Opinion
23-cv-02867-TSH
12-21-2023
JOHN RODGERS, Plaintiff, v. BUTCHER CROWN LLC, Defendant.
REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT WITH REPORT & RECOMMENDATION RE: MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT RE: DKT. NO. 16
THOMAS S. HIXSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
John Rodgers filed this case against Butcher Crown LLC, owner of the Butcher Crown Roadhouse in Petaluma, California, alleging it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and related California laws. Rodgers seeks damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and injunctive relief. Pending before the Court is Rodgers' Motion for Default Judgment. ECF No 16. Butcher Crown has neither opposed the motion nor appeared in this case. The undersigned finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and VACATES the January 11, 2024 hearing. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). As not all parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the undersigned requests this case be reassigned to a district judge for disposition. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the District Court GRANT the motion.
II. BACKGROUND
Rodgers, a resident of Richmond, California, is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for mobility. Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 1. Butcher Crown owns the Butcher Crown Roadhouse (the “Restaurant”), located at 1905 Bodega Ave in Petaluma, California. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8.
On February 3, 2023, Rodgers tried to dine at the Restaurant. Id. ¶ 14. Upon approaching, Rodgers saw that he needed to use a ramp to enter, but the ramp's slope appeared to be very steep. Id. ¶ 15. Once on the ramp, Rodgers realized it was even steeper than it looked. Id. As he made his way up the ramp, Rodgers felt that due to the excessive slope he may roll backwards and falling should he not be able to stabilize his wheelchair. Id. A customer saw Rodgers struggling and helped him by pushing him up the ramp. Id. Once inside, Rodgers saw that all the tables were full, so he ordered his meal to go. Id. Rodgers then needed an employee's assistance to make his way down the same ramp. Id. Despite this difficulty, Rodgers enjoyed the food and wants to return to dine at the Restaurant again. Id. ¶ 16. He is frustrated and anxious for Butcher Crown to make the Restaurant wheelchair accessible. Id. In April 2023 Rodgers wanted to dine at the Restaurant but was deterred from doing so because it remains inaccessible to him. Id.
Before filing this action, Rodgers' accessibility expert conducted an informal investigation of the Restaurant. Id. ¶ 17. He confirmed that the ramp was not wheelchair accessible and determined it was also inaccessible in multiple other ways: (1) Exterior seating does not provide 5% of wheelchair accessible tables; (2) No tow away sign; (3) Access aisle typically blocked by a frame sign; (4) Access aisle does not have blue borders; (5) Access aisles lettering is less than 12" high; (6) Parking sign does not have $250 penalty sign; (7) Front ramp does not have railings on both sides; (8) Railing on ramp does not extend 12" beyond sloped area; (9) Railing on ramp is not correctly configured because upper extension is not parallel to the finish floor service; and (10) No 5% wheelchair accessible seating at back patio. Id.
On June 9, 2023, Rodgers filed the present complaint, alleging four causes of action: (1) violation of Title III of the ADA; (2) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 et seq.; (3) violation of the California Health and Safety Code, Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 19955 et seq.; and (4) violation of the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54 et seq. After Butcher Crown failed to respond, Rodgers sought and received an entry of default. ECF Nos. 10, 12-13. He now seeks a default judgment against Butcher Crown, an order requiring it to remove the architectural barriers to his access, $4,000 in statutory damages, and $11,781.88 in attorneys' fees and costs.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) permits a court, following default by a defendant, to enter default judgment in a case. “The district court's decision whether to enter default judgment is a discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980).
At the default judgment stage, the factual allegations of the complaint, except those concerning damages, “together with other competent evidence submitted” are deemed admitted by the non-responding parties. Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see also Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (“With respect to the determination of liability and the default judgment itself, the general rule is that well-pled allegations in the complaint regarding liability are deemed true.”). “However, a defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation omitted)). Therefore, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)); accord DIRECTV, 503 F.3d at 854. Further, the scope of relief is limited by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), which states that a “default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.”
In determining whether default judgment is appropriate, the Ninth Circuit has enumerated the following factors for courts to consider:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction and Service of Process
In considering whether to enter default judgment, a district court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to the case. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988) (considering subject matter jurisdiction on a 12(b)(1) motion).
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are presumptively without jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A federal court may dismiss an action on its own motion if it finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 78-79 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Here, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction because Rodgers asserts claims under the ADA, a federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims because they arise from the same nucleus of operative facts and out of the same transactions as the ADA claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.”).
2. Personal Jurisdiction
a. Basis for Personal Jurisdiction
To enter default judgment, the Court must have a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants in default. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d at 712. “Without a proper basis for [personal] jurisdiction, or in the absence of proper service of process, the district court has no power to render any judgment against the defendant's person or property unless the defendant has consented to jurisdiction or waived the lack of process.” S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2007). Traditional bases for conferring a court with personal jurisdiction include a defendant's consent to jurisdiction, personal service of the defendant within the forum state, or a defendant's citizenship or domicile in the forum state. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011).
Here, Butcher Crown owns the subject property, it is a limited liability company with its principal place of business in California, and Rodgers claims arise from his activity within the forum state. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7; Irakli Karbelashvili Decl., Ex. 6, ECF Nos. 16-11. As such, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Butcher Crown. See also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“Specific jurisdiction . . . depends on an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.”); Whitaker v. Lucky Opco LLC, No. 2021 WL 3427115, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2021) (in ADA accessibility case, court has specific jurisdiction over store located in district).
In support of his motion, Rodgers submitted declarations from both of his attorneys, Irene Karbelashvili (ECF No. 16-4) and Irakli Karbelashvili (ECF No. 16-6). The undersigned cites to their full names for clarity.
b. Service of Process
Personal jurisdiction also requires notice that is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). “A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been served properly under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4].” Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988).
Serving an “unincorporated association,” such as an LLC, requires “delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process ....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(h)(1)(B). Alternatively, plaintiffs may serve unincorporated entities in any manner permitted for serving an individual. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(h)(1)(A). That includes “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(1). Under California law, LLCs may be served by delivering the necessary documents “to the person designated as agent for service of process in a statement filed with the Secretary of State or to the president or other head of the association, a vice president, a secretary or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the association to receive service of process.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 416.40(b).
Here, Rodgers served Pete Schnell, the Restaurant's owner, who is also Butcher Crown's agent for service of process. ECF No. 10; Irakli Karbelashvili Decl., Ex. 11. Butcher Crown's address matches the address listed for Schnell on its registration with the California Secretary of State. See Irakli Karbelashvili Decl., Ex. 11. By taking these steps, Rodgers complied with California's requirements for service of an entity defendant and thus properly served Butcher Crown.
B. Eitel Factors
Applying the seven Eitel factors, the undersigned finds default judgment is warranted in favor of Plaintiff.
1. The Possibility of Prejudice
The first factor the Court considers is the possibility of prejudice if a default judgment is not entered. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. This factor weighs in favor of default judgment “when a defendant has failed to appear or defend against a suit, and the plaintiffs could not otherwise seek relief.” Vietnam Reform Party v. Viet Tan - Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F.Supp.3d 948, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citations omitted); IO Grp., Inc. v. Jordon, 708 F.Supp.2d 989, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (prejudice exists where denying the requested default judgment would leave the plaintiff without a proper remedy). Here, Rodgers will be without a remedy for Butcher Crown's violations of the ADA and related state law claims if default judgment is not entered. See Johnson v. Baglietto, 2020 WL 3065939, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3060902 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2020); Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Juno Biomedical, Inc., 2018 WL 2021483, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1993407 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2018) (“Because Plaintiffs have no recourse for injunction if default judgment is not entered, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.”). This factor weighs in favor of granting Rodgers' motion.
2. Substantive Claims and the Sufficiency of the Complaint
The second and third Eitel factors focus on the merits of the substantive claims and the sufficiency of the complaint. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. “These two factors are often analyzed together and require courts to consider whether a plaintiff has ‘state[d] a claim on which [it] may recover.'” Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F.Supp.3d at 962 (quoting PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). “Of all the Eitel factors, courts often consider the second and third factors to be ‘the most important.'” Id. (quoting Sanrio, Inc. v. Jay Yoon, 2012 WL 610451, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012)).
a. ADA
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability within places of public accommodation. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” For the purposes of Title III, discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
“Readily achievable” is defined as “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9).
Plaintiffs bringing claims under Title III must establish: (1) they have a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant “owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation;” and (3) the defendant denied them public accommodations because of their disability. Lopez v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc., 974 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 2020).
i. Rodgers is Disabled
The ADA defines the term “disability” to mean “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “Major life activities” include, among other things, walking. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). As Plaintiff is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for mobility, he satisfies the first element of an ADA claim. Daubert v. Lindsay Unified Sch. Dist., 760 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2014) (a plaintiff who is unable to walk without the use of a mobility aid such as a wheelchair is disabled within the meaning of the ADA); Whitaker, 2021 WL 3427115, at *3 (same).
ii. The Restaurant is a Place of Public Accommodation
The ADA expressly provides that “private entities are considered public accommodations . . . if the operations of such entities affect commerce.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The definition of public accommodation includes restaurants. Id. § 12181(7)(B). The ADA also provides that owners and lessors of places of public accommodation are expressly responsible for ensuring compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the . . . accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”). Thus, taking Rodgers' allegations as true, he has established this element.
iii. Rodgers was Denied Public Accommodation
Finally, Rodgers alleges he was denied access to the Restaurant based on his disability. As noted above, discrimination includes a failure to remove architectural barriers where such removal is readily achievable. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). In the Ninth Circuit, courts follow a burden-shifting framework to determine who bears the burden of proving that removal of an architectural barrier is readily achievable. See Lopez, 974 F.3d at 1038. Under this burdenshifting analysis, “the plaintiff bears the initial burden of plausibly showing that a proposal for removing a barrier is readily achievable, and then the defendant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on an affirmative defense that removal of a barrier is not readily achievable.” Johnson v. In Suk Jun, 2020 WL 6507995, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2020) (citing Lopez, 974 F.3d at 103439).
The undersigned finds Rodgers has met his initial burden of plausibly showing that removal of the identified barriers is readily achievable. The ADA defines “readily achievable” as “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). Federal regulations provide a non-exclusive list of steps to remove barriers, including
“[i]nstalling ramps.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b)(1). “Courts in this district have also observed that the listed items are examples of readily achievable steps to remove barriers.” Johnson v. Prospect Venture LLC, 2022 WL 2276890, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2022) (collecting cases) (internal quotations omitted). Further, “[b]ecause [Butcher Crown] ha[s] not appeared in this action, [it] necessarily ha[s] failed to meet [its] burden of showing that removal of the identified barriers is not readily achievable.” Id. Thus, the undersigned finds Rodgers has alleged the requisite elements for an ADA claim.
b. California Claims
“Any violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, “[b]ecause Plaintiff has alleged an ADA claim based on architectural barriers at [the Restaurant], he has also alleged an Unruh Act claim as to those barriers.” Prospect Venture LLC, 2022 WL 2276890, at *5.
Similarly, the undersigned finds Rodgers adequately alleged a claim under the California Health and Safety Code. “All buildings constructed or altered after July 1, 1970, must comply with standards governing the physical accessibility of public accommodations.” Ridola v. Chao, 2018 WL 2287668, at *11 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2018) (citing Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955 and Cal. Gov't Code § 4450(a)). Rodgers alleges the Restaurant is a public accommodation that has undergone alterations after January 1982. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 50-51; Altwal Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 16-2. As with his ADA claims, the undersigned accepts these allegations as true and finds them sufficient. See Rojas v. AARAV Hosp. LLC, 2023 WL 7198157, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 7195795 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2023) (finding allegations sufficient to support claim under Health and Safety Code where plaintiff “alleges the Ocean Lodge is an inaccessible public accommodation ‘constructed and/or altered after July 1, 1970, and substantial portions of Ocean Lodge and/or the building(s) had alternations, structural repairs, and/or additions made . . . after July 1, 1970.'”); Ridola, 2018 WL 2287668, at *12 (“Because the Motel and parking lot are not accessible to individuals with disabilities in violation of the CBC, Ridola has shown that Defendants have violated California Health and Safety Code § 19953 et seq.”).
Finally, California Civil Code section 54(d) states, “a violation of the right of an individual under Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) also constitutes a violation of this section, and nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the access of any person in violation of that act.” Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1. Thus, because Rodgers has sufficiently alleged an ADA claim against Butcher Crown, he has also alleged a California Disabled Persons Act claim.
3. The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action
Under the fourth Eitel factor, “the Court must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant's conduct.” Dr. JKL Ltd. v. HPC IT Educ. Ctr., 749 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When the amount at stake is substantial or unreasonable in light of the allegations in the complaint, default judgment is disfavored. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472 (affirming the denial of default judgment where the plaintiff sought $3 million in damages and the parties disputed material facts in the pleadings). “However, when the sum of money at stake is tailored to the specific misconduct of the defendant, default judgment may be appropriate.” Yelp Inc. v. Catron, 70 F.Supp.3d 1082, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Here, Rodgers seeks $4,000 in statutory damages and $11,781.88 in attorneys' fees and costs. This amount, plus any amount necessary to comply with an injunction, is reasonable in light of Butcher Crown's failure to defend against his adequately pled claims. See Rojas, 2023 WL 7198157, at *4 ($21,486.34 is reasonable in ADA default judgment context). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.
4. The Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts
The fifth Eitel factor examines the likelihood of dispute between the parties regarding the material facts surrounding the case. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. However, upon entry of default, the defendant is “deemed to have admitted all well-pleaded factual allegations” in the complaint. DIRECTV, Inc., 503 F.3d at 851 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a)). Moreover, as outlined above, Rodgers provided the Court with well-pleaded allegations supporting his claims. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.
5. Whether Default was Due to Excusable Neglect
The sixth Eitel factor examines whether the defendant's failure to respond to the complaint was the result of excusable neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Here, Rodgers provided adequate notice of this action, yet Butcher Crown made no appearance and failed to respond to the present motion. See S.E.C. v. Internet Sols. for Bus. Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A signed return of service constitutes prima facie evidence of valid service which can be overcome only by strong and convincing evidence.”) (simplified). Further, there is nothing in the record suggesting this failure is based on excusable neglect. See Shanghai Automation Instrument Co., 194 F.Supp.2d at 1005 (default after proper service was not excusable neglect). Thus, this factor supports default judgment.
6. Policy Favoring Deciding a Case on its Merits
The last Eitel factor examines whether the policy of deciding a case based on the merits precludes entry of default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. In Eitel, the Ninth Circuit admonished that “[c]ases should be decided on their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Id. “The existence of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), however, shows that this policy is not dispositive.” McMillan Data Commc'ns, Inc. v. AmeriCom Automation Servs., Inc., 2015 WL 4380965, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2015) (citing Kloepping v. Fireman's Fund, 1996 WL 75314, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1996)). Further, “deciding the case on the merits is impossible where a party refuses to participate.” Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F.Supp.3d at 970. Thus, because Defendant made no effort to respond to communication attempts by Plaintiff and in no way participated in the proceedings, “[t]his factor thus weighs against, but does not preclude, entry of default judgment.” Id.
7. Summary of the Eitel Factors
In sum, the majority of the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the District Court GRANT Rodgers' motion and enter default judgment against Butcher Crown.
C. Relief Sought
The undersigned next turns to the relief Rodgers seeks. Once liability is established, the plaintiff must then establish that the requested relief is appropriate. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). A “default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c).
1. Injunctive Relief
Rodgers seeks injunctive relief requiring Butcher Crown to remove the barriers to his access. Aggrieved individuals “may obtain injunctive relief against public accommodations with architectural barriers, including ‘an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.'” Molski, 481 F.3d at 730 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2)). Injunctive relief is also available under the Unruh Act, see Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, and under California Health and Safety Code section 19955, see D'Lil v. Riverboat Delta King, Inc., 59 F.Supp.3d 1001, 1007 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Ca. Civ. Code § 55). “The standard requirements for equitable relief need not be satisfied when an injunction is sought to prevent the violation of a federal statute that specifically provides for injunctive relief.” Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 643 F.3d 1165, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Thus, injunctive relief is proper under the ADA where the plaintiff establishes that “architectural barriers at the defendant's establishment violate the ADA and the removal of the barriers is readily achievable.” Ridola, 2018 WL 2287668, at *13 (citing Moreno v. La Curacao, 463 Fed.Appx. 669, 670 (9th Cir. 2011)).
As discussed above, Rodgers has shown he is entitled to injunctive relief with respect to wheelchair access at the Restaurant. Therefore, the Court undersigned RECOMMENDS the Court GRANT his request for injunctive relief. See Johnson v. An Khang Mi Gia, 2021 WL 5908389, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2021) (“Injunctive relief is proper where the plaintiff establishes that ‘architectural barriers at the defendant's establishment violate the ADA and the removal of the barriers is readily achievable.'”) (quoting Ridola, 2018 WL 2287668, at *13); Rojas, 2023 WL 7198157, at *5 (granting default judgment, including injunctive relief, where the plaintiff “adequately alleged that the Ocean Lodge could readily remove its architectural barriers.”).
2. Statutory Damages
Rodgers seeks $4,000 in statutory damages for Butcher Crown's violation of the Unruh Act, which provides a minimum statutory damages award of $4,000 for each violation. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). Rodgers “need not prove [he] suffered actual damages to recover the independent statutory damages of $4,000” per violation. Molski, 481 F.3d at 731. As discussed above, Rodgers has sufficiently pled the entrance ramp at the Restaurant did not meet ADA standards, and this barrier constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. Id. at 731 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f)). Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the Court GRANT Rodgers $4,000 in statutory damages. See Prospect Venture LLC, 2022 WL 2276890, at *7 (awarding $8,000 in statutory damages for two violations of the Unruh Act).
3. Attorneys' Fees
The ADA and Unruh Act both authorize a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable attorneys' fees. Specifically, the ADA provides that a district court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Similarly, under the Unruh Act, a prevailing party can recover “any attorney's fees that may be determined by the court.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). A prevailing party is one who “achieve[s] a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” that is “judicially sanctioned.” Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The calculation of a reasonable fee award is a two-step process. Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). First, a court begins by calculating the “lodestar figure,” or presumptive award, by multiplying the hours reasonably spent on the litigation by the attorney's reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Second, the court may enhance or reduce the lodestar figure based on the factors articulated in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), that were not subsumed in the initial lodestar determination. Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119. “A strong presumption exists that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee, and therefore, it should only be enhanced or reduced in rare and exceptional cases.” Id. n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
a. Reasonableness of Hourly Billing Rate
To determine the appropriate lodestar amount, the Court must first assess the reasonableness of counsel's claimed hourly billing rate. Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1994). Courts look to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for similar work by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). Generally, the relevant community is the forum where the district court sits. Id. The applicant bears the burden to produce sufficient evidence that the rates claimed for its attorneys are in line with prevailing market rates. Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1121 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). “Affidavits of the plaintiffs' attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” U.Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). Put differently, the party seeking fees bears the burden to prove the reasonableness of hours expended using detailed time records documenting completed tasks and time expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437; Roberts v. City of Honolulu, 938 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2019) (“It is the responsibility of the attorney seeking fees to submit evidence to support the requested hourly rate.”).
When a party seeking fees submits declarations, courts must consider those declarations and cannot substitute that analysis by only considering previous fee awards. Roberts, 938 F.3d at 1024 (“The district court diverged from the applicable standard in discarding the declarations entirely and considering only previous fee awards in determining the prevailing market rate.”) (emphasis in original). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has explained that solely “[e]xamining prior fee awards to [even the same attorneys] in the district [is] not an acceptable substitute for considering declarations submitted by [that attorney], and explaining why those declarations did or did not establish the prevailing hourly rate in the district.” Id. at 1025.
At the same time, district courts must remember that “[a] reasonable fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case.” Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Ctr., LLC, 893 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). The purpose of granting fees in cases like the instant case is both “to attract qualified counsel to civil rights cases and [to] avoid[] a windfall to counsel. The way to do so is to compensate counsel at the prevailing rate in the community for similar work; no more, no less.” Id. (quotation marks, citations, and internal alterations omitted).
Rodgers seeks $350/hr. for attorney Irene Karbelashvili and $275/hr. for attorney Irakli Karbelashvili. Mot. at 20; Irene Karbelashvili Decl. ¶ 4; Irakli Karbelashvili ¶ 11. Courts in this District have approved these rates in similar cases. See Rojas, 2023 WL 7198157, at *6; Kucera v. Becerra, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194129, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2023). As such, the undersigned finds these rates appropriate.
b. Reasonableness of Hours Billed
Having determined reasonable hourly rates to be applied, the undersigned proceeds to determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119. The Court “may not attempt to impose its own judgment regarding the best way to operate a law firm, nor to determine if different staffing decisions might have led to different fee requests.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008). At the same time, however, the Ninth Circuit has recently explained that “district courts have a duty to ensure that claims for attorneys' fees are reasonable, and a district court does not discharge that duty simply by taking at face value the word of the prevailing party's lawyer for the numbers of hours expended on the case. Rather, a district court must ensure that the winning attorneys have exercised billing judgment.” Vogel, 893 F.3d at 1160 (emphasis in original and quotation marks and citations omitted).
Rodgers seeks 3.80 hours for Irene Karbelashvili's work and 25.60 hours for Irakli Karbelashvili's work. Mot. at 20; Irene Karbelashvili Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. 1; Irakli Karbelashvili ¶ 17 & Ex. 4. A review of counsels' billing records shows that this time is reasonable. Further, the requested time is within the range that Rodgers' counsel has obtained in a similar matter in this District that reached the default judgment stage before a joint site inspection took place pursuant to General Order No. 56. See Rojas, 2023 WL 7198157, at *6 (finding 4.9 hours for Irene Karbelashvili's work and 27.4 hours for Irakli Karbelashvili's work reasonable in a similar ADA matter that “did not involve . . . a joint site inspection, motion practice, mediation, a case management conference, and a settlement conference.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
In sum, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the Court award 3.80 hours to Irene Karbelashvili at $350 per hour and 25.60 hours to Irakli Karbelashvili at $275 per hour, for a total attorneys' fees award of $8,370.
3. Costs
In addition to permitting recovery of attorney's fees, the ADA permits a district court, in its discretion, to award “litigation expenses” and “costs” to a prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. “Litigation expenses” include reasonable out-of-pocket expenses that would normally be charged to a fees-paying client, such as expert witness fees, certain travel expenses, and the preparation of exhibits. See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2002); Riker v. Distillery, 2009 WL 4269466, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009).
“[U]nlike the ADA, the [] Unruh Act do[es] not provide for out-of-pocket litigation expenses.” Rodriguez v. Barrita, Inc., 53 F.Supp.3d 1268, 1294 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Johnson v. Hey Now Props. LLC, 2019 WL 586753, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2019) (“Unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act contains no mention of litigation expenses as allowable costs.”); Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a) (failing to mention out-of-pocket litigation expenses).
Rodgers seeks costs in the amount of $3,401.88: $2,655 for the work of his expert, Bassam Altwal (9 hours at $295/hr.), $402 for the filing fee, $276 for process server fees, $6 to obtain a copy of the “Notice to Creditors of Bulk Sale” from the Recorder's Office, and $62.88 in research costs. Mot. at 21; Altwal Decl. ¶¶ 24-25 & Ex. C; Irakli Karbelashvili Decl., Exs. 7-10. The undersigned has reviewed the costs and finds them reasonable. See Rojas, 2023 WL 7198157, at *6 (finding similar costs reasonable); Macias v. Faisal, 2021 WL 2719297, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2021) (same). However, while Rodgers seeks $295/hr. for the work of his expert, Mr. Altwal has been awarded $275/hr. as recently as October of this year. See Rojas, 2023 WL 7198157, at *6. As Rodgers has provided no explanation for the $20/hr. increase in this case, the undersigned finds a reduction of $180 ($20 x 9 hours) is appropriate. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS the Court award $3,221.88 in costs.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the District Court GRANT Plaintiff John Rodgers' Motion for Default Judgment and enter judgment against Defendant Butcher Crown LLC. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS the Court:
(1) GRANT Rodgers' request for injunctive relief requiring Butcher Crown to provide wheelchair compliant access at Butcher Crown Roadhouse, located at 1905 Bodega Ave in Petaluma, California;
(2) AWARD $4,000 in statutory damages under the Unruh Act; and
(3) AWARD $8,370 in attorneys' fees and $3,221.88 in costs.Rodgers shall serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation and file proof of service thereafter. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), a party may serve and file any objections within 14 days after being served. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.