Opinion
2:20-cv-01581-AR
03-07-2023
JONATHAN JASON RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. BRAD CAIN, et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Jeffrey Armistead United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff, held in custody at the Oregon State Correctional Institution and representing himself, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action against six named defendants, all of whom are or were employed by the Oregon Department of Corrections: Brad Cain, Correctional Lieutenant Officer James Eastwood, Correctional Sergeant Spriet, Corrections Officer Allison, Corrections Officer Main, and Hearings Officer Joe Capps. Rodriguez alleges that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him due process in connection with a disciplinary hearing, and violated his Eighth Amendment rights by imposing an excessive fine. Compl., ECF No. 2. Defendants move for summary judgment on Rodriguez's claims. Defs. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 38. The court recommends GRANTING defendants' motion for summary judgment.
As discussed below, Spriet is deceased and did not appear in this action.
PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL MATTER
Rodriguez filed this action on September 11, 2020. Comp., ECF No. 2. Defendants moved for summary judgment on January 3, 2022. Defs. Mot. Summ. J., ECF 24. On January 4, 2022, Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta issued the following notice to Rodriguez:
The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment (Motion for Summary Judgment [24]) by which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case.
Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no dispute of material fact-that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case-and the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials, as provided in Rule 56(c), show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.Summ. J. Advice Notice, ECF No. 41.
On April 22, 2022, Rodriguez filed his “Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,” which did not include any supporting documentation. Opp. Summ J., ECF 49.
Defendants' version of events is supported by declarations and official ODOC records related to the events in question. See Declaration of James Eastwood (“Eastwood Decl.”), ECF No.39 and Declaration of Joe Capps (“Capps Decl.”), ECF No. 40. Rodriguez's complaint in this action is unverified, which means the court may not treat the complaint as an affidavit opposing the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985) (an unverified complaint is insufficient to counter a summary judgment motion supported by affidavits); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (1995) (“A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56”). Thus, the following facts are based primarily on defendants' evidence, and the court considers them undisputed given Rodriguez's failure to submit oppositional evidence.
A verified complaint is filed with a sworn statement declaring that, under penalty of perjury, the allegations are true and correct in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 12, 2018, ODOC employees James Eastwood, Randall Allison, and Harley Spriet were assigned to the bus run between the Salem Transport Unit and Ontario; Allison was driving the bus, Spriet was sitting in the front of the bus, and Eastwood was sitting in the back. Eastwood Decl., ¶ 5. Rodriguez was one of 32 adults in custody (“AICs”) secured in the caged area of the bus. Eastwood Decl., ¶ 5.
While the bus was traveling through LaGrande, Oregon, Rodriguez, who was seated in the middle of the bus, yelled out that he needed to go to the bathroom. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 5. Spriet responded that Rodriguez would need to wait until the bus arrived at the Powder River Correctional Facility (“PRCF”) in Baker City, Oregon, to use the bathroom. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 5, Att. 2, p. 7. About 20 minutes later, Rodriguez shouted, “I need to take a fucking piss, I'm gonna piss right here if you don't stop!” Eastwood Decl. ¶ 6. Spriet told Rodriguez the bus would be at PRCF soon, and he could go then. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 6. Rodriguez then yelled, “I'll spit in your fucking face you fucking punk and beat your ass!” Eastwood Decl. ¶ 6. Eastwood then radioed Spriet on the intercom and instructed him to have Allison pull the bus over so the officers could move Rodriguez into a single secure cell in the front of the bus to separate him from the other AICs. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 6.
While Allison pulled the bus off the highway, Spriet called the Oregon State Police dispatch to inform them that the bus was pulling over to allow the officers to deal with a situation, but that they did not need any assistance at that time. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 7. Spriet and Eastwood secured their firearms in a safe at the front of the bus, and Spriet instructed Allison to stay armed and remain in the front of the bus to provide security. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 7. Spriet and Eastwood then entered the caged area of the bus, unlocking sections as they went through to gain access to Rodriguez. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 7. When they reached Rodriguez's seat, Spriet instructed Rodriguez to stand up, and Rodriguez yelled, “Are you gonna take me back to piss?” Eastwood Decl. ¶ 7. Eastwood told Rodriguez no and ordered him to stand, and Rodriguez then yelled, “Make me fucking get up!” Eastwood Decl. ¶ 7. Eastwood then grabbed Rodriguez by the front of his jumpsuit and forced him to stand, and Spriet and Eastwood escorted Rodriguez to the front of the bus to secure him in a single cell. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 7, Att. 2, p. 8.
While Spriet was opening the door to the single cell, Rodriguez attempted to raise his legs to kick at Spriet. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 8. Eastwood then held Rodriguez's upper body and Spriet placed his foot on top of Rodriguez's leg irons to prevent Rodriguez from being able to kick. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 8. Eastwood then placed Rodriguez in the cell and the door was secured. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 8. Once Rodriguez was secured in the single cell, Allison returned the bus to the freeway and the Oregon State Police were informed that the bus trip had resumed. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 8.
When the bus arrived at PRCF, the officers offloaded some inmates and noticed liquid on the floor where Rodriguez was sitting, indicating that he had urinated in the cell. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 8. The bus continued on to SRCI without further incident, and upon arrival the officers removed Rodriguez from the bus and escorted him to intake, where they removed his restraints and placed him in a cell for special housing staff to come and get him. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 9, Att. 2, p. 8. The following day Eastwood completed an Unusual Incident Report describing what had occurred, both Spriet and Allison authored memoranda describing the events, and Eastwood issued a Misconduct Report to Rodriguez. Eastwood Decl., Att.2.
On September 17, 2018, Hearings Officer Joe Capps conducted a disciplinary hearing with Rodriguez on the charges alleged in the Misconduct Report. Capps Decl. ¶ 5. Prior to the hearing, Rodriguez received a copy of the underlying Misconduct Report, Notice of Hearing, Notice of Inmate's Rights in a Hearing, and Rules of Prohibited Conduct. Capps Decl., Att. 2, p.1. After reading the officers' reports and speaking with Rodriguez, Capps found that on September 12, 2018, while on the transport bus traveling between the Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution and PRCF, Rodriguez stood up and shouted that he needed to “[t]ake a piss,” that Spriet told Rodriguez he could use the bathroom at PRCF, and that about 20 minutes later Rodriguez again stood and shouted, “I need to take a fucking piss. I'm gonna piss right here.” Capps Decl. ¶ 5. After being instructed by the officers to wait, Rodriguez then stated, “I'll spit in your face you fucking punk, I'll beat your ass.” Capps Decl. ¶, Att. 2, p. 1.
Capps further found that the bus then pulled off the interstate at an exit, and Eastwood and Spriet disarmed themselves and entered the AIC enclosure to move Rodriguez to a single holding cell because of his disruptive behavior. Capps Decl. ¶ 6. Eastwood told Rodriguez to stand up and Rodriguez responded, “Make me fucking get up.” Capps Decl. ¶ 6. Eastwood then grabbed Rodriguez by his jumpsuit and turned him away from Spriet and himself because of Rodriguez's threats to spit, and Rodriguez was then walked backwards towards the cell and placed there. Capps Decl. ¶ 6. Capps found that at some point after that, Rodriguez urinated on the floor of the holding cell, and it ran along the floor of the bus. Capps Decl. ¶ 6, Att. 2, p. 1.
Capps spoke to Rodriguez during the hearing about his actions, and Rodriguez told Capps that he did not remember the incident and that he had blacked out. Capps Decl. ¶ 8. Rodriguez asked to view a video of the incident, but Capps informed Rodriguez that there were no video recordings of the incident. Capps Decl. ¶ 8. Based upon a telephone conversation with Eastwood, Capps states there is a monitor in the bus which allows officers to observe the AICs who are being transported, but it does not record. Capps Decl. ¶ 8.
Capps concluded that Rodriguez “made hostile and physical threats towards staff, refused orders to move, and urinated on the floor which threatened the safety, security, and orderly operation of the transport out in the community.” Capps Decl., Att. 2, p. 1. Capps found that Rodriguez violated Rule 1.05.03 (Property I), by defacing the transport bus by urinating in it, that Rodriguez violated Rule 2.10 (Disrespect I) by directing hostile verbal language towards the officers on the transport bus, and that Rodriguez violated Rule 4.01 (Disobedience of an Order I) when he refused to comply with the order to stand and to wait to go to the bathroom. Capps Decl. ¶ 7. Although Rodriguez was also charged with violation Rule 2.06 for inmate assault, Capps dismissed that charge due to insufficient evidence. Capps Decl. ¶ 7, Att. 1, p. 2. Capps sanctioned Rodriguez with 21 days of loss of privileges and a $75.00 fine. Capps Decl. ¶ 9, Att. 1, p. 2.
Rodriguez's complaint alleges three claims for relief. First, Rodriguez alleges that during the bus ride he voiced his need to use the bathroom; when told that he could not, he got upset and responded by yelling, “fuck you pigs.” Comp. ECF 2, p. 4. He alleges that Spriet and Eastwood “pulled me up and choked me until I was unconscious,” and that “I later woke up covered in blood inside the cage.” Comp. ECF 2, p. 4. In his second claim, Rodriguez alleges that he heard Eastwood or Allison, presumably while still on the bus, yell out to “call ahead” and place restrictions on Rodriguez, and that upon arrival at SRCI and asking to use the restroom, eight staff members (including one female) surrounded Rodriguez and watched him urinate. Comp. ECF 2, p. 5. When Rodriguez asked for privacy, defendant Main “screamed at” and threatened him physically. Comp. ECF 2, p. 5. Rodriguez also alleges that Eastwood submitted a falsified disciplinary report. Comp. ECF 2, p. 5. Finally, Rodriguez's third claim alleges that, at the disciplinary hearing, Capps refused to believe Rodriguez, and refused to review video from the bus, ask the officers for photos, or contact the body spill clean up crew. Comp. ECF 2, p. 5. He also alleges that the $75.00 fine that Capps imposed is excessive. Comp. ECF 2, p. 5. As noted, however, Rodriguez's complaint is not verified and he provides no evidence in support of those claims; they are referenced here solely for the purpose of providing context for defendants' arguments and evidence.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate where the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party must establish the absence of genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party can only defeat summary judgment by going beyond the allegations in the complaint to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. A party cannot defeat a summary judgment motion by relying on the allegations set forth in the complaint, unsupported conjecture, or conclusory statements. Hernandez v. Spacelabs Medical, Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment thus should be entered against “a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
To determine whether summary judgment is proper, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982). All reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact should be resolved against the moving party. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976). However, deference to the nonmoving party has limits. “Mere allegations or denials” are insufficient to meet the nonmoving party's burden to show a genuine issue of material fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1994). Therefore, where “the record taken as a whole could not lead to a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).
The court construes a pro se litigant's filings liberally. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A pro se party involved in civil litigation, however, is held to the same standards in responding to a motion for summary judgment and “should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of record.” Jacobsen v. Filler, 7 90 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986). Additionally, “[i]t is not the district court's job to sift through the record to find admissible evidence in support of a non-moving party's case.” Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Therefore, when a plaintiff makes assertions but does not identify specific evidence in the record to support those assertions, the court is not required to search for it. See F.T.C. v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (“A non-movant's bald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence in his favor are both insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Rodriguez's claims on the following five grounds: (1) claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be based on an individual's personal involvement in depriving a constitutional right and cannot succeed under a respondeat superior theory; (2) Rodriguez's claims against defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) defendants did not violate Rodriguez's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; (4) defendant Capps did not violate Rodriguez's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, nor did he violate Rodriguez's Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive fines; and (5) defendants are shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
A. Lack of Personal Involvement
Rodriguez does not allege personal participation by defendant Cain in any of the alleged constitutional violations. As to defendants Allison and Main, Rodriguez alleges only that he may have heard Allison yell on the bus to “call ahead” and place Rodriguez on restrictions, and that defendant Main screamed at him and threatened him-Rodriguez does not allege that either were involved in the use of force or the disciplinary proceeding.
Liability under § 1983 “arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant” in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Arnold v. Int'l Business Machines, Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). Liability may also be imposed if the defendant sets into “motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted).
“A supervisor may be liable if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted), abrogated on other grnds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). It is well established, however, that § 1983 does not impose liability upon state officials for the acts of their subordinates under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978).
Rodriguez does not allege facts establishing that Cain, Allison, or Main were personally involved in the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Rodriguez does not state a claim against defendants Cain, Allison, or Main upon which relief may be granted under § 1983, and they are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
To the extent Rodriguez alleges that Allison's and Main's verbal statements somehow violated his rights, verbal harassment generally does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996); Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Rodriguez's complaint does not allege whether he is suing the individual defendants in their personal or their official capacities. “Persons” liable for damages under § 1983 include state employees sued in their individual capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). States and agencies and state employees sued in their official capacities are not proper defendants under § 1983 and, therefore, cannot be sued under the statute. Id. at 25-26 (citing Will v. Michigan State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 62-71 (1989)). Where a plaintiff fails to identify the capacity in which the state actor is sued, the Ninth Circuit looks beyond the caption of the complaint to the “basis of the claims asserted and the nature of relief sought.” Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Commission, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (presumption that plaintiffs sued state officials under § 1983 in their individual capacities as “any other construction would be illogical”). Here, the court presumes that Rodriguez names the defendants in their individual capacities; any other construction would be illogical given that Rodriguez seeks relief in the form of money damages, which would be precluded had Rodriguez filed an official-capacity suit. See Marcotte v. Monroe Corrections Complex, 394 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1295 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (citing Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 42 F.3d at 1284). Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment for failure to name a proper § 1983 defendant.
C. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment - the Bus Incident
The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). When a plaintiff alleges that correctional officers used excessive force against him, the issue is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013). The standard has both objective and subjective elements. Objectively, the alleged wrongdoing must be “harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Subjectively, prison officials must act “with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” id, but an “express intent to inflict unnecessary pain is not required.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
To determine whether a particular use of force evinces the wanton infliction of pain, the court must “consider the objective need for force, the relationship between any such need and the amount of force actually used, the threat reasonably perceived by the correctional officer, whether the officer took efforts to temper the severity of his response, and the extent of the inmate's injury.” Marquez v. Gutierrez, 322 F.3d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2003). In considering use of force measures, courts must afford prison officials “wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22.
Here, Eastwood stated that due to Rodriguez's disruptive behavior during the bus ride, Eastwood grabbed Rodriguez by the front of his jumpsuit, forced him to stand up, and then Eastwood and Spriet escorted Rodriguez to the front of the bus to secure him in the single cell. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 8. Once there, when Rodriguez attempted to kick out at Spriet, Eastwood held Rodriguez's upper body and Spriet put his foot on Rodriguez's leg irons to prevent him from doing so. Eastwood Decl. ¶ 8. The threat perceived by Eastwood was reasonable as Rodriguez was verbally aggressive, refused to comply with orders, and attempted to kick Spriet. The relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used was likewise reasonable. Moreover, Rodriguez presents no evidence beyond his bare allegations that he suffered any injury, and Eastwood's version of the incident is consistent with the lack of injury. Based on the evidence before the court, there are no facts from which a factfinder could infer that Eastwood or Spriet acted with an improper motive or in an objectively unreasonable manner. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Rodriguez's claim of excessive force.
D. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process - Disciplinary Hearing
Rodriguez alleges that Capps violated his due process rights when he refused to believe Rodriguez's version of the incident over Eastwood's and Spriet's version at Rodriguez's disciplinary hearing. He further alleges that Capps refused to review bus video showing Rodriguez being assaulted and refused to observe the alleged property damage or otherwise verify that the damage occurred.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Analysis of procedural process claims in the prison context involves a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the state interfered with an AIC's protected liberty or property interest, and (2) whether procedural safeguards were constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
“To comply with due process requirements during inmate disciplinary proceedings, prison officials must provide [an AIC] with: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) some time following the notice to prepare a defense; (3) a written decision by the fact-finder; (4) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (5) assistance from staff or other [AICs] if the [AIC] is illiterate or if the case is extremely complex.” Calderon v. Dezi, No. 2:17-cv-01625-JR, 2018 WL 4705537, at *4 (D. Or. Oct. 1, 2018) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-572 (1974)). Further, substantive due process requires that “some evidence” support a prison disciplinary decision. Supt., Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); see also Williams v. Thomas, 492 Fed.Appx. 732, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (observing that “due process requires that there be ‘some evidence in the record' supporting the decision by the prison”) (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 454)).
Here, nothing in the record suggests that Rodriguez is illiterate or required assistance due to the complexity of his case, nor that defendants failed to provide Rodriguez with written notice of the charges, some time to prepare a defense, or a copy of Capps's written decision. Therefore, the issues in dispute relevant to the due process analysis are whether Capps provided Rodriguez with a sufficient opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence at his disciplinary hearing, and whether some evidence supported Capps's decision.
The record demonstrates that Capps advised Rodriguez of his right to call witnesses and present evidence as part of his defense, and that Rodriguez made statements on his own behalf. Capps Decl., Att. 2. Capps informed Rodriguez that there was no video of the alleged incident for him to review or to show to Rodriguez, and that because the property damage violation was based upon defacing the transport by urinating in it, there was no damaged property for Capps to go view. Capps Decl., Att. 2. In light of the officers' reports and Rodriguez's statement to Capps that he did not remember the incident because he blacked out, Capps's disciplinary decision satisfied the Constitution's minimally stringent standards of “some evidence.” See Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board”) (emphasis in original) (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted to defendants on Rodriguez's due process claim against Capps.
E. Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines - Disciplinary Sanction
Rodriguez alleges that Capps violated his right to not be penalized by an “excessive fine” when Capps imposed a fine of $75.00-“a fourth of” an AIC's average yearly wages. The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, no excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's “power to extract payments, whether in case or in kind, as punishment for some offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). By its plain language, the Excessive Finds Clause is violated only if the disputed fees are both “fines” and “excessive.” Id. “A punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of a defendant's offense.” Id. at 324.
The Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection applicable to states under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682, 687 (2019).
Rodriguez's claim fails as a factual matter. The fine of $75.00 is not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the related offense; as Capps noted, the fine imposed was within the range of sanctions provided in prison disciplinary rules. Capps Decl. ¶ 9. See Howard v. Oregon Dept. of Corrections, No. 6:10-cv-06390-AA, 2013 WL 4786483, at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 5, 2013) (ODOC disciplinary fines proscribed on a grid through administrative rules and statutorily approved as appropriate punishment for the proscribed offenses are not excessive), affirmed, 603 Fed.App'x 633 (9th Cir. 2015). Moreover, Rodriguez's allegation that the fine is excessive based on the proportion it represents of an average yearly prison income lacks merit; proportionately does not bear on the excessive fines analysis. See United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a claim that the excessive fines provision of the Eighth Amendment was violated does not require an inquiry into the offender's ability to pay or the hardship that the fine may impose on the offender). Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Rodriguez's excessive fine claim.
F. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the court engages in a two-part analysis. First, the court asks, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 235-236 (2009). Second, the court asks “whether the right was clearly established.” Id. A right is clearly established if “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. The court has discretion to decide “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see also Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, as discussed above, Rodriguez has failed to establish the violation of any statutory or constitutional right, i.e., the first prong of the qualified immunity test. Therefore, it is unnecessary to reach the question of whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
G. Defendant Spriet
Defendant Spriet, who is deceased, has not appeared in this action. See Waiver of Service of Summons, ECF 13 (declining waiver of service of behalf of Spriet, as he passed away in December 2018). The court's finding that Rodriguez cannot succeed on his excessive force claim against Eastwood, however, is equally effective in barring his claim against Spriet. See Silverton v. Department of Treasury of U.S. of America, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (court may take sua sponte action against non-moving defendants “where such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defendants are integrally related”); Jones v. Bishop, No. CV-09-0150-JLQ, 2010 WL 4628067, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2010) (dismissing claims against deceased defendant who had not appeared in action because ruling dismissing claims against other defendants was equally effective as to the deceased defendant). Accordingly, Rodriguez's claim against Spriet should be dismissed.
H. Doe Defendants
Finally, Rodriguez names “Jane Doe” and “John Doe (x5)” as defendants who have never been identified or served in this action. While naming fictitious defendants is generally disfavored in federal court, “plaintiff[s] should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). This case has been pending since September 2020, and the deadlines to amend pleadings, identify parties, and complete discovery have passed. See ECF Nos. 17, 43.
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court-on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff-must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). The 90-day deadline applies to service on unnamed defendants. Jordan v. Arce, No. 1:20-cv-01658-ADA-SAB (PC), 2022 WL 17417869 at *12 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2022) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 425761 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2023). In addition to Rule 4(m)'s requirements, “courts may dismiss a defendant, a claim[,] or an action based on a party's failure to prosecute an action[,] failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules.” Bulgara v. Cty. of Stanislaus, No. 1:18-cv-00804-DAD-SAB, 2020 WL 5366306, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2020) (citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1105255 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2021). Where a plaintiff has failed to effect service in accordance with Rule 4(m) and has failed to comply with the orders instructing him to identify all parties, dismissal of the Doe defendants is warranted. See Williby v. California, 276 Fed.Appx. 663, 665 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding district court's sua sponte dismissal of Doe defendants was merited where plaintiff had failed to identify defendants within allotted discovery period); Bulgara, 2022 WL 5366306, at *5 (recommending dismissal of Doe defendants, without additional notice, for failure to effect service under Rule 4(m) where defendants were not identified within the allotted discovery period). Accordingly, the Jane and John Doe defendants should be dismissed from this action.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court recommends that the district judge GRANT defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 38) and enter a judgment of dismissal.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen days. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen days. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.