Opinion
No. 04-19-00586-CR
11-04-2020
Victor Raul RODRIGUEZ, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 341st Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018CRF000047-D3
Honorable Rebecca Ramirez Palomo, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Beth Watkins, Justice Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice AFFIRMED
Appellant Victor Raul Rodriguez was charged with two counts of indecency with a child by contact. The trial court rejected his agreement to plead guilty to a different offense and sentenced him to seven years' confinement. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
After being charged with two counts of indecency with a child by contact, Rodriguez entered into a plea bargain agreement under which the State would dismiss Rodriguez's child indecency by contact charges, and Rodriguez would plead guilty to an abandoning a child charge he faced in another cause number. When the parties presented the terms of their plea agreement to the trial court, the trial court rejected the agreement, stating, "I can't in good conscience approve this agreement that's being presented to the Court today." Rodriguez then moved to dismiss his charges, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea agreement because the State provided sufficient reasons to support the agreement. The trial court denied Rodriguez's motion, and Rodriguez subsequently pled guilty to a lesser offense of indecency with a child by exposure. Rodriguez now appeals.
ANALYSIS
Rodriguez contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss and rejecting the plea bargain agreement because the State provided sufficient reasons supporting the agreement and the trial court failed to explain why it rejected the agreement. The State argues the trial court has an absolute right to refuse a plea bargain agreement and is not required to explain its reasoning.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. Williams v. State, 464 S.W.2d 842, 844-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Cabello, 981 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Plea bargains play an integral part of the criminal justice system. Moore v. State, 295 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). However, a defendant does not have an absolute right to enter a plea bargain agreement. Morano v. State, 572 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). If the State and defense enter into such an agreement, Texas law provides trial judges with broad discretion in determining whether to accept that agreement. Wright v. State, 158 S.W.3d 590, 593 (Tex. App—San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd) (citing State ex rel. Bryan v. McDonald, 662 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc)). Specifically, article 26.13(a)(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires a trial court to announce its acceptance or rejection of a plea bargain agreement before any finding on a defendant's plea. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(2). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly recognized that the plain meaning and reasonable construction of this provision is that a trial court may reject a plea bargain agreement. Rodriguez v. State, 470 S.W.3d 823, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (providing that article 26.13(a)(2) grants trial courts discretion to refuse a plea); Gaal v. State, 332 S.W.3d 448, 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (providing trial judge may refuse to allow plea bargaining); Morano, 572 S.W.2d at 551 ("[A] trial judge may in every case or in any particular case refuse to allow plea bargaining. . . .").
Application
It is undisputed that the parties presented the terms of the plea agreement to the trial court and the State provided the court with its reasons supporting the agreement. After hearing the terms and the State's reasons, the trial court expressly rejected the parties' agreement. The trial court's actions fell within its wide discretion under article 26.13(a)(2). See Rodriguez, 470 S.W.3d at 828.
Rodriguez asserts, however, the State provided sufficient reasons supporting the plea agreement, and therefore, the trial court was required to accept the terms of the agreement and grant his motion to dismiss. For support, Rodriguez relies on Article 32.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Smith v. State.
Article 32.02 provides that the State may dismiss a criminal action at any time by filing a written statement setting out its reasons for the dismissal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 32.02. It further provides that "No case shall be dismissed without the consent of the presiding judge." Id. In Smith, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss his capital murder charges after entering an immunity agreement with the State. Smith v. State, 70 S.W.3d 848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). At the hearing on the motion, the State joined the motion, and the trial court signed a dismissal order. Id. Two years later, the State reopened the case against the defendant; the defendant moved to enforce the immunity agreement, and the trial court denied the motion. Id. A jury convicted the defendant of capital murder, and the defendant appealed, claiming the trial court erred in refusing to enforce the immunity agreement. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, finding the immunity agreement enforceable even though the dismissal order did not incorporate the immunity agreement's terms. Id. at 855. It then remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the existence of the immunity agreement. Id.
Unlike in Smith, the trial court here never approved the plea bargain agreement to dismiss Rodriguez's charges. And, contrary to Rodriguez's assertion, neither article 32.02 nor Smith require the trial court to accept a plea agreement that dismisses charges even if the State sets forth reasons approving the dismissal. Rather, article 32.02 expressly requires judicial approval of a dismissal, and Smith notes the mandatory nature of that requirement. Id. at 852 ("The requirement of judicial approval of a dismissal is mandatory[.]"). Again, the trial court has wide discretion in determining whether to accept any type of plea agreement, even those that include an agreed dismissal. See Rodriguez, 470 S.W.3d at 828.
Rodriguez also argues the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to explain why it refused the terms of the agreement. Nothing in Article 26.13 requires a trial court to announce its reasoning, and we decline to read such a requirement into the statute. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(2). We therefore hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodriguez's motion to dismiss and rejecting the plea bargain agreement. Rodriguez's sole issue on appeal is overruled.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Beth Watkins, Justice Do Not Publish