Opinion
Index No. E2021011348
10-07-2022
Rochester General Long Term Care, Inc. d/b/a HILL HAVEN TRANSITIONAL CARE AND REHABILIATION CENTER, Plaintiff, v. Gwendolyn Siplin, and ODESSA COOPER, Defendants.
William M.X. Wolfe, Esq., HARRIS BEACH PLLC, attorneys for Plaintiff No appearance by Defendant Siplin No appearance by Defendant Cooper
Unpublished Opinion
William M.X. Wolfe, Esq., HARRIS BEACH PLLC, attorneys for Plaintiff
No appearance by Defendant Siplin
No appearance by Defendant Cooper
HONORABLE DANIEL J. DOYLE, JSC
In this action, Plaintiff Rochester General Long Term Care, Inc. d/b/a Hill Haven Transitional Care and Rehabilitation Center (hereinafter "Rochester General"), seeks to quiet title to real property, under Article 15 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, located at 51 High Street, Rochester, New York 14614, and to declare a prior foreclosure sale of the subject property void.
See RPAPL §§ 1501 et seq.; Summons and Complaint ¶ 8.
Rochester General now moves for summary judgment on their complaint. For the reasons that follow, Rochester General's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Furthermore, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3212(b) summary judgment is awarded to the defendants herein, and the complaint is dismissed.
"If it shall appear that any party other than the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment, the court may grant such judgment without the necessity of a cross-motion." (CPLR Rule 3212[b].)
Relevant Facts
On December 25, 1997 Herbert Thomas died having held title to 51 High Street, Rochester, New York (the "subject property) as a joint tenant with his wife, Defendant Odessa Cooper. Twenty-one years later, a foreclosure action was commenced against the subject property to foreclose on tax liens, but Odessa Cooper was not properly served with the required pleadings and notices, or named as a Defendant in the action.
Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (NYSCEF Docket # 29) at ¶¶ 2-3
Id. at ¶¶ 4-6.
Pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure and sale, the subject property was sold to Defendant Gwendolyn Siplin and she received a referee's deed to the property on February 26, 2019.
Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.
On or about July 20, 2021 a judgment was entered by Rochester General against Defendant Cooper in the amount of $98,512.34.
Affidavit of Elizabeth Young (NYSCEF Docket # 18) at ¶ 8.
On December 22, 2021 the instant action was commenced by the filing of a Summons and Complaint seeking to quiet title to the subject property. In the Complaint, it is alleged that Plaintiff Rochester General is a limited liability company that operated a skilled nursing facility. Nowhere in the complaint is it alleged by Rochester General that they have an ownership interest in the subject property. Furthermore, the present summary judgment motion is devoid of any evidence that Rochester General claims a present ownership interest in the subject property. Instead, Rochester General alleges that Defendant Cooper is the proper owner of the subject property (due to the defective foreclosure proceeding), that Rochester General has a judgment against Defendant Cooper, and that Rochester General seeks to divest title in the subject property from Siplin and a court order that Cooper is the lawful owner. Rochester General also seeks declaratory judgment that the lien against Defendant Cooper is a lien against the subject property.
See, generally, Complaint (NYSCEF Docket # 1) at ¶¶ 1-28.
Nor is there any allegation, or evidence to support an allegation, that Rochester General is acting on any authority on behalf of Defendant Cooper.
Defendant Siplin interposed an Answer. Defendant Cooper failed to appear.
NYSCEF Docket # 14.
It appears that Defendant Cooper may be incompetent, as the prior action in which Rochester General obtained the judgment was initially to appoint a guardian (NYSCEF Docket # I2018000042). Additionally, the judgment itself was a confession of judgment by Ms. Cooper's appointed powers of attorney. (See Statement For Judgment of Defaulted Confession of Judgment, attached as Exhibit G to the Summons and Complaint [NYSCEF Docket # 8].)
Summary Judgment Standard
A party seeking summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issue of fact. (Iselin & Co. Inc v Landau, 71 N.Y.2d 420 [1988].) Summary judgment may only be granted when "it has been clearly ascertained that there is no triable issue of fact outstanding; issue finding, rather than issue determination, is its function". (Suffolk County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v James M., 83 N.Y.2d 178, 182 [1994].) Only when the proponent demonstrates entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must then demonstrate, generally by admissible evidence, the existence of an issue of fact requiring a trial. (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 851 [1985].)
"To obtain summary judgment in an action to quiet title pursuant to RPAPL article 15, "the movant must establish, prima facie, that it holds title, or that the nonmovant's title claim is without merit" (White Sands Motel Holding Corp. v Trustees of Freeholders & Commonalty of Town of E. Hampton, 142 A.D.3d 1073, 1074 [2016])." (1259 Lincoln Place Corp. v. Bank of New York, 159 A.D.3d 1004, 1005 [2nd Dept. 2018], emphasis added.)
Plaintiff has Failed to Establish Entitlement to Summary Judgment
Here, in the light most favorable to Rochester General, the facts establish that Rochester General initiated this action against the current owner, Ms. Siplin, to seek a finding that a third-party (Odessa Cooper) is the actual owner of the subject property. Furthermore, in the light most favorable to Rochester General, they do not, and cannot, assert a present ownership estate or interest in the subject property. At most, they assert a judgment against Odessa Cooper that may become a lien against the subject property at some future date should title to the subject property vest with Ms. Cooper.
RPAPL § 1501 clearly requires in an action to quiet title that both the plaintiff and the defendant(s) claim an estate or interest in the real property at issue.
Where a person claims an estate or interest in real property... such person... may maintain an action against any other person, known or unknown, including one under disability as hereinafter specified, to compel the determination of any claim adverse to that of the plaintiff which the defendant makes, or which it appears from the public records, or from the allegations of the complaint, the defendant might make...(RPAPL § 1501[1].)
"To maintain a cause of action to quiet title, a plaintiff must allege actual or constructive possession of the property and the existence of a removable cloud on the property, which is an apparent title to the property, such as in a deed or other instrument, that is actually invalid or inoperative (see Zuniga v BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 147 A.D.3d 882, 883 [2017])." (Cudjoe v. Boriskin, 157 A.D.3d 654, 655, [2nd Dept. 2018].)
Furthermore, RAPL § 1515 specifically requires a complaint seeking to quiet title under Article 15 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law "set forth facts showing:... The plaintiff's estate or interest in the real property, the particular nature of such estate or interest, and the source from or means by which the plaintiff's estate or interest immediately accrued to him..." (RPAPL § 1515 [1][a].)
Thus, the assertion of an interest or estate in the subject property is an essential element of a cause of action to quiet title under RPAPL Article 15. (See Soscia v. Soscia, 35 A.D.3d 841 [2nd Dept. 2006].)
Defendant Cooper may have a property interest sufficient to establish a potential cause of action to quiet title. Defendant Siplin also has a property interest sufficient to bring an action to quiet title to the subject property. (See RPAPL § 1503.) However, Rochester General clearly does not. The complaint is devoid of any allegations that Rochester General has a property interest in the subject property sufficient to maintain an action to quiet title under Article 15 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law. As Rochester General failed to allege in the complaint or establish by the admissible evidence accompanying its motion papers that it has a property interest in the subject property, it cannot maintain an action to quiet title. (RPAPL §§ 1501; 1515; Soscia v. Soscia, supra; see also Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 73 A.D.3d 124, 130 [1st Dept. 2010].)
"Finally, the court properly rejected defendant's contention that the action is analogous to a quiet title action. In every case cited by the defendants in support of its "quiet title" theory, the plaintiff or plaintiffs alleged an ownership claim to the property at issue, be it real property or securities. See Wright v. Nostrand, 94 NY 31 (1883); Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. Jewelry Co., 76 NY 365 (1879); New York & New Haven R.R. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 NY 592 (1858). Here the plaintiffs are in the shoes of a judgment creditor, rather than an alleged owner, and are asking for a judgment declaring a third party, codefendant PA, as the true owner of the securities held by SASI."
Similarly, as to the causes of action in the complaint seeking declaratory judgments as to the prior foreclosure proceeding, the proper owner of the subject property, and to confirm the judgment lien against the non-appearing Defendant Cooper, Rochester General has failed to establish there is a justiciable controversy sufficient to justify a finding for Rochester General.
See Summons and Complaint at ¶¶ 34-50.
Pursuant to CPLR 3001, "[t]he supreme court may render a declaratory judgment... as to the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable controversy." To constitute a "justiciable controversy," there must be a real dispute between adverse parties, involving substantial legal interests for which a declaration of rights will have some practical effect (see Downe v. Rothman, 215 A.D.2d 716, 627 N.Y.S.2d 424; De Veau v. Braisted, 5 A.D.2d 603, 174 N.Y.S.2d 596, affd. 5 N.Y.2d 236, 183 N.Y.S.2d 793, 157 N.E.2d 165, affd. 363 U.S. 144, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109; Playtogs Factory Outlet v. County of Orange, 51 A.D.2d 772, 379 N.Y.S.2d 859). A controversy is said to exist where the plaintiff asserts rights which are actually challenged by the defendant (see DeVeau v. Braisted, 5 A.D.2d at 603, 174 N.Y.S.2d 596). The primary purpose of a declaratory judgment is to stabilize an uncertain or disputed jural relationship with respect to present or prospective obligations (see Goodman v. Reisch, 220 A.D.2d 383, 631 N.Y.S.2d 890).(Chanos v. MADAC, LLC, 74 A.D.3d 1007, 1008 [2nd Dept. 2010], emphasis added; see also CPLR § 3001.)
The possible justiciable controversy exists between Defendants Cooper and Siplin (see RPAPL § 1503), not between Rochester General and the Defendants.
Assuming arguendo the existence of a justiciable controversy between Rochester General and the Defendants herein, since Defendant Cooper has not answered, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to grant declaratory judgment.
A" 'default judgment in a declaratory judgment action will not be granted on the default and pleadings alone for it is necessary that plaintiff establish a right to a declaration against * * * a defendant' "(Levy V. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 124 A.D.2d 900, 902, 508 N.Y.S.2D 660; see, 43 NY Jur 2d, Declaratory Judgments § 57). Plaintiff failed to establish its right to the declaration sought. Moreover, even if plaintiff had established its right to a declaration, the decision whether to grant a declaratory judgment rests within the sound discretion of the court (CPLR 3001) and is "dependent upon facts and circumstances rendering it useful and necessary. [The court's] discretion must be exercised judicially and with care" (James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 NY 298, 305, 176 N.E. 401). Denial of the default judgment was proper because the declaratory relief requested clearly affects the rights of other parties not alleged to be in default (see, Rivera v. Laporte, 120 Misc.2d 733, 735, 466 N.Y.S.2d 606).(Merchants Ins. Co. of New Hampshire v. Long Island Pet Cemetery, Inc., 206 A.D.2d 827, 828 [4th Dept. 1994].)
Thus, Rochester General has failed to meet its initial burden establishing it is entitled to summary judgment on its complaint. (1259 Lincoln Place Corp. v. Bank of New York, supra.)
Upon its authority to search the record and award summary judgment to a non-moving party, the Court determines that as Rochester General does not have a property interest in the subject property and thus cannot maintain an action to quiet title, and there is no justiciable controversy between Rochester General and the Defendants as to the subject property, the Court awards summary judgment to Defendants Siplin and Cooper and the complaint is dismissed.
See CPLR Rule 3212(b).
Finally, as the Court finds that Rochester General has not established a property interest sufficient to maintain a quiet title action, and that there is no justiciable controversy between Rochester General and the Defendants, the Court shall enter judgment to "declare the validity of any claim to any estate or interest established by any party to the action." (RPAPL § 1521.)
Based upon the foregoing, and upon review of the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (NYSCEF Docket No.s 17-28); Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts (NYSCEF Docket # 29); and Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support (NYSCEF Docket # 30), it is hereby
ORDERED that the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that upon a search of the record pursuant to CPLR Rule 3212(b) the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Defendants Cooper and Siplin and the complaint is dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that pursuant to Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 1521 it is hereby ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Plaintiff Rochester General's claim to any interest or title to the property located at 51 High Street, Rochester, New York 14614 has been adjudged invalid.
Any prayers for relief not specifically addressed herein are DENIED.
This constitutes the Decision and Judgment of the Court.