Summary
In Rodgers v. Duncanville Independent School District, 2005 WL 770712 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2005) (Report and Recommendation adopted, 2005 WL 991287 (N.D. Tex Apr. 25, 2005)), the court granted summary judgment for a school district that banned a father from the school premises.
Summary of this case from Williamson v. Nettleton Sch. Dist.Opinion
No. 3-04-CV-0365-D.
April 5, 2005
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment in this pro se civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons stated herein, the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
I.
Plaintiff Michael D. Rodgers, Sr., the parent of two Duncanville ISD students, complains that the school district and various employees violated his civil rights by limiting his access and eventually barring him from the campus at Merrifield Elementary School. Although his pleadings are less than a model of clarity, it appears that plaintiff sues defendants under federal law for: (1) violating his parental right of access to the school; (2) retaliating against him for exercising his right to free speech; and (3) race, gender, and disability discrimination. ( See Plf. Sec. Am. Compl. at 7-8). Plaintiff also asserts claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the violation of his parental rights under Texas law. ( See id. at 8-9). By this suit, plaintiff seeks $360,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. ( Id. at 9).
Defendants now move for summary judgment as to all claims and causes of action. Plaintiff was directed to file a response to the motion by March 25, 2004, but has failed to do so. The court will therefore consider the summary judgment motion without the benefit of a response.
The court initially ordered plaintiff to file a response and any supporting evidence by February 22, 2005. See Order, 1/31/05 at 2. At plaintiff's request, this deadline was extended until March 25, 2005. See Order, 2/23/05.
II.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" if the issue could be resolved in favor of either party. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Thurman v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 952 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 136 (1992). A fact is "material" if it might reasonably affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matter of Gleasman, 933 F.2d 1277, 1281 (5th Cir. 1991).
A summary judgment movant who does not have the burden of proof at trial must point to the absence of a genuine fact issue. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to show that summary judgment is not proper. Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992). The parties may satisfy their respective burdens by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 82 (1992). Where, as here, the non-movant has not filed a summary judgment response or submitted any controverting evidence, the court may accept as true the undisputed facts adduced by the movant. See Tillison v. Trinity Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc., 2005 WL 292423 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2005) (Fitzwater, J.), citing Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F.Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (Fitzwater, J.). All evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1993).
Although the verified pleadings of a pro se litigant can be considered as summary judgment evidence to the extent such pleadings comport with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), see King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994), the only sworn pleading submitted by plaintiff in this case is an affidavit filed on March 16, 2004. However, nothing in that affidavit controverts the summary judgment evidence relied on by defendants.
A.
Plaintiff first sues for federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants seek summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's parental access, retaliation, and discrimination claims on the grounds that: (1) there is no constitutional right of unlimited parental access to a school; (2) plaintiff's speech did not involve matters of public concern and disrupted the educational environment; and (3) there is no evidence of race, gender, or disability discrimination. The court will consider these arguments in turn.
Defendants also move for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) there is no basis for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Because plaintiff has failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation, the court need not address the issues of municipal liability and qualified immunity.
1.
In order to maintain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must show that he has been deprived of a federally protected right by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). The only arguable constitutional right implicated by plaintiff's parental access claim is the right to direct the education and upbringing of his children guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). However, no court has ever interpreted the due process clause to create a parental right of unfettered access to school facilities. To the contrary, courts have consistently upheld the authority of school officials to control activities on school property. This includes barring third parties, including parents, from access to the premises when necessary to maintain order and prevent disruptions to the educational environment. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655-56 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting claim that school administrators must provide parents with "boundless access" to school property); Van Deelen v. Shawnee Mission Unified School Dist. #512, 316 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1057 (D. Kan. 2004) (finding no constitutional right of parent to enter school); Ryans v. Gresham, 6 F.Supp.2d 595, 601 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (same).The summary judgment record shows an escalating pattern of threatening, abusive, and disruptive conduct by plaintiff toward the faculty and administration at Merrifield Elementary School. These incidents include yelling at his son's first grade teacher and following her into the parking lot, swatting his son and another student on the backside for misbehaving as they walked down the hallway, and using profanity when addressing school administrators. (Def. MSJ App. at 39-40). At first, plaintiff was restricted from entering the classroom but was allowed to eat lunch with his son and daughter in a separate area of the cafeteria. Plaintiff also was told to schedule a formal conference with the principal if he wanted to communicate with any teachers. ( Id. at 40). When plaintiff ignored these directives, he was banned from the campus. ( Id. at 41). Plaintiff continued to defy school officials by entering the campus and verbally taunting teachers. Twice the police were called to remove plaintiff from school property. ( Id.). Plaintiff even confronted his son's teacher during a class field trip to the zoo, shouting "No Justice, No Peace" and using profanity in front of the students. ( Id. at 42). None of these facts are controverted by competent summary judgment evidence. Consequently, plaintiff has failed to establish a cognizable claim for the violation of his parental right of access to the school.
2.
Plaintiff further alleges that he was banned from the school campus for exercising his right to free speech. To the extent plaintiff attempts to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim, he must prove that: (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) defendants' actions caused him to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) the adverse actions were substantially motivated against the plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. See Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first and third elements of this test.
Speech is constitutionally protected only if it addresses a "matter of public concern." See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Kirkland v. Northside Independent School Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 799 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2620 (1990). In making this determination, the court must consider the content, form, and context of the speech. See Markos v. City of Atlanta, Tex., 364 F.3d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 2004). Here, plaintiff complained to school officials about the treatment of his son. The form of such communications were private discussions with teachers and administrators. Although plaintiff has continued to voice his complaints by picketing the school, he did not engage in this more formal type of public protest until after he was banned from the campus. Under these circumstances, the court concludes that plaintiff's speech did not involve a matter of public concern. See, e.g. Landstrom v. Illinois Dep't of Children Family Services, 892 F.2d 670, 680 (7th Cir. 1990) (parental complaints about the questioning of their children by school officials in a child abuse investigation did not involve matters of public concern); Clark v. West Contra Costa Unified School Dist., 2000 WL 336382 at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2000) (speech not protected by First Amendment where mother attempted to gain particular result for her daughter and was not "speaking out against a general pattern of conduct by defendants" or "attempting to inform the public of widespread problems with the school"); Ryans, 6 F.Supp.2d at 600 (complaints about the way child was being treated fell outside purview of First Amendment).
Nor has plaintiff shown that defendants' actions were motivated by a desire to retaliate against him. As previously discussed, plaintiff was banned from the school campus as a result of his threatening, abusive, and disruptive behavior. There is no evidence that defendants were motivated by a desire to punish plaintiff for exercising his right to free speech. In fact, plaintiff has been allowed to picket outside the school without interference, and may continue to exercise that right provided he does not disturb the educational environment. ( See Def. MSJ App. at 41, 59-61). For these reasons, plaintiff cannot establish a violation of his First Amendment rights.
3.
Plaintiff also accuses defendants of discriminating against him on the basis of race, gender, and disability. The court initially observes that plaintiff does not specify a constitutional or statutory basis for his discrimination claims. To the extent such claims are brought under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff "must allege and prove that he received treatment different from that received by similarly-situated individuals and that the unequal treatment stemmed from discriminatory intent." Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 153 (2004). Plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence that defendants banned him from the school campus because he is an African-American male or suffers from an unspecified disability. Nor is there any basis for concluding that defendants "singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected [their] course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effect on an identifiable group." Lavernia v. Lynaugh 845 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1988). Without evidence that defendants treated similarly-situated non-minority parents differently than plaintiff, he cannot establish an equal protection violation.
B.
Finally, plaintiff sues for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the violation of his parental rights under Texas law. A federal court has broad discretion in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993). Among the factors to be considered in exercising this discretion are judicial economy, convenience, fairness, federalism, and comity. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403-04, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1213-14, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970). When all federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, these factors weigh heavily in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction. See Bunch v. Duncan, 2002 WL 324287 at * 4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2002), quoting Parker Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries, 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Our general rule is to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendant are dismissed."). Accordingly, plaintiffs state law claims should be dismissed without prejudice.
RECOMMENDATION
Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in part. The motion should be granted with respect to plaintiff's federal claims for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Those claims should be dismissed with prejudice. The court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the violation of his parental rights. Those claims should be dismissed without prejudice.