Opinion
B224586
09-08-2011
GUADALUPE RODRIGUEZ, an individual; and as Successor in Interest of GILBERTO JIMINEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ELECTROPEDIC MANUFACTURING CORPORATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.
The Law Offices of J. Grant Kennedy and J. Grant Kennedy, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Horvitz & Levy, David S. Ettinger, Julie L. Woods; Law Offices of Priscilla Slocum, Priscilla S. Slocum; Early, Maslach & Van Dueck, John C. Notti and James G. Randall, for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GC042892)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. C. Edward Simpson, Judge. Affirmed.
The Law Offices of J. Grant Kennedy and J. Grant Kennedy, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Horvitz & Levy, David S. Ettinger, Julie L. Woods; Law Offices of Priscilla Slocum, Priscilla S. Slocum; Early, Maslach & Van Dueck, John C. Notti and James G. Randall, for Defendants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Guadalupe Rodriguez's son died as the result of a fire that began in his mechanized bed. Two years after the accident, Rodriguez filed a wrongful death suit alleging that the fire was caused by a "manufacturing defect" in a motor located within the bed. The complaint named the manufacturer and distributor of the bed, along with fictitiously named "Doe Defendants 1-200."
Nine months later, Rodriguez amended the complaint by substituting Respondents Steven and Anna Chang, who owned the apartment where the fire occurred, as Doe Defendants 1 and 2. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 474.) Rodriguez alleged that the Changs had contributed to her son's death by failing to install a sufficient number of smoke alarms on the premises.
Respondents filed a motion to quash arguing in part that the Doe amendments were barred by the statute of limitations. In her opposition, Rodriguez conceded that the amendments were filed after the limitations period had run, but argued that her new claim involved the same general set of facts set forth in the original complaint and was therefore timely under the "relation-back doctrine."
The trial court ruled that Rodriguez's amendments did not relate back because the original complaint did "not mention a failure to maintain a sufficient number of smoke alarms" as a causative factor in her son's death. In a subsequent minute order, the court granted the motion to quash and dismissed Respondents from the case.
On appeal, Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the Doe amendments did not relate back to the filing date of the original complaint. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Guadalupe Rodriguez's Complaint
On May 1, 2007, Appellant Guadalupe Rodriguez's disabled son, Gilbert Jimenez, died in a fire that began in his mechanized bed. Two years later, Rodriguez filed a complaint against Electropedic Manufacturing Corporation, who manufactured the bed, Wishing Well Products, Inc., who distributed the bed, and numerous fictitiously named "Doe" defendants.
The complaint alleged that the fire was the result of a "manufacturing defect" in a motor that controlled Jimenez's bed, and asserted claims for negligence, strict liability, products liability, wrongful death, infliction of emotional distress and property damage. Each cause of action specifically alleged that Jimenez's death was caused by the manufacture and delivery of a defective bed.
In addition to alleging that the fire was the result of a "manufacturing defect," the complaint pled, on information and belief, that the fire was caused by "defective design; lack of proper instructions; failure to maintain; failure to warn; failure to supervise; negligent performance; negligent supervision; or some other duty and/or obligation of Defendants and/or any combination of these and/or other factors caused by Defendants."
More specifically, the negligence claim asserted that Defendants had "breached the duty" to provide and operate a "safe" bed, while the strict liability, product liability and wrongful death claims alleged that "the BED was defective" and that "said malfunctioning BED was the actual and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages." The claims for "negligent infliction of emotional distress" and "property damage" incorporated by reference all prior allegations in the complaint and asserted that such acts had caused damage "in an amount to be determined at trial."
The complaint did not allege any facts explaining the Doe defendants' role in the fire. Instead, paragraph six of the complaint stated:
Plaintiffs are currently unaware of the names or capacities of each of the fictitiously named DOE defendants herein but believe they are in some way responsible for the events, happenings, acts and occurrences alleged herein, and the damages resulting therefrom, and therefore Plaintiff sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this Complaint to show their true names and capacities after they have been ascertained.
B. Rodriguez's Doe Amendments and Respondents' Motion to Quash
Approximately nine months after the complaint was filed, Rodriguez filed amendments substituting Alice Chang and Steven Chang, who owned the apartment where the fire occurred, as Doe defendants 1 and 2. The amendments did not state why the Changs had been substituted in as Doe defendants and did not add any new claims or factual allegations to the original complaint.
Rodriguez also filed an amendment substituting "The Alice Yueh Chang Family Trust" as "Doe 3." However, Rodriguez never served the Trust, which has never appeared in the case.
Rodriguez served Alice and Steven Chang with separate summonses, along with copies of the Doe amendments and the original complaint. The Doe amendments stated that the Changs were being sued as fictitiously named defendants and listed the fictitious name under which each defendant had been sued. However, the summonses failed to include that information.
On March 11, 2010, the Changs filed a motion to quash service arguing that the summonses failed to inform the defendants they were being sued as fictitiously named defendants as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 474. Although captioned as a "motion to quash," the Changs's filing also raised arguments regarding the merits of Rodriguez's Doe amendments.
First, the Changs contended that Rodriguez had failed to state a cause of action because neither the amendments nor the complaint included any allegations explaining how the Changs, as the property owners, were responsible for the defective bed that allegedly caused Jimenez's injuries. Second, the Changs argued that any claim against them for Jimenez's death was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. Although the Changs were uncertain why they had been substituted into the case, they argued that the amendments could not relate back to the filing of the original complaint because "a claim, presumably for 'premises liability,' does not relate back to a claim of 'products liability.'"
In addition, the motion to quash argued that Rodriguez had had unreasonably delayed in filing and serving the amendments and requested a "Barrows hearing." (See generally A.N. v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067 (A.N.)[under Barrows v. American Motors Corp. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 1, "a defendant named in an action by a Doe amendment under section 474 may challenge the amendment by way of an evidence-based motion, which argues that the plaintiff 'unreasonably delayed' his or her filing of the challenged amendment"].) Because we affirm the trial court's ruling that Rodriguez's amendments were untimely, we need not address whether the Changs were entitled to a Barrows hearing.
Rodriguez opposed the motion, arguing that service should not be quashed merely because the summonses failed to state that the Changs were being sued as fictitiously named defendants. Rodriguez contended that any such defect was cured by service of the actual Doe amendments, which indicated that the Changs had been substituted as Doe defendants 1 and 2. Rodriguez further asserted that, to the extent any procedural error occurred, "the worst consequence . . . would be that service would need to be done again."
Rodriguez also argued that her amendments adequately stated a timely cause of action against the Changs. In her opposition brief, Rodriguez explained for the first time that the Changs had been substituted into the action because a recent inspection of the apartment revealed there was an "inadequa[te] . . . number of smoke detectors located at the premises." Rodriguez asserted that although her amendments did not include these newly discovered facts, the original complaint contained sufficient "charging allegations" because it stated that the Doe defendants were "in some way responsible for the events, happenings, acts and occurrences alleged herein." According to Rodriguez, this language "clearly" informed the Changs "what they [we]re being charged with: negligence and wrongful death, based on the fire and death of [Jimenez]."
Rodriguez also argued that the amendments were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations because they arose from the same general set of facts described in the original complaint, and therefore "related back" to the filing date of that pleading.
C. The Trial Court's Ruling on the Motion to Quash
On April 22, 2010, the trial court heard the Changs' motion to quash. At the outset, Rodriguez's counsel requested permission to serve and file an amended complaint that included allegations explaining how the smoke alarms "impact[ed] . . . the injuries of [Jimenez]." After the court questioned whether the inclusion of such allegations would remedy the statute of limitations problem, Rodriguez's counsel argued that the amended complaint would "relate back [to the original complaint] because it's the very same . . . the core central facts are a fire, a fire, person burning to death and what happened to him as a result of that." Counsel clarified that Rodriguez was "not trying to say the smoke alarms caused the fire," only that "had there been a smoke alarm, [Jimenez] might have gotten care, attention quicker. So you have in the chain of events, we're not saying he caused it . . . but we are saying that they . . . contributed to the occurrences, damages therefrom."
The trial court rejected Rodriguez's arguments, ruling that any claim regarding the Changs' failure to install sufficient smoke alarms would not relate back to the original complaint, which alleged only that the fire was caused by a defective bed. In a subsequent minute order granting the motion to quash, the court explained:
The factual charging allegations set forth in the complaint do not run against the Chang defendant's [sic]. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff's decedent Gilberto Jimenez was killed by a fire caused by a defective electronic bed. The charging allegations do not mention a failure to maintain a sufficient number of smoke alarms.The trial court further ruled that because Rodriguez's amendments did not relate back, they were time-barred. Rodriguez filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
1. We treat the trial court's ruling as a grant of demurrer without leave to amend
To determine the appropriate scope of our review, we must first determine the nature of the Respondents' motion. (See A.N., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1064 [for purposes of appellate review, "[t]he substance of the 'motion to quash' is what matter[s], not its label"]; Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 472, 478-479 [treating order labeled "judgment on pleadings" as an "order . . . granting summary judgment" because "language in the written ruling ma[de] it clear the trial court found no triable issue of fact"].) The Changs labeled their filing as a motion to quash, which is generally limited "to the question of jurisdiction over the defendant" and "does not serve the function of a demurrer as to whether the complaint states a cause of action." (Kroopf v. Guffey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1360.) The Changs' motion, however, argued that service was improper and, alternatively, that the Doe amendments failed to state a cause of action and that the defect could not be cured through further amendment.
Because the Changs' motion raised both jurisdictional and merits-based arguments, the filing was, in effect, a motion to quash accompanied by a demurrer. (See A.N., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1064; Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2. (Beechnut)["'It is not what a paper is named, but what it is that fixes its character'"].) This procedure is specifically permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (e), which allows a defendant to "make a motion [to quash] . . . and simultaneously . . . demur."
The trial court's ruling indicates that it treated the motion as a demurrer because, rather than addressing whether service was proper, it ruled on the merits of Rodriguez's claims. Specifically, the court concluded that Rodriguez's new claims did not relate back to the filing date of the original complaint and were therefore barred by the statute of limitations. In light of the court's ruling, it is apparent that Rodriguez could not have cured the defect through further amendment. We therefore treat the trial court's ruling as the grant of demurrer without leave to amend. (See A.N, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1064 [regardless of the "label" assigned to a motion, "[o]ur role is to review the decision actually made by the trial court"].)
2. Standard of review for grant of demurrer without leave to amend
"On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citations.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.]" (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865 (Dinuba).)
When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we must also decide "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse. [Citation.]" (Dinuba, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 865.) In making this determination we consider "whether the plaintiff has shown 'in what manner he [or she] can amend [the] complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of [the] pleading.' [Citation.] '[L]eave to amend should not be granted where . . . amendment would be futile.' [Citation.]" (Davaloo v. State Farm Ins. Co. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 409, 414-415 (Davaloo).)
B. The Trial Court did not Err in Granting Demurrer Without Leave to Amend
1. The complaint does not state a cause of action against the Changs
The first issue we must resolve is whether the original complaint, coupled with Rodriguez's "Doe amendments," adequately pled a cause of action against the Changs.The Code of Civil Procedure requires that every complaint contain "[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language." (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) "The requirement to specifically plead facts in a complaint is to apprise the defendant of the circumstances upon which plaintiff relies and to prevent defendant from being taken by surprise." (Frisvold v. Leahy (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 752, 756; see also Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 415 [complaint must contain allegations that, "'as a whole apprise[ ] the adversary of the factual basis of the claim. [Citations.]'"]) Thus, to adequately state a claim, the complaint must "'set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of [the plaintiff's] cause of action.' [Citation.]" (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157 (Rannard);see also Beechnut, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 139, fn. 2 [under Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f), complaint fails to state a claim if it does not provide "substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet"].)
The trial court did not reach this issue, ruling that, regardless of whether Rodriguez's amendments included sufficient factual allegations to state a claim against the Changs, the claim was time barred. On appeal, the parties disagree over whether Rodriguez's complaint, coupled with the amendments, included enough detail to adequately state a claim. For the sake of clarity, we will address those arguments.
In this case, neither the original complaint nor the Doe amendments contain any factual allegations describing what acts the Changs or any other Doe defendant committed in regards to Jimenez's death. Moreover, the causes of action in Rodriguez's complaint, all of which are predicated on a "manufacturing defect" in Jimenez's bed, have no obvious relation to the Changs, who merely owned the apartment where the fire occurred. Therefore, in its current form, the complaint is too uncertain to state a cause of action against the Changs because it contains "no allegations which purport to show how, why or in what manner" they are being charged. (Pacific Coast Refrigeration, Inc. v. Badger (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 233, 249; Rannard, supra, 26 Cal.2d at pp. 156-157 [complaint must "'acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of [the plaintiff's] cause of action.' [Citation.]"])
Rodriguez, however, argues that the complaint sufficiently states a claim because "paragraph 6 of the [pleading] . . . alleged the Doe defendants were 'in some way responsible' for the events alleged in the petition and the damages resulting therefrom." According to Rodriguez, this language informed the Doe defendants, including the Changs, that they were "at least to some degree responsible for the fire, and the subsequent death of [Jimenez]."
The mere allegation that, as Doe defendants, the Changs were "somehow responsible" for Jimenez's injuries is not sufficient; based on that statement alone, there is simply no way the Changs could have deciphered what alleged conduct gave rise to Rodriguez's cause of action. The fact that Rodriguez had to explain in her opposition papers why she named the Changs as defendants (insufficient smoke alarms) only highlights that, as pled, the complaint and the accompanying amendments do not provide "substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet." (Beechnut, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 139, fn. 2 [citing Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f)].)
Although Rodriguez argues on appeal that the original complaint contains sufficient allegations to state a cause of action, during the trial court proceedings her counsel appeared to concede the complaint was deficient. At the hearing on the Changs' motion to quash, counsel began his argument by stating: "all we'd ask is that we'd be allowed to amend . . . [to] show the smoke alarms are related" to Jimenez's injuries.
2. The defect in the complaint cannot be cured
Rodriguez argues that, to the extent she failed to state a cause of action against the Changs, the defect can be remedied by amending the complaint to include allegations that the apartment did not contain sufficient smoke alarms and that that failure was a causative factor in Jimenez's injuries. Rodriguez concedes that, to survive the applicable statute of limitations, her proposed amendment must relate back to the filing date of the original complaint. We therefore must determine whether the relation-back doctrine applies under the circumstances of this case.
Rodriguez concedes the statute of limitations expired prior to the filing of her Doe amendments, but has failed to identify the relevant statute of limitations. We presume that Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 applies, which provides a two-year limitations period for an "action for . . . injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another." The fire that killed Jimenez occurred on May 1, 2007; Rodriguez filed the Chang Doe amendments more than two years later, in February 2010.
a. Summary of the "relation-back doctrine" and examples of its application
Under the relation-back doctrine, "[a]n amended complaint relates back to a timely filed original complaint, and thus avoids the bar of the statute of limitations, only if it rests on the same general set of facts and refers to the same 'offending instrumentalities,' accident and injuries as the original complaint." (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 415.) Thus, to relate back, "the amended complaint must (1) rest on the same general set of facts, (2) involve the same injury, and (3) refer to the same instrumentality, as the original one." (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408-409 (Norgart).)
The California Supreme Court has analyzed the relation-back doctrine in several different contexts. For example, in Grudt v. L.A. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 575 (Grudt),the plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of Los Angeles that set forth a single cause of action alleging that two police officers, who were city employees, intentionally shot her husband without cause. Over a year later, the plaintiff amended her complaint to add a second cause of action alleging that "the City was negligent in continuing to employ [the officers] after it knew or should have known that they were dangerous and violent officers, prone to the use of unnecessary physical force." (Id. at p. 583.) The trial court ruled that plaintiff's amendment was untimely because it was filed after the one-year statute of limitations had run.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the amendment related back to the filing of the original complaint. The Court acknowledged that, by asserting the City was liable for "retaining the services of officers known to be dangerous," the amendment "added a significant new dimension to the lawsuit." (Grudt, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 583-584.) However, the Court ruled that the amendment still related back because "both counts in the amended complaint . . . recite the same acts by [the officers] as the gravamen of the action, and recovery is sought in both counts to compensate plaintiff for the loss of her husband." (Id. at p. 584.)
In Smeltzley v. Nicholson Manufacturing (1977) 18 Cal.3d 932 (Smeltzley), the Supreme Court considered the relation-back doctrine in the context of a Doe amendment. The plaintiff, who had suffered injuries while operating a debarking machine, filed a personal injury complaint against his employer and several fictitiously named defendants. The complaint did not specifically reference the debarking machine, but alleged that the employer had breached its duty to provide a safe work place, which caused his leg to be amputated in an accident. Two-and-a-half years after the accident, the plaintiff filed a first amended complaint asserting that his injuries were caused, in part, by a defect in the debarking machine and substituted the machine's manufacturer as "Doe 1." (Id. at p. 935.) The manufacturer demurred to the first amended complaint, arguing that the new claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the relation-back doctrine applied because "[b]oth complaints issue from the same injuries and the same accident. The original complaint asserts that the injuries were caused by a dangerous condition of the employers' premises; the amended complaint identifies that condition as a defective machine manufactured by [defendant]." (Smeltzley, supra, 18 Cal.3d. at p. 939.) In reaching its holding, the Court rejected the manufacturer's assertion that the amendment did not relate back because the original complaint failed to identify the debarking machine as the cause of the accident:
The crucial fact . . . is not whether the original complaint mentioned the debarking machine as the reason the mill premises were dangerous, but that . . . the amended complaint refers to 'the same accident and the same injuries referred to in the original complaint.' [Citation.]"(Id. at p. 937.)
More recently, in Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th 383, the Supreme Court discussed the relation-back doctrine in the context of the "discovery rule," which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff has reason to discover the cause of action. (Id. at p. 397.) The plaintiffs in Norgart brought a wrongful death suit alleging that the manufacturer of the depression medication "Halcion" sold an unsafe product that caused the plaintiffs' daughter to commit suicide by intentionally overdosing on prescription drugs, including Halcion. Although the suit was filed after the limitations period had expired, the plaintiffs argued that the claims were timely under the discovery rule.
In analyzing the discovery rule issue, the Supreme Court considered whether plaintiffs could have filed a timely suit against a third party, and then amended the complaint to add the manufacturer of Halcion as a Doe defendant. Plaintiffs admitted that, shortly after the suicide, they suspected their daughter's husband, through his physical abuse, and her doctor, through his professional negligence, had caused her to intentionally overdose on Halcion and other drugs. Based on those admissions, the Court concluded that, if the plaintiffs had filed that suit, any amendment alleging that the manufacturer of Halcion had contributed to the intentional overdose by selling an unreasonably dangerous product would have related back to the original complaint.
The Supreme Court explained that such an amendment would satisfy each element of the relation-back doctrine. First, "the same-general-set-of-facts requirement" would have been met because "[b]oth the original and amended complaints would have involved Kristi's wrongful death by means of an intentional overdose of prescription drugs including Halcion arising out of depression." (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 409.) Second, the "same-injury requirement would . . . have been met . . . [because] . . . . [b]oth the original and amended complaints would have involved Kristi's wrongful death by means of an intentional overdose of prescription drugs including Halcion arising out of depression." (Ibid.)Third, "the same-instrumentality requirement would . . . have been met . . . [because] . . . . [b]oth the original and amended complaints would have referred to Kristi's wrongful death by means of an intentional overdose of prescription drugs including Halcion arising out of depression. (Ibid.)
In each of the cases summarized above, the Supreme Court found that the relation-back doctrine was applicable because the amendment (or in the case of Norgart, the hypothesized amendment) added a claim alleging that the newly-named defendant "was responsible for the same occurrence" or "instrumentality" referred to in the original complaint that allegedly caused the plaintiff's injury. (Barnes v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 199, 205 (Barnes);see also Garrett v. Crown Coach Corp. (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 647, 651 [relation back applies where "plaintiff is seeking to hold [Doe defendant] legally responsible for the same accident and the same injuries referred to in the original complaint"].)
b. The "relation-back doctrine" does not apply here
In this case, Rodriguez's complaint alleged that her son died as the result of a fire that was caused by a defect in the motor of his mechanized bed. Her proposed amendment, however, would assert that her son's death was caused by the Changs' failure to install a sufficient number of smoke alarms, which might have alerted neighbors to the fire. Although the amendment involves the same injury described in the original complaint - Jimenez's death - it introduces a new "instrumentality" as the cause of that injury: insufficient fire alarms. Because the amendment does not "refer to the same instrumentality" that allegedly gave rise to Jimenez's injuries (the manufacturing defect in his bed), the relation-back doctrine does not apply. (See Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 408-409.)
Rodriguez, disagrees, arguing that her amendment does not allege that a different instrumentality - the smoke alarm - actually caused the fire; rather she is alleging that "the inadequate number of smoke detectors is merely a contributing factor [to Jimenez's injuries], a link in the chain of causation." Thus, in Rodriguez's view, the relation-back doctrine applies whenever an amended complaint alleges that a substituted Doe defendant committed an act that was a causative factor in the plaintiff's injury.
The primary authority Rodriguez cites in support of her broad interpretation of the relation-back doctrine is Coronet Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 342 (Coronet).In Coronet, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the plaintiff's daughter had been electrocuted while using a "defective Lady Sunbeam electric hair dryer." (Id. at p. 344.) The complaint named the Sunbeam Corporation and several Doe defendants who provided components to Sunbeam. After the statute of limitations had run, plaintiff amended the complaint to substitute Coronet, which had allegedly supplied components for a "table lamp with a Leviton switch" that caused the electrocution, as a Doe defendant. (Ibid.)
After reviewing prior case law analyzing the relation-back doctrine, the appellate court concluded that the doctrine applied only if the "'accident' and the instrumentality were the same throughout." (Coronet, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 347.) The court further ruled that because the plaintiff's amendment alleged that the table lamp, rather than the hair dryer, caused the injury to the deceased, it introduced a "different instrumentality," and therefore did not relate back to the original complaint.
The court specifically rejected the notion that an amendment may relate back if it merely "rests upon the same general set of facts as the original complaint and refers to the same . . . injuries referred to in the original complaint." (Coronet, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 345.) The court explained that such a rule would "emasculate the statute of limitations and simply permit an injured party to file a complaint alleging that a number of unknown persons were, without specificity, 'somehow' responsible for the injury and then at his leisure amend to include various causes of action against later identified defendants." (Ibid.)
Although the court determined that, as pled, plaintiff's amendment did not relate back to the original complaint, it remanded the case to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to cure the defect:
We do, however, see some possible salvation for [plaintiffs] . . . if Coronet can be shown to be in the chain of causation of the originally pleaded cause of action involving use of the hair dryer.(Coronet, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at pp. 347-348.)
It is obvious that in order for the electrocution to have occurred, the hair dryer had to be plugged into an electrical outlet. If [the plaintiffs] can truthfully plead that the hair dryer was connected to the lamp with its Leviton switch and socket, which was manufactured by Coronet, then the amended complaint would be referring to the same "accident," i.e., use of the hair dryer and its components. The amended complaint would be based on the same general set of facts and would relate back.
The court explained that a similar "chain of causation" analysis had been followed in Barnes, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d 199, in which the plaintiff initially brought suit against a bar after being stabbed by an intoxicated patron:
The original complaint [in Barnes]charged the owners of the bar where the assault occurred. The theory of liability was the negligent failure of the owners to restrain the assailant and protect the plaintiff. The amended complaint charged the owners of a neighboring bar with having, prior to the assault, furnished liquor to the intoxicated assailant. Thus, though the cause of action, the defendants and the theory of liability of the amended complaint were all different from the original complaint, the assailant and the injury were the same. The new defendants were simply added as a part of the chain of causation.(Coronet, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 346.)
Rodriguez contends that Coronet and Barnes recognize that the relation-back doctrine applies whenever the amendment asserts a claim alleging the defendant committed an act that was a causative factor in the plaintiff's injury. However, Coronet specifically rejected such an argument, explaining that a Doe amendment relates back only if it asserts that the substituted defendant was part of the chain of causation that led to the act or instrumentality identified in the original complaint that caused the plaintiff's injury. (Coronet, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at pp. 345, 347-348.) Similarly, Barnes concluded that the amendment against the neighboring bar related back because the plaintiff claimed the newly named defendant was "responsible for the same occurrence," not merely the same injury, described in the original complaint. (Barnes, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at p. 205.)
This same "causation" analysis is evident in the Supreme Court's holdings in Norgart, Smeltzley and Grudt. In Norgart, the hypothesized original complaint would have alleged that defendants had engaged in wrongful conduct that induced the victim to intentionally overdose on prescription drugs (the instrumentality), which led to her death (the injury). The Doe amendment, in turn, would have alleged that the substituted defendant's sale of an unreasonably dangerous depression medication was partly to blame for the victim's intentional overdose. In Smeltzley, the original complaint alleged that the defendants' failure to provide a safe working environment had caused dangerous mill conditions (the instrumentality) that damaged the plaintiff's leg (the injury). The amendment, in turn, alleged that the substituted defendant had contributed to the accident by manufacturing the defective debarker machine, which was the same "dangerous . . . condition" referenced in the original complaint. (Smeltzley, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 937.) Finally, in Grudt, the original complaint alleged that police officers had shot the plaintiff without cause (the instrumentality), and the plaintiff died as a result (the injury). The amendment, in turn, alleged that the City of Los Angeles had contributed to the officer's conduct by continuing to employ officers who were known to be violent. Thus, in all three cases, the amendment did not merely allege that the defendant had contributed to the plaintiffs' injuries, but rather that the defendant was responsible for the same instrumentality or occurrence that caused those injuries.
Although the original complaint did not specifically identify the debarking machine as the cause of the accident, the court ruled that "plaintiff's assertion of unsafe, dangerous and defective conditions at the mill is sufficiently general to comprehend any danger arising from defective mill machinery." (Smeltzley, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 937.)
In contrast, Rodriguez's proposed amendment alleges that an entirely different instrumentality (the smoke alarms, rather than the defective motor) caused Jimenez's injuries. (See Coronet, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 34 [relation-back doctrine applies only where the "'accident' and the instrumentality were the same throughout"].) This new theory has nothing to do with the "gravamen of the original complaint," which is simply that a defective motor caused the fire. (Grudt, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 584 [permitting amendment where "additional facts . . . do not involve a significantly distinct cause of action"].) Indeed, the cause of the fire is not even relevant to Rodriguez's claim against the Changs. (See Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 282 [relation back improper where "the facts underlying the claims were logically separate and distinct"].)
If we were to accept Rodriguez's assertion that the relation-back doctrine applies whenever an amendment alleges a Doe defendant was partially responsible for the plaintiff's injury, it would effectively "emasculate the statue of limitations" by permitting an injured party to bring claims that have virtually no connection to the allegations or issues raised in the original complaint. (Coronet, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 345.) Indeed, under Rodriguez's theory, she could conceivably amend her complaint to sue the builder of the apartment complex for negligently using non-fire retardant construction materials, or sue the ambulance operator for failing to respond to the fire in a timely manner.
The case law makes clear, however, that the relation-back doctrine does not apply so broadly. Instead, it applies only where an amendment "seeks to hold [the substituted defendant] responsible for the same occurrence and damage alleged in the original complaint." (Barnes, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at p. 205.) Because Rodriguez does not seek to hold the Changs responsible for the defective motor, or the fire that it allegedly caused, the amendment does not relate back to the original complaint.
The Changs have also argued that, even if Rodriguez's amendments stated a timely cause of action, service of the amendments should have been quashed because the summonses did not indicate the Changs were being sued as fictitiously named defendants. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 474 [stating that "no default or default judgment shall be entered against a [fictitiously named] defendant . . . unless it appears that the copy of the summons . . . bore on the face thereof a notice stating" the fictitious name under which the defendant has been sued].) To the extent service was defective, the proper remedy would have been to allow Rodriguez to re-serve the Doe amendments. (See, e.g., Streicher v. Tommy's Electric Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 876, 884-885 [trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff opportunity to correct defective handling of Doe amendment].) In this case, however, re-serving the amendments would serve no purpose because, as the trial court properly concluded, Rodriguez's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (See Civ. Code, § 3532 ["The law neither does nor requires idle acts"].)
--------
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order is affirmed. Respondents are to recover their costs on appeal.
ZELON, J. We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
JACKSON, J.