Opinion
2018–07159 Index No. 1655/17
02-02-2022
In the Matter of ROCKLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPUTIES ASSOCIATION, et al., appellants, v. COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, et al., respondents.
Bartlett LLP, White Plains, NY (John P. Quartucio of counsel), for appellants. Coughlin & Gerhart, LLP, Binghamton, NY (Lars P. Mead of counsel), for respondents.
Bartlett LLP, White Plains, NY (John P. Quartucio of counsel), for appellants.
Coughlin & Gerhart, LLP, Binghamton, NY (Lars P. Mead of counsel), for respondents.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., BETSY BARROS, PAUL WOOTEN, JOSEPH A. ZAYAS, JJ.
DECISION, ORDER & JUDGMENT In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review a determination of the respondent County of Rockland Sheriff's Office dated June 22, 2017, which adopted the determination of a hearing officer dated June 16, 2017, made after a hearing, affirming the denial of the petitioner Erica DeFilippo's application for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207–c, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Sherri L. Eisenpress, J.), dated April 23, 2018. The judgment denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding.
ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed and the judgment is vacated; and it is further,
ADJUDGED that the determination of the respondent the County of Rockland Sheriff's Office dated June 22, 2017, is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits; and it is further,
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents.
In August 2007, the petitioner Erica DeFilippo, a sheriff's deputy in Rockland County, sustained injuries as a result of a car accident that occurred while she was on the job. DeFilippo received benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207–c until April 2008, when she returned to work in full capacity. In 2011, DeFilippo was assigned to the mounted unit of the County of Rockland Sheriff's Office (hereinafter Sheriff's Office). In advance of taking that assignment, DeFilippo's chiropractor provided her with a letter stating that she was able to "function in all capacities and has resumed all physical routines that she was able to perform prior to the accident."
In 2016, DeFilippo filed an application for General Municipal Law § 207–c benefits, alleging a disability attributable to the injuries that she sustained in 2007. The Sheriff of the County of Rockland denied her application on the ground that her current disability was not attributable to a work-related injury. DeFilippo appealed that determination. Following an evidentiary hearing, a hearing officer affirmed the denial of DeFilippo's application, and the Sheriff's Office adopted the hearing officer's determination. Thereafter, the petitioners commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review the determination of the Sheriff's Office. The Supreme Court denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding. The petitioners appeal.
We agree with the petitioners’ contention that the Supreme Court should have transferred this proceeding to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804(g), since the petition raises a question of whether the challenged administrative determination is supported by substantial evidence. Nevertheless, because the complete record is now before this Court, we will treat the matter as one transferred here and will review that determination de novo (see Matter of Delgrande v. Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d 987, 988, 18 N.Y.S.3d 178 ; Matter of Figueroa v. Rhea, 120 A.D.3d 814, 814, 991 N.Y.S.2d 373 ; Matter of Whitehead v. New York City Hous. Auth., 102 A.D.3d 974, 974–975, 958 N.Y.S.2d 749 ).
Judicial review of the subject determination is limited to whether that determination is supported by substantial evidence (see CPLR 7803[4] ; Matter of Fortuna v. City of White Plains, 170 A.D.3d 1011, 1012, 96 N.Y.S.3d 286 ; Matter of Campo v. City of Mount Vernon, 156 A.D.3d 694, 694, 67 N.Y.S.3d 277 ). "Substantial evidence means more than a ‘mere scintilla of evidence,’ and the test of whether substantial evidence exists in a record is one of rationality, taking into account all the evidence on both sides" ( Matter of Solano v. City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d 676, 677, 969 N.Y.S.2d 528, quoting Matter of Stork Rest. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 273, 26 N.E.2d 247 ).
"When there is conflicting evidence or different inferences may be drawn, the duty of weighing the evidence and making the choice rests solely upon the [administrative agency]. The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [such agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists" ( Matter of Solano v. City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d at 677, 969 N.Y.S.2d 528 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Miserendino v. City of Mount Vernon, 96 A.D.3d 946, 947, 946 N.Y.S.2d 640 ). "Moreover, where there is conflicting expert testimony, in making a General Municipal Law § 207–[c] determination, a municipality is free to credit one physician's testimony over that of another" ( Matter of Solano v. City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d at 677, 969 N.Y.S.2d 528 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Segura v. City of Long Beach, 230 A.D.2d 799, 800, 646 N.Y.S.2d 823 ). Here, the hearing officer's determination is supported by substantial evidence. The testimony and evidence provided by the respondents’ experts was supported by medical evidence and the hearing officer was free to credit that testimony over the testimony of DeFilippo's experts (see Matter of Davenport v. City of Mount Vernon, 110 A.D.3d 1071, 1072–1073, 973 N.Y.S.2d 797 ; Matter of Solano v. City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d at 677, 969 N.Y.S.2d 528 ).
Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, DeFilippo was not entitled to receive General Municipal Law § 207–c benefits pending a determination by the hearing officer. Although a recipient of such benefits is entitled to a due process hearing prior to the suspension or reduction of those benefits (see Matter of DeMasi v. Benefico, 34 A.D.3d 472, 473, 823 N.Y.S.2d 537 ), the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that DeFilippo was not receiving such benefits when she applied for benefits in 2016, and that she had, in fact, returned to unrestricted duty eight years earlier (see General Municipal Law § 207–c[1] ; Matter of Miele v. Town of Clarkstown, 299 A.D.2d 362, 362, 749 N.Y.S.2d 274 ; Matter of Hensel v. City of Utica, 115 A.D.3d 1217, 1218, 982 N.Y.S.2d 627 ). Accordingly, the Sheriff's Office properly treated her application as one for new benefits. Similarly, the petitioners’ reliance on a section of the collective bargaining agreement entitled "Termination of Benefits" is misplaced because that section applies only where the County of Rockland seeks to terminate existing benefits on the ground that the claimant is no longer disabled.
The petitioners’ remaining contention is without merit.
DILLON, J.P., BARROS, WOOTEN and ZAYAS, JJ., concur.