Opinion
Case No. 5:00-CV-134
March 26, 2001
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Court's Opinion of this date;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant County of Ionia's Motion to Set Aside Default (Dkt. No. 15) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. No. 10) and Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 21) are DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant County of Ionia's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 17), Defendants 64A District Court, Hon. Raymond P. Voet, and Magistrate Garald Mooeggenborg's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 8), and Defendants R. Piper and City of Portland's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 6) are GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all federal law claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the several motions of the parties: specifically, Plaintiff Joseph Rodgers' Motion for Entry of Default Judgment and Motion to Strike Defendant County of Ionia's Motion to Dismiss, Defendant County of Ionia's Motion to Set Aside Default and Motion to Dismiss, Defendants City of Portland and R. Piper's Motion to Dismiss, and Defendants 64A District Court, Hon. Raymond Voet and Magistrate Garald Moeggenborg's Motion to Dismiss.
I. Allegations and Procedural Historv
This suit was filed on November 8, 2000. It's allegations have all of the hallmarks of a bad pro se complaint — conclusory statements, unfounded legal conclusions and legally baseless allegations. Nevertheless, it was filed by two attorneys, one of whom, Edward Rodgers, II, is described in the allegations of the Complaint as a witness and the father of Plaintiff Joseph Rodgers.
Once more it would appear, kinship has caused a party and counsel to leap wildly into places where angels otherwise fear to tread.
Plaintiff's allegations, to the extent that they are not unfounded legal conclusions, are as follows: On July 19, 2000, Defendant R. Piper issued Plaintiff a traffic ticket, which Plaintiff protested. On July 27, 2000, Plaintiff requested an informal conference (within the meaning of Michigan Court Rule 4.101(E)(2)) regarding the ticket. This conference was scheduled for August 23, 2000 at 3:30 p.m. by Magistrate Garald H. Moeggenborg of the 64A District Court (District Court for Ionia County). Plaintiff arrived for the conference with his father, Edwards F. Rodgers, II, and awaited the conference from a waiting room. Plaintiff was called into the conference by Defendant Piper at 3:40 p.m. At that time, Defendant Piper told Plaintiff's father that he did not have permission to participate in the informal conference. Plaintiff's father objected to this instruction on the ground that the conference was a public hearing. Plaintiff's father also asked Defendant Piper to inquire of Defendant Moeggenborg whether he could participate. Defendant Moeggenborg responded to this inquiry by stating that Plaintiff's father could not come in and Defendant Piper so informed Plaintiff's father. Plaintiff's father protested and was told by Defendant Piper to "back off" in a menacing manner. This confrontation caused Plaintiff's father to step backwards and land against a row of chairs. Defendant Moeggenborg then rushed out of the conference room and told Plaintiff's father in a loud voice that he could not participate in the conference.
According to the allegations, Plaintiff then attended the conference without his father. Defendant Moeggenborg inquired during the conference whether Plaintiff desired to pay the ticket. Plaintiff then demanded a hearing. The hearing was conducted immediately by the Magistrate taking the testimony of Defendant Piper and the testimony of Plaintiff. The testimony of the two was directly contrary on the issue of whether the Defendant was in a position to observe any ticket violation. The Magistrate found in favor of the State of Michigan and issued a $40 fine. When Plaintiff informed the Magistrate that he would appeal the decision, the Magistrate determined that the fine should be $75.
Plaintiff claims generally that the conduct of the Defendants constitutes violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States' Constitution. He also claims that the conduct violates state law. He also asserts liability against the City of Portland, the County of Ionia, the 64A District Court, and Judge Raymond Voet based on their supervision of Magistrate Moeggenborg and/or Defendant Piper and the financing of court operations.
After filing of this suit, Plaintiff served the various Defendants and specifically served the County of Ionia by November 15, 2000 . (See Dkt. No. 3, Return of Service.) Notwithstanding, Defendant County of Ionia neglected to file an answer or otherwise defend as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. This resulted in Plaintiff's request for entry of default and default judgment on January 4, 2001 and the Clerk's entry of default against the County of Ionia on January 5, 2001. (See Dkt. Nos. 10 and 11.) Defendant County of Ionia then moved to set aside the default on January 22, 2001 — on the ground that its failure to defend was due to excusable neglect (the mistaken belief that the Attorney General was tendering a defense to the County) and that the default should be set aside under Rule 55. Both before and after this motion, the Court has received motions to dismiss by the various defendants in this suit, which are now fully briefed. The Court has also received Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant Ionia County's Motion to Dismiss — which is premised on the notion that Ionia County is in default.
II . Rule 55 — Motion to Set Aside Default
"[T]he district court enjoys considerable latitude under the `good cause shown' standard" of Rule 55(e) to grant a defendant relief from a default entry. W aifersong Ltd. Inc. v. Classic Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Manufacturers' Indus. Relations Ass'n v. East Akron Casting Co., 58 F.3d 204, 208 (6th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that motions to set aside default entries, as opposed to default judgments, are to be granted more liberally). This policy of the Federal Rules is particularly important since the Rules strongly favor resolution of controversies on their merits. United States v. Real Property, All Furnishings Known as Bridwell's Grocery, 195 F.3d 819, 820 (6th Cir. 1999); Shepard Claims Serv., Inc. v. William Darrah Assoc., 796 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1986).
In exercising its discretion, the district court is to consider three factors: (1) whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether the culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default. Manufacturers' Indus. Relations Ass'n, 58 F.3d at 209; United Coin Meter Co., Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1983).
In this case, the resolution of the issue is perfectly clear. The Motion to Set Aside the Default was filed early and long before any prejudice resulted to Plaintiff. Defendant also has strong and meritorious defenses (as later described in this Opinion). Finally, the Defendant is not guilty of culpable conduct and merely failed to respond out of inadvertence. As such, the Motion to Set Aside Default will granted. This decision renders moot the Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment. It also dictates that Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be denied in order for the Court to assess the defenses asserted by Ionia County in the Motion to Dismiss.
III . Motions to Dismiss-Rule 12 — Standard
Defendants' remaining motions request dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state cognizable claims. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The allegations of the complaint must be construed in the favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The rules generally require only a "short and plain statement of the claim" and not detailed allegations. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). Nevertheless, the complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'" Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted.) The district court "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987).
IV . Federal Claims A. Judicial Immunity
Regarding judicial immunity, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the advent of the civil rights laws has not destroyed judicial immunity:
It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.
We do not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by § 1983, . . . we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991). Thus, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Pierson, the common law privilege of absolute judicial immunity protects a judge from any lawsuit for compensation as to acts done by a judge in his official capacity even if the judge is alleged to have acted corruptly in performing his official duties. The Supreme Court also determined in Mireles v. Waco that this judicial immunity extended to acts by a judge in ordering that a police officer bring a litigant before the court, even where the officer was alleged to have used excessive force. See also Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. Turner, 125 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 1997).
In this case, the actions of the Magistrate, even were they corrupt and decidedly improper, were the actions of a local judicial officer performing judicial functions in a judicial setting. As such, they are protected by judicial immunity and the claims against Defendant Moeggenborg shall be dismissed as failing to state cognizable claims.
B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity and Witness Immunity
Plaintiff's Complaint describes essentially two kinds of conduct on the part of Defendant R. Piper — abusiveness in acting as a court bailiff and perjury as a court witness. As to both kinds of conduct (which presumably deprived Plaintiff the right to a fair hearing), the Defendant is protected by immunity. The rationale for extending absolute judicial immunity to a bailiff carrying out court orders is obvious. Otherwise, personnel carrying out judicial orders would become "lightening rods" for lawsuits and the purpose of judicial immunity (the creation of a sphere of safety in which judicial decisions can be free from reprisals from unhappy litigants) would be quickly defeated. For this reason, the federal courts have held that absolute judicial immunity extends to officers performing bailiff functions at the court's instructions. Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1997); Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107 (8th Cir. 1994); Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 762 (7th Cir. 1989 ); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965); Nabkey v. Gibson, 923 F. Supp. 117, 121 (W.D.Mich. 1996 ). As such, no liability can arise out of Defendant Piper's actions as a bailiff.
Relating to Defendant Piper's testimony, the Supreme Court has previously determined that police officers are entitled to common law absolute immunity as to their testimony in judicial proceedings even if that testimony is false. Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). This is consistent with the rulings of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which extends this immunity to police officers testifying falsely in court proceedings. Alioto v. City of Shively, 835 F.2d 1173 (6th Cir. 1987). As such, all claims against Defendant Piper shall be dismissed because his conduct was protected by absolute immunity.
C. City of Portland, County of Ionia, Raymond Voet and 64A District Court
Plaintiffs' remaining claims are against the City of Portland, County of Ionia, Raymond Voet and the 64A District Court for their supervision and/or funding of the conduct of Officer Piper and Magistrate Moeggenborg.
On the face of the claims, it is apparent that Plaintiff's claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1985 and 1986 since there are no allegations that the Defendant utilized the state court system to deny access to Plaintiff or to otherwise discriminate or conspire against Plaintiff on the basis of race or other protected class membership. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (holding that proof of class-based discrimination is required under 42U.S.C. § 1985(3)); Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983) (stating that proof of class-based discrimination is required under Section 1985(2) when arising out of a state court system); General Bldg. Contractors Assoc., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (holding that proof of class-based discrimination is required under Section 1981); Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that proof of class-based discrimination is required under Section 1985(2) when arising out of a state court system); Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359, 1363 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that absent a violation of Section 1985, Section 1986 claims cannot be sustained); Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) (same as Grimes). In this case, the general allegations of the Complaint are that Plaintiff, like all other litigants before the Magistrate, was denied fair treatment in the traffic court. These allegations do not create any inference of class-based discrimination which is a required element under these statutes as to deprivations arising out of the operation of state court systems. As such, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state causes of action under these statutes.
As for 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it would appear that Plaintiff is suing on the basis that the judge and officer's conduct deprived him of the right to a fair hearing as to his civil infraction, which may constitute a deprivation of due process of law. See Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978) (describing elements of Section 1983 claim); Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). Nevertheless, as to such deprivations, Judge Voet (the district court judge), the County of Ionia, the City of Portland and the 64A District Court can have no liability under Section 1983 absent their participation in the wrongdoing by policy or other conduct. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); McMillian v. Monroe County, Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 784-85 (1997); Salenpour v. University of Tennessee, 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998); Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (1989).
In this case, the Complaint alleges only a failure to act by the named Defendants. The Complaint provides no factual basis for a reasonable conclusion that the Defendants in fact knew of unconstitutional practices by the Magistrate or the Officer in advance of the hearing in question or had adopted any policies which fostered those practices. In particular, there are no allegations that Defendants received and refused to act on complaints about this incident nor that the Defendants had disregarded similar kinds of complaints prior to the incident. The inference desired by Plaintiff — that the Defendants should have known of the alleged unconstitutional practices of the Magistrate or the Officer merely because of the regularity of those practices or because of their positions of supervision — is not an inference supported by the case law of this Circuit. As such, Plaintiff's Complaint also fails to state a federal cause of action against these Defendants.
While the Court dismisses these claims, it does find disturbing the allegations that justice is regularly trammeled in the traffic court of Ionia County. Plaintiff is advised that such complaints may be aired and addressed through the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission which has authority to enforce provisions of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. See Michigan Court Rules 9.201, 9.205.
Furthermore, the claims against the 54A District Court, which is essentially the funding source for the Magistrate's judicial activities, must also be dismissed because of Eleventh Amendment Immunity. This is because federal courts, including the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that allowing a lawsuit for compensation to proceed in federal court against a branch of the state court system would be equivalent to a lawsuit against the state, which is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Randles v. Gregart, 965 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 869 F. Supp. 289 (D.N.J. 1994). For this reason also, the claims against the 54A District Court must be dismissed.
V. State Law Claims
Plaintiff's Complaint also contains claims for the state law tort of abuse of process and for violation of state court rules. As to those claims, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Nevertheless, since the only federal law claims asserted will be dismissed, Section 1367(c)(3) authorizes this Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. The Court believes that the interests of justice would be best served by the state court's resolution of the remaining state law issues and therefore will dismiss those claims without prejudice in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988); Long v. Bando Mfg. of America, Inc., 201 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2000).
CONCLUSION
In accordance with this Opinion, a Judgment shall entered dismissing all Plaintiff's federal law claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Said Judgment shall dismiss all Plaintiff's state law claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).