22, 2014, and that the State of Connecticut accepted the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits for her injuries.
B. Workers' Compensation Exclusivity Provision
Next, the defendant argues that its motion for summary judgment should be granted because the plaintiff's claim is barred by the exclusivity provision in the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-284(a). The plaintiff counters that her claim is not barred by the exclusivity provision as this action falls under an exception contained in § 31-293a, pertaining to negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
Section § 31-284(a) provides in relevant part: " An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter, except that compensation shall not be paid when the personal injury has been caused by the wilful and serious misconduct of the injured employee or by his intoxication. All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees . . . arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter . . ."
Section § 31-293a provides in relevant part: " If an employee or, in case of his death, his dependent has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee or dependent and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section 14-1." (Emphasis added.)
In the present case, the plaintiff is suing her employer, not a fellow employee and, therefore, the exception providing that an action can be maintained against a fellow employee due to the fellow employee's negligence in operation of a motor vehicle is inapplicable. See Szczapa v. UPS, 56 Conn.App. 325, 332, 743 A.2d 622 (workers' compensation statute providing that, if employee has right to benefits on account of injury caused by negligence of fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless action is based on fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle did not authorize employee's action against employer), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 951, 748 A.2d 299 (2000). Thus, because this action is against an employer, and the plaintiff has not shown that the employer is a " fellow employee, " the defendant's motion for summary judgment must be granted on this ground.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.