Summary
upholding expulsion when the record established no violation of the association's constitution or bylaws
Summary of this case from Williams v. SmithOpinion
No. 05-07-00204-CV
Opinion issued January 16, 2008.
On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 03-12005-K.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, BRIDGES, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Andrew V. Rodriguez appeals the summary judgment granted in favor of Vincent Montagno, Gary Thornley, Robert Tomlinson, and the American Racing Pigeon Union, Inc. (collectively "ARPU"). In two issues Rodriguez contends: (i) ARPU violated its bylaws in expelling Rodriguez from membership and (ii) the expulsion from membership is void due to ARPU's violation of its bylaws. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Fred Werner is not a party to this appeal. The trial judge granted Werner's motions for summary judgment and for severance.
Background
Rodriguez was a member of ARPU, a national organization of individuals engaged in racing pigeons. Rodriguez sued ARPU after being expelled from membership following an investigation of allegedly fraudulent pigeon racing results entered by Rodriguez for which he received an award.
The pigeon race at issue took place on May 2001. Rodriguez submitted the race results to ARPU in November 2001 for competition in national awards. Based on the race results as submitted by Rodriguez, he received a national award, which he accepted in November 2002. ARPU received an inquiry in December 2002 regarding the racing results submitted by Rodriguez, and at that time ARPU began its investigation of member Rodriguez's conduct. The investigation culminated in the expulsion of Rodriguez from ARPU membership. Rodriguez seeks reinstatement of membership. Rodriguez and ARPU filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial judge granted ARPU summary judgment on Rodriguez's claim for reinstatement. On appeal, Rodriguez asserts the trial judge erred in granting ARPU summary judgment, because the ARPU investigation of Rodriguez's conduct violated the ARPU's bylaws as undertaken beyond the one year limitation period contained in the bylaws. Therefore, Rodriguez asserts that his expulsion from ARPU membership is void.
Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing a summary judgment is well established. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). A defendant who moves for summary judgment must show the plaintiff has no cause of action. A defendant may meet this burden by either disproving at least one essential element of each theory of recovery or conclusively proving all elements of an affirmative defense. See Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. 1993). A matter is conclusively established if ordinary minds cannot differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. See Triton Oil Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. 1982). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549. After the movant has established a right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence creating a fact issue. See Kang v. Hyundai Corp., 992 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
Discussion
Traditionally, courts are not disposed to interfere with the internal management of a voluntary association. Dickey v. Club Corp. of Am., 12 S.W.3d 172, 176 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, writ denied); Harden v. Colonial Country Club, 634 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). By becoming a member, a person subjects himself, within legal limits, to the organization's power to make and administer its rules. Dickey, 12 S.W.3d at 176; Harden, 634 S.W.2d at 59. Thus, courts will not interfere with the internal management of voluntary associations so long as the governing bodies of those associations do not substitute legislation for interpretation and do not overstep the bounds of reason or violate public policy or the laws of the state. See Burge v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n, 782 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ); Adams v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n, 583 S.W.2d 828, 834 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hoey v. San Antonio Real Estate Bd., 297 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio, 1956, no writ); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Price, 108 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1937, writ dism'd). Judicial review is only proper when the actions of the organization are illegal, against some public policy, arbitrary, or capricious. Dickey, 172 S.W.3d at 176; Harden, 634 S.W.2d at 60.
Rodriguez contends ARPU's conduct was arbitrary and capricious in the violation of ARPU's bylaw governing limitations for investigation of an alleged violation of the rules of conduct. We disagree. Section 14.05 of the ARPU Constitution and By Laws, entitled "Statutes of Limitations," provides:
No investigation of any violation of any Union Rule of Conduct shall be undertaken if the last act, omission, or event, or the last of a continuing series of acts, omissions, or events constituting a possible violation occurred more than one (1) year prior to the date of the receipt by the [Union Infractions] Committee of the charge or complaint.
The record establishes no violation of ARPU's constitution or bylaws. The record shows that Rodriguez's acceptance of the award based on the allegedly fraudulent race results in November 2002 was the last act or the last of a continuing series of acts committed by Rodriguez that ARPU investigated. The record further confirms that ARPU received the complaint regarding the authenticity of the Rodriguez's award and began its investigation in December 2002, well within the one-year limitation period contained in the bylaws. We conclude the trial judge did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of ARPU. We overrule Rodriguez's first issue.
We need not address Rodriguez's second issue which is predicated on the Court concluding that ARPU violated its bylaws. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.