Opinion
No. 3:03-CV-2015-N
April 7, 2004
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b) and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. BACKGROUND
A. Nature of the Case ; This is a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Parties ; Plaintiff is a former inmate in the Texas prison system. He names the State of Texas (State) as the sole defendant in this action. (Compl. at 1.) No process has been issued in this case.
C. Statement of the Case ; Plaintiff sues the State for keeping him on a ten-year sentence for fourteen years. ( See Answers to Questions 1 and 3 of Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire (MJQ).) As relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages, his prison medical records, and a polygraph test that he took while in prison or on parole. ( See Answer to Question 2 of MJQ.) He also wants his records expunged. ( Id.) In addition, he has filed a motion to seal this case. ( See Mot. filed Feb. 13, 2004.)
II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING
The Court has permitted plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis. His complaint is thus subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). That statute provides for sua sponte dismissal if the Court finds the complaint "frivolous" or "malicious," if it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or if it "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief."As demonstrated below, plaintiff seeks relief against an entity not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeks monetary relief from a defendant which is immune to such relief, and seeks other relief not available in this action.
III. RELIEF UNDER § 1983
Plaintiff sues the State of Texas for keeping him on parole after the date his parole allegedly expired pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ( See Compl. at 4; Answer to Question 3 of MJQ.) That statute "provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's `rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It "afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms." Id. To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999).
The State of Texas is not a "person" subject to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Furthermore, the specific relief that plaintiff seeks is not available under § 1983. Thus, this § 1983 action against the State of Texas necessarily fails.
A. Monetary Damages
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages as relief against the State. "The Eleventh Amendment [, however,] secures the states' immunity from private suits for monetary damages filed in federal court." Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2000). Although Congress has the power to abrogate that immunity through the Fourteenth Amendment, Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-76 (2000), and the State may waive its immunity by consenting to suit, ATT Communications v. BellSouth Telecommunications Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2001), the State has not waived its immunity by consenting to suit nor has Congress abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Plaintiff cannot obtain monetary damages from the State.
B. Expungement
Plaintiff also seeks expungement of his records by this action. Even if plaintiff had named a person subject to suit under § 1983, expungement of records is not a type of relief available under that statute. "The right to expungement of state records is not a federal constitutional right." Eutzy v. Tesar, 880 F.2d 1010, 1011 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting Duke v. White, 616 F.2d 955, 956 (6th Cir. 1980)). Furthermore, in the absence of some "special circumstance", lower federal courts may not order expunction of public records or order that a state conviction be expunged. See Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567, 568 (5th Cir. 1978); Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1972). Plaintiff has asserted no special circumstances to warrant expungement of his records.
C. Request for State Records
Plaintiff also seeks his prison medical records and the results of a polygraph examination by this action. Such relief is also not available in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Assuming that plaintiff sought and was denied his prison medical records or the results of his polygraph examination, this does not make his request viable under § 1983. The failure to "provide copies of medical records does not violate any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Clay v. City of San Francisco, No. C 97-307 SI (PR), 1997 WL 142800, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 1997). Likewise, the failure to provide plaintiff with a copy of the results of his polygraph examination does not violate any constitutional or federal right.
Were the Court to construe the complaint as a claim under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, the result would be the same. FOIA "requires federal agencies to disclose records that do not fall into one of nine exempt categories." United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 793-794 (1984) (footnote omitted). FOIA does not apply to state agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (f)(1); St. Michael's Convalescent Hasp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff thus has no viable FOIA claim against the State of Texas or its agencies.
D. Sealing Case
By motion filed several months after the filing of the instant action, plaintiff seeks to have the Court seal his case from public scrutiny. It has long been recognized that the public has "a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents." Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (footnote omitted). Such right, however, "is not absolute." Id. at 598. Each "court has supervisory power over its own records and files," and may deny "access . . . where court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes." Id. "Thus, the common law merely establishes a presumption of public access to judicial records." SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, "the district court's discretion to seal the record of judicial proceedings is to be exercised charily." Federal Savs. Loan Ins. Corp. v. Blain, 808 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1987).
"In exercising its discretion to seal judicial records, the court must balance the public's common law right of access against the interests favoring nondisclosure." Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d at 848. Having public access to judicial records "serves to promote trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb judicial abuses, and to provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, including a better perception of its fairness." Id. at 849 (quoting Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 682 (3d Cir. 1988)).
In this instance, plaintiff has presented nothing to overcome the presumption of public access. There appears to be nothing in the court records that could be used for improper purposes, and with the dismissal of this action, this case will be closed. Because nothing weighs in favor of limiting public access in this case, the common law right of access overcomes plaintiff's motion to seal the action. The Court should not seal this case from public scrutiny.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the District Court summarily DISMISS plaintiff's complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) and DENY the motion to seal the case. In view of such dismissal, all other pending motions should be DEEMED MOOT.