Opinion
6:23-cv-01863-MK
07-10-2024
MARTIN RODRIGUEZ; BRITNI RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF OREGON; SALEM POLICE DEPARTMENT; MARION COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; MARION COUNTY JUSTICE COURT; MARION COUNTY; CITY OF SALEM, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
KASUBHAI, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiffs Martin and Britni Rodriguez, proceeding self-represented, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and other federal and state law action against Defendants the State of Oregon; Salem Police Department and the City of Salem (“City Defendants”); Marion County Sheriff's Department, Marion County Justice Court, and Marion County (“County Defendants”). Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 33) and County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 49). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claims should be construed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted. Plaintiffs' federal claims against the County Defendants should be dismissed with leave to amend. County Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' state law claims should be granted.
Defendant State of Oregon has since been dismissed with prejudice from this action. ECF No. 66
BACKGROUND
This case relates to an eviction proceeding initiated in the Marion County Justice Court against Plaintiffs on February 6, 2023. Hernandez Decl. Ex. A at 58, ECF 50-1. Plaintiffs' landlord alleged entitlement to possession of the property because of Plaintiffs' failure to pay rent. Id. Plaintiffs were served with the complaint on February 10, 2023, and answered it on February 23, 2023. Id. at 45, 50. On March 9, 2023, following trial, judgment was entered against Plaintiffs and they were ordered to vacate the premises. Id. at 42.
On April 17, 2023, Defendant Marion County Sheriff's Office received a writ of execution to perform an eviction at Plaintiffs' apartment. Wallace Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 51. Before the writ of execution could be carried out, it expired. Id. at ¶¶ 5-9. The Marion County Justice Court issued a second writ of execution on July 21, 2023. Hernandez Decl. Ex. A at 5. On August 2, 2023, members of Defendant Marion County Sheriff Department removed Plaintiffs from their home pursuant to the July 21, 2023 writ of execution. Wallace Decl. ¶ 11.
Plaintiffs allege in their Section 1983 claims they were deprived of rights conferred by the Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 6, 7. Plaintiffs also allege several other federal and state law claims. Id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file, if any, show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Substantive law on an issue determines the materiality of a fact. T.W. Elec. Servs.,Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party determines the authenticity of the dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
Special rules of construction apply when evaluating a summary judgment motion: (1) all reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact should be resolved against the moving party; and (2) all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630.
As explained below, the Court construes County Defendants' motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
“After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings is “functionally identical” to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the same standard of review applies to both motions. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989).
“Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when there is no issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 979). The court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, id., but the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim is plausible on its face when the factual allegations allow the court to infer the defendant's liability based on the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must present more than “the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 678.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs move the Court for summary judgment in their favor, arguing that the Court should grant their motion because “none of the Defendants have denied the occurrence of the Plaintiffs' allegations.” Pl. Mot. 4.
As an initial matter, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' motion should be denied for failure to comply with the local rules. Under LR 7-1(a), “[e]xcept for motions for temporary restraining orders, the first paragraph of every motion must certify that.. .the parties made a good faith effort through personal or telephone conferences to resolve the dispute and have been unable to do so,” that the opposing party willfully refused to confer, or one of the parties to the motion is an unrepresented prisoner. In addition, under LR 7-1(b), “motions may not be combined with any response, reply, or other pleading.” Plaintiffs' motion complies with neither of these rules, as it contains no conferral certificate and is contained within their response to a motion to dismiss.
The Court may deny a party's motion based solely on a failure to comply with the local rules. See Tri-Valley CARES v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a motion as the result of a failure to comply with local rules is well within a district court's discretion”). However, the Court declines to deny this particular motion on that basis because Plaintiffs are proceeding unrepresented by counsel, have not previously been warned of the consequences of failing to abide by local rules, and it is in the interest of justice and expediency to rule on this motion on its merits. Nevertheless, the Court reminds Plaintiffs that self-represented parties are expected to familiarize themselves with and comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules. It appears that, since this motion was filed, Plaintiffs have continued to file motions that do not contain a certificate of compliance with LR 7-1(a). Moving forward, Plaintiffs should understand that the Court will deny further motions that do not comply with the conferral requirement of LR 7-1(a), the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or other any other local rules, available at https://www.ord.uscourts.gov/index.php/rules-orders-and-notices/local-rules/civil-procedure. Additional information and resources on self-representation are available at https://www.ord.uscourts.gov/index.php/representing-yourself/information-about-representing-yourself.
Turning to the merits of Plaintiffs' motion, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs' motion rests on the assertion that summary judgment should be granted because “none of the Defendants denied the occurrence of the Plaintiffs allegations.” Pl. Mot. 4. This assertion is unsupported by the record. The docket reflects that Defendants in this case filed answers to Plaintiffs' Complaint which deny many of the allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint. See ECF Nos. 28, 30. Plaintiffs' motion does not identify how the facts which are admitted amount to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the elements of their claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be denied.
II. County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Section 1983 Claim
With respect to Plaintiff's federal claims, County Defendants' “Motion for Summary Judgment” identifies deficiencies in Plaintiffs' Complaint against the County Defendants and asks for dismissal of the Section 1983 claims against them “with prejudice.” The nature of these arguments-which are directed at the allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint and then address whether amendment would be futile-are more in the nature of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) and the Court therefore construes the motion as such.
If the Court did construe the motion as one for summary judgment, that motion is premature and unsupported by the record. Discovery has only just begun and County Defendants have not provided any argument, beyond a mere conclusory statement, that Plaintiffs will be unable to produce any evidence to support Monell claims.
Turning to the merits of County Defendants' motion as construed, Section 1983 permits a cause of action for constitutional violations only against “person[s].” In certain circumstances, a municipality may be held liable as a “person” under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). However, “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. Liability only attaches where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation through the “execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694; see also Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[i]f the mere exercise of discretion by an employee could give rise to a constitutional violation, the result would be indistinguishable from respondeat superior liability”) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988)).
There are three methods by which a plaintiff may establish municipal liability under Monell. First, a local government may be liable where the “execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflict[s] the injury.” Rodriguez v. City of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Second, a local government can fail to train employees in a manner that amounts to “deliberate indifference” to a constitutional right, such that “the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the [government entity] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). Third, a local government may be held liable if “the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority or such an official ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Id. at 802-03 (quoting Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013)).
Here, Plaintiffs allege no facts supporting liability under any Monell theory. Instead, Plaintiffs' allegations only set forth allegations of conduct by county employees, so the Complaint can only be read to assert claims based on vicarious liability. As noted above, this is insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim against County Defendants. Accordingly, the Section 1983 claims against the County Defendants are dismissed.
A court may grant leave to amend in response to a Rule 12(c) motion if the pleadings can be cured by further factual enhancement. See Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego, 311 F.Supp.2d 898, 903 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (because motions for judgment on the pleadings are analyzed under the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a court considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings may give leave to amend); Kemp v. Regents of University of Cal., 2010 WL 2889224 at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (“[b]ecause motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are ‘functionally identical' [citation omitted], leave to amend should be granted unless amendment would be futile.”) (citing Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990)). County Defendants fail to articulate why any further allegations against County Defendants would be futile. Plaintiffs should therefore be granted leave to amend their Complaint as to their Monell claims only.
Instead, County Defendants argue that any claims asserted against individual county employees would be futile. But that question is not ripe; the Complaint does not name any county employees, and Plaintiffs have not sought leave to assert any such claims. Accordingly, the Court declines to address these arguments.
B. Negligence Claim
County Defendants also move for summary judgment against Plaintiffs' state law claims because County Defendants are entitled to judicial immunity under state law and because Plaintiffs will not be able to produce evidence to support their cliams. Because the Court agrees as to the first point, it declines to reach the second basis for County Defendants' motion.
In Oregon, common law has “long recognized that some public officials should be immune from civil actions for some of the actions taken in the execution of their public employment.” Praggastis v. Clackamas Cnty., 305 Or. 419, 426, 752 P.2d 302, 307 (1988). One such type of immunity applies to “a judge acting within the court's jurisdiction.” Id. That immunity extends, in certain circumstances, to “[o]ther officials who are performing acts associated with the judicial process.” Id. Public bodies such as County Defendants are also “immune from liability for any claim for injury to or death of any person or injury to property resulting from an act or omission of an officer, employee or agent of a public body when such officer, employee or agent is immune from liability.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.265(5).
Here, Plaintiffs' allegations against Defendant Marion County Justice Court relate to its acts in relation to the eviction case against Plaintiffs, which Plaintiffs allege was outside Defendant's jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' allegations against Defendants Marion County and Marion County Sheriff's Office relate to the acts of officers carrying out the eviction. The Court addresses each set of allegations separately below.
1. Claims against Marion County Justice Court
Plaintiffs assert state law claims against Defendant Marion County Justice Court based on its actions in the eviction proceeding over which Plaintiffs claim Defendant “was not a court of record and they did not have to submit to the jurisdiction of that court.” Compl. 1. This is the sole factual allegation against this Defendant in the Complaint.
While judicial immunity does not attach when a judge acts outside their jurisdiction, Oregon law clearly establishes Defendant Marion County Justice Court's jurisdiction over the relevant eviction proceeding. See ORS 105.110 (“When a forcible entry is made upon any premises, or when an entry is made in a peaceable manner and possession is held by force, the person entitled to the premises may maintain in the county where the property is situated an action to recover the possession of the premises in the circuit court or before any justice of the peace of the county”). Because there is no genuine issue of fact as to this Defendant's jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' eviction case, Defendant Marion County Justice Court is entitled to judicial immunity. Summary judgment should therefore be granted in its favor.
2. Claims against Marion County and Marion County Sheriff's Office
Plaintiffs assert state law claims against Defendants Marion County and Marion County Sheriff's Office related to their carrying out the eviction authorized by Defendant Marion County Justice Court. However, judicial immunity “immunizes acts performed under a court order or directive, so long as the court order or directive is a permissible exercise of judicial authority and the acts comply with the court order or directive.” Harrison v. Joseph B. Mazza, LLC, 333 Or.App. 367, 371 (2024) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because the allegations against them fall within this type of judicial immunity. Plaintiffs argue that these Defendants are not entitled to judicial immunity because the directive they were acting on (the writ of execution issued by Defendant Marion County Justice Court) had expired.
The summary judgment record does not support Plaintiffs' assertions regarding unlawful eviction pursuant to an expired writ of execution. The Marion County Justice Court issued an Amended Writ of Execution on July 21, 2023. Hernandez Decl. Ex. A at 5. The actions at issue took place on August 2, 2023, which was within the timeframe of the amended writ of execution. Wallace Decl. ¶ 11; see also ORS 105.161 (writs of execution are valid for 30 days). Accordingly, the record supports that these Defendants' execution of the writ was performed in compliance with a valid court order, and they are therefore entitled to judicial immunity. Summary judgment in their favor should be granted.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons above, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 33) should be DENIED and County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 49) should be resolved as follows: County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claims should be construed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and GRANTED. Plaintiffs' federal claims against the County Defendants should be dismissed with leave to amend. County Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' state law claims should be GRANTED.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today's date. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).