Opinion
Case No. 1:22-cv-20635-KMM
2022-12-10
William RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. Lydia Marquez GOMEZ, Defendant.
Joseph Anthony Carballo, Steven A. Swartz, Carballo Law, PA, Coral Gables, FL, Rafael Ventura, Ralph Ventura, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff. Jennifer Laura Hochstadt, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
Joseph Anthony Carballo, Steven A. Swartz, Carballo Law, PA, Coral Gables, FL, Rafael Ventura, Ralph Ventura, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff. Jennifer Laura Hochstadt, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
K. MICHAEL MOORE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Lydia Gomez's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 23). Plaintiff William Rodriguez filed a Response (ECF No. 28), and the Officer Defendant filed a Reply (ECF No. 29). This Motion is now ripe for review. I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") (ECF No. 21) and are accepted as true for purposes of ruling on this Motion to Dismiss. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 40 F.4th 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2022).
In 2018, Plaintiff William Rodriguez, a certified police officer, went to the Miami-Dade Police Department Kendall District Station (the "Station") to obtain a background search. SAC ¶ 14. The Station was not busy. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff waited briefly until Defendant called him to her desk. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff told Defendant that he required a background search and gave Defendant his driver's license. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Plaintiff's license was valid, unexpired, and included a Commercial Driver's License Class-A ("CDLA") certification. Id. ¶ 20.
Shortly thereafter, Defendant stated that there was a warrant out for Plaintiff's arrest for an issue related to his driver's license. Id. ¶ 24. The warrant in question, was for a man named William Ulises Rodriguez Garcia (the "Wanted Rodriguez"). Id. ¶ 4. In 2016, the Wanted Rodriguez received two traffic citations—one for driving without ever having a driver's license and one for parking in a handicapped parking spot. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6, 8. The Wanted Rodriguez failed to appear for a Court hearing related to the traffic citations and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Id. ¶ 9. The traffic citations stated the Wanted Rodriguez's birthday, February 15, 1988, and his address, 1450 NE 110th St., Homestead, Florida 33033. See Exhibits 1 and 2.
Plaintiff told Defendant that he is "certain she has the wrong person," and stated that: (1) he is a certified police officer in the process of applying to work for the Miami-Dade Police Department, and he knows there are no issues with his license, and (2) William Rodriguez is a common name and there are about 37 people in Miami-Dade County named William Rodriguez, per his knowledge as a police officer. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Plaintiff then told Defendant she could "quickly and easily verify him, stating, 'Verify me. Run my name in DAVID, FCIC, or NCIC.' " Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff also requested to speak to a supervisor and that Defendant have him fingerprinted and verified. Id. ¶¶ 31-32. Defendant refused and stated, "No papo, that's you." Id. ¶ 33. Then, Defendant booked and detained Plaintiff, and conveyed him to the correctional center, where he spent one day in jail. Id. ¶¶ 33, 45.
"DAVID" stands for the Driver and Vehicle Information Database. "FCIC" stands for the Florida Crime Information Center. "NCIC" stands for the National Crime Information Center.
Miami Dade Police Department adopts standard operating procedures for arrests and detention. Id. ¶ 37. In pertinent part, these procedures provide:
Officers shall utilize every source of information available to ensure correct identification of a person arrested or confined. All efforts will be made to confirm identity, so that the decision to arrest is not based solely on the similarity of names or information received from other law enforcement agencies. A suspect whose identity is doubtful may be detained, but not booked, until identity is confirmed. Should a suspect be detained as a result of a warrant arrest claim mistaken identity, the officer will notify the Warrants Bureau and delay booking the suspect until positive identification is established. Claims of mistaken identity shall be recorded on the Complaint/Arrest Affidavit.
Id. (citing Chapter 18, MDPD Standard Operating Procedures, Section III, Paragraph B). Defendant failed to notify the Warrants Bureau of Plaintiff's claim of mistaken identity or record on her arrest affidavit that Plaintiff claimed mistaken identity. Id. ¶ 38.
Plaintiff commenced this action on March 2, 2022, asserting claims for unreasonable arrest and false arrest. Id. ¶¶ 55-70. Defendant now move to dismiss the Complaint.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 8(a)(2) "is to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement "give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citation and alterations omitted). The court takes the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).
A complaint must contain enough facts to plausibly allege the required elements. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2007). A pleading that offers "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on two grounds: (1) the constitutional claim is barred by qualified immunity; and (2) the false arrest claim is barred by statutory immunity. See generally Mot. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.
A. Qualified Immunity
Defendant argues that the § 1983 claim against her should be dismissed because she is cloaked with qualified immunity. Mot. at 5-18. Government officials sued in their individual capacities enjoy qualified immunity "where their conduct 'does not violate clearly establish statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Quinette v. Reed, 805 F. App'x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). "An officer is entitled to qualified immunity where his actions would be objectively reasonable to a reasonable officer in the same situation." Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-41, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). Qualified immunity may be raised in a motion to dismiss. Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002).
For qualified immunity to apply, the government official must first show that he or she was "acting within the scope of his or her discretionary authority." Moore v. Pederson, 806 F.3d 1036, 1042 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc). The term "discretionary authority" "include[s] all actions of a governmental official that (1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his authority." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994)). Here, Defendant states, and Plaintiff does not contest, that "the SAC 'readily satisfies this requirement, as [Officer Gomez] undertook all the challenged actions while on duty as [a] police officer[ ] conducting arrest and investigative functions." Mot. at 6-7. The Court agrees.
Once the government official establishes that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Moore, 806 F.3d at 1042. To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must show that (1) the facts alleged demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). This Court may consider the two prongs in any order, but "an official is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to establish either." Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty, 923 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2019).
1. Whether Defendant Violated Plaintiff's Constitutional Right
Turning to the first inquiry, the Court must determine whether, taking the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Defendant violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
An officer may "arrest a suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). Yet, a police officer violates an individual's constitutional rights if the officer arrests the individual without probable cause. See Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997) ("There is no question that an arrest without probable cause to believe a crime has been committed violates the Fourth Amendment.").
Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, the police have a valid warrant to arrest someone, and mistakenly arrest the wrong person, the Eleventh Circuit employs a "reasonable mistake" standard to determine whether there was probable cause to make an arrest. Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court must therefore determine, based on the facts alleged in the SAC, whether Defendant's mistaken arrest of Plaintiff—pursuant to the execution of a valid arrest warrant for the Wanted Rodriguez—was outside the scope of "reasonable mistakes." In making this determination, the Court must analyze the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1347.
Defendant argues that she had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Mot. at 8-14. In support of this argument, Defendant cites to several Eleventh Circuit cases deeming mistaken identifications reasonable. Mot. at 10 (citing Chapman v. City of Atl., Ga., 192 F. App'x 922, 924 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding mistake reasonable when the only "glaring inconsistency" was plaintiff was white and suspect in warrant was African American); Williams v. City of Montgomery, 839 F. App'x 356, 361 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding mistake reasonable and granting qualified immunity on false arrest claim where officers arrested Brandon Williams instead of his younger brother Braxton Williams, despite having seen Braxton's photograph prior to effecting the arrest)).
Plaintiff argues these cases are distinguishable because, among other reasons, Defendant cited to cases that "concern misidentification arrests in the field, as opposed to a police station." Resp. at 4. Importantly, the Eleventh Circuit holds officers to a lower standard of reasonableness when in the field compared to a police station. See Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1350. Defendant cites to no authority holding that a police officer made a 'reasonable mistake' in a case of mistaken identity while sitting at the comfort of her own desk. The Court agrees with Plaintiff.
Turning to the facts, Plaintiff, a certified police officer, voluntarily entered a police station, which was not busy, for a background check. SAC ¶¶ 14, 16. Plaintiff went to Defendant's desk and gave her his driver's license, which revealed his name and residential address, 4825 SW 135 Ct. Miami, FL 33175, as well as his date of birth, February 15, 1986. Id. ¶ 20.
Shortly thereafter, Defendant stated that there was a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. Id. ¶ 24. The warrant in question was for a man who lived at 1450 NE 10th St. Homestead, FL 33030, and who was born in 1988. See id. ¶¶ 4-11. The traffic citation, which also included the Wanted Rodriguez's address and date of birth, was issued to the Wanted Rodriguez for, in part, driving without ever having a driver's license issued. SAC ¶ 6. During the interaction between Defendant and Plaintiff, Defendant was holding Plaintiff's driver's license, which was valid, unexpired, and included a CDLA certification. Id. ¶ 20.
Defendant ignored Plaintiff's request to speak to a supervisor, to be fingerprinted and verified, as well as his request that Defendant "[r]un [his] name in DAVID, FCIC, or NCIC." Id. ¶¶ 27, 31-32. Plaintiff also stated that, based on his knowledge as a police officer, there are about 37 people in Miami-Dade County named William Rodriguez. Id. ¶ 26. In arresting Plaintiff, Defendant violated MDPD's standard operating procedures including by: (1) booking and detaining Plaintiff without utilizing every source of information available to her to ensure positive identification; (2) failing to notify the Warrants Bureau of Plaintiff's claim of mistaken identity; (3) failing to delay booking Plaintiff until she could establish positive identification; and (4) failing to record on her arrest affidavit that Plaintiff claimed mistaken identity. Id. ¶ 38.
While failing to follow internal operating procedures in and of itself does not amount to a constitutional violation, the operating procedures provide insight as to what a reasonable officer would do in similar circumstances.
Without more, Defendant lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. At the time of the incident, Defendant was not stopped on the side of the road or in pursuit in the field, she was sitting at her desk. Defendant's safety as an officer of the law was not in jeopardy. She had ample opportunity to look at Plaintiff's drivers license and recognize that it was not consistent with the warrant and citations. Defendant detained Plaintiff, in violation of internal operating procedures, notwithstanding the significant differences between the license and the arrest warrant. This was not a reasonable mistake. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and, in arresting him, she violated his constitutional rights.
2. Whether Plaintiff's Constitutional Right Was Clearly Established
Having determined that there was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, the Court must determine whether the violated right was clearly established at the time of the incident.
The Supreme Court has held "that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). This does not mean that "the very action in question" must have "previously been held unlawful." Id. Rather, it means "that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Id.
Based on these principles, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted an "arguable probable cause" standard for wrongful arrest cases. Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 579 (11th Cir. 1990); Poulakis, 341 Fed. App'x. at 525. "Arguable probable cause exists where reasonable officers in the same circumstances and with the same knowledge as the defendant could have believed that probable cause existed." Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2011). This standard stems from the determination that "it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and in such cases those officials should not be held personally liable." Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Von Stein, 904 F.2d at 579). "Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6, 134 S.Ct. 3, 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2013). The standard of arguable probable cause is an objective one, and "does not include an inquiry in the officers' subjective intent or beliefs." Rushing v. Parker, 599 F.3d 1263, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
Defendant appears to separate the inquiries of whether she had arguable probable cause and whether Plaintiff's right to be free from arrest under the circumstances of this case was clearly established. This is incorrect. The inquiries are the same. Poulakis v. Rogers, 341 Fed. App'x. 523, 526-27 (11th Cir. 2009). "Arguable probable cause" is merely the label the Eleventh Circuit uses for the "clearly established" inquiry in wrongful arrest cases. Id.
In determining whether Defendant had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, the Court finds instructive the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1993). In Cannon, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit found a police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity based upon the following facts. The plaintiff was traveling, ran out of money, stopped her automobile at a rest area to telephone relatives for help, and spent the night at the rest area while waiting for help to arrive. Id. at 1560. The following day, the plaintiff was questioned by a sheriff's deputy patrolling the rest area, and she provided the deputy with her name. Id. The deputy radioed her name to the sheriff's office and was informed that a person using the plaintiff's name as an alias was wanted in another state according to information maintained by the NCIC. Id. The deputy arrested the plaintiff and transported her to jail. Id. A second sheriff's deputy, Collins, completed an arrest report. Id. Collins copied the identifying information written on the arrest report directly from the NCIC report on the wanted individual, rather than asking plaintiff for the information or copying the information from plaintiff's driver's license that was stored in a filing cabinet in the sheriff's office. Id.
The plaintiff and the description of the wanted individual from the NCIC report differed in the following ways: the plaintiff was 5'1" tall, whereas the wanted individual was 5'5"; the plaintiff had blue eyes, but the wanted individual had brown eyes; the plaintiff's middle initial was different from the middle initial of the wanted individual; the two had different social security numbers; and the plaintiff was twelve years younger than the wanted individual. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that Collins was not entitled to claim qualified immunity, because the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established and "a reasonable official in Collins' position would have known that Collins' conduct could violate Cannon's fourteenth amendment right not to be falsely imprisoned" without due process of law. Id. at 1565.
Here, Plaintiff and the Wanted Rodriguez had different addresses and were born in different years. SAC ¶¶ 10, 21. The Wanted Rodriguez had a citation for driving without ever being issued a license, while Plaintiff had a driver's license with CDL Class-A certification. Id. ¶¶ 6, 26. While Defendant did not copy identifying information about the Wanted Rodriguez on the arrest report, Defendant disregarded, or failed to look at, the differences between Plaintiff's license and the warrant for the Wanted Rodriguez. Defendant also clearly failed to follow several internal operating procedures. Id. ¶ 38. Importantly, like in Cannon, the interaction between Plaintiff and Defendant occurred in the police station, as opposed to in the field. Given these facts, reasonable officers in the same circumstances and with the same knowledge as the defendant could not have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff. See Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1007. Based on the facts as alleged in the Complaint, the Court finds that Defendant did not make a reasonable mistake, she demonstrated plain incompetence. See Stanton, 571 U.S. at 6, 134 S.Ct. 3. Considering the above, the Court cannot find that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
B. Statutory Immunity
Defendant argues Plaintiff's claim for false arrest under state law should be dismissed because (1) it is barred by statutory immunity, and (2) Defendant had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Mot. at 18-20.
Florida law provides police officers with immunity from personal tort liability unless the officers "acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property." Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Therefore, to withstand a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "allegations which, if true, would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that the deputy acted 'in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights [or] safety,' as those phrases are used in section 768.28(9)(a)." Peterson v. Pollack, 290 So. 3d 102, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a)). "[W]hether an act was committed with malicious purpose, bad faith, or with wanton and willful disregard is not a question that must be submitted to a jury, but rather, can be decided by the Court depending on the facts." Blue v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 10-23599-CIV, 2011 WL 2447699, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2011) (citing Prieto v. Malgor, 361 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Defendant, sitting at her desk in the police station, allegedly plainly disregarded, or ignored, the differences between Plaintiff and the Wanted Rodriguez. Defendant was not in fear for her safety and had ample opportunity to inquire as to whether Plaintiff was the Wanted Rodriguez. She refused to do so. Defendant also acted in clear violation of MDPD's internal operating procedures. According to Plaintiff, the "detention and arrest amounted to a willful disregard for [Plaintiff's] constitutional rights." SAC ¶ 67. This allegation—taken together with Plaintiff's other factual assertions and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff—indicate that Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant acted "acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property." Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's claim of statutory immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 23) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 10th day of December, 2022.