Opinion
Civil Action 21-cv-03491-WJM-STV
06-13-2022
C. SEBASTIAN ROBLEDO-VALDEZ, Plaintiff, v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, DEAN WILLIAMS, TRAVIS TRANI, ANTHONY DECESARO, MARSHALL GRIFFITH, SCOTT DAUFFENBACH, BOBBY MAYES, JUSTIN TORIBIO, SERGEANT BUSTAMANTE, SERGEANT COOK, SERGEANT CORNEJOS, SERGEANT FISCHER, OFFICER GUSTIN, MARK FAIBAIRN, LINDSAY GOUTY, MISTY ZADE, STEPHANIE SANDOVAL, JOHN DOE SERGEANT, Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Scott T. Varholak, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief and Extension [#59], which has been referred to this Court [#61]. The Court has carefully considered the Motion and related briefing, the entire case file, and the applicable case law, and has determined that oral argument would not materially assist in the disposition of the Motion. For the following reasons, this Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion be DENIED.
The facts are drawn primarily from the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [#38] to provide context to the instant Motion.
Plaintiff Craig Sebastian Robledo-Valdez is an inmate currently imprisoned at the Sterling Correctional Facility (“SCF”). [#38 at 4] Plaintiff filed the instant action against the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”) and a number of CDOC employees. [See generally #38] In the Amended Complaint, zhealleges that Defendants-either individually or through their responsibility for CDOC policy-applied a “blackbox” on Plaintiff in a manner which caused injury. [Id. at 7] According to Plaintiff, the purpose of the blackbox is to cover the keyhole of handcuffs during transport. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that vertical application of the blackboxes-as opposed to horizontal application- causes pain, torture, injury, and discomfort. [Id.] Plaintiff identifies a number of occasions when Defendants applied a blackbox to zhim in a vertical manner, including several dates in 2019 and 2020. [Id.]
Plaintiff's pronouns are “zhe/zhis/zhim.” [See ##38 at 7; #59 at 2; 65 at 2 n.1]
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint brings four claims for relief. [#38] Claim One alleges Eighth Amendment violations stemming from abuse of discretion, malicious intent, and unlawful policies as to the vertical use of blackboxes. [Id. at 8-11] Claim Two alleges Eighth Amendment violations stemming from torture and the willful infliction of pain as it relates to the vertical use of blackboxes on Plaintiff. [Id. at 12-14] Claim Three alleges deliberate indifference and excessive force under the Eighth Amendment, also for vertical use of the blackboxes. [Id. at 16-17] Claim Four alleges First Amendment violations, PLRA interference, and conspiracy to interfere with Plaintiff's rights, arguing that Defendants' imposition of grievances restrictions on Plaintiff has interfered with zhis rights. [Id. at 18-19] Plaintiff brings zhis various claims against Defendants in both their individual and official capacities and seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. [Id. at 2-6, 21]
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on May 23, 2022. [#59] According to the Motion, Defendants stole $785.00 that had been reimbursed to Plaintiff's inmate account from Jefferson County Court. [Id. at 1] Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants stole $102.99 from Plaintiff in library book fines. [Id. at 2] As a result of these actions, Plaintiff's inmate account balance is -$117.14, and Plaintiff alleges zhe can no longer purchase hygiene items, pens, paper, or envelopes. [Id.] Plaintiff asserts that zhe did not receive due process for the seizure of zhis money, and that this action will cause zhim to be “destitute for 3 to 6 months.” [Id. at 3] The Motion seeks an order instructing Defendants to “cease all garnishments in excess of statutory 40% limits,” the return of $102.88, and an extension of case deadlines. [Id.] Defendants filed a response to the Motion on June 7, 2022. [#65]
“A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). “The Haines rule applies to all proceedings involving a pro se litigant.” Id. at 1110 n.3. The Court, however, cannot be a pro se litigant's advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
II. ANALYSIS
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that is granted only when the movant's right to relief is clear and unequivocal.” McDonnell v. City & Cty. of Denver, 878 F.3d 1247, 1257 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: “(1) the movant ‘is substantially likely to succeed on the merits; (2) [the movant] will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) [the movant's] threatened injury outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.'” Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 723 (10th Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009)). “Whether to issue a preliminary injunction lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.” DERS Grp. Svc LLC v. W. Skyways, Inc., No. 17-CV-00560-WYD-MJW, 2017 WL 6945041, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2017) (citing RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009)).
Although styled as an “Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief,” the Motion is properly viewed as a motion for preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a). Plaintiff seeks a refund of monies and a change in the CDOC's garnishment policies, and Defendants were notified of-and have responded to-the Motion. Accordingly, the Court treats the Motion as a request for a preliminary injunction. See Folsom v. Knutson, No. CIV-13-632-D, 2016 WL 1171178, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 26, 2016) (collecting cases), recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1179211 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 24, 2016).
First, Plaintiff has failed to show the substantial likelihood of success on the merits. “A preliminary injunction is . . . appropriate to grant intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.” De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945). Here, Plaintiff seeks relief not requested in the Complaint, based upon conduct not alleged in the Complaint. Given the tangential relationship between the Motion and the conduct alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff has not satisfied the first requirement for a preliminary injunction. See Hicks v. Jones, 332 Fed.Appx. 505, 507 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's denial of injunctive relief where inmate's original complaint alleged that prison failed to protect inmate from his cellmate, but injunction sought to keep inmate in protective custody); Robledo-Valdez v. Dick, No. 16-CV-00192-MSK-KLM, 2020 WL 468053, at *17 (D. Colo. Jan. 29, 2020) (summarily rejecting request for preliminary injunction relating to garnishments of inmate accounts because the “Amended Complaint challenges the various Defendants' failure to protect [plaintiff] from known risks of physical violence,” not inmate account garnishments, and therefore plaintiff “cannot possibly show a likelihood of success on the merits of a claim involving garnishments because no such claim exists in this case”).
Second, Plaintiff has not demonstrated irreparable injury if the injunction is denied. A showing of irreparable harm is “the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004). The Motion contends that Plaintiff will be “destitute for 3 to 6 months” as a result of the funds taken from zhis account. [#59 at 3] But, rather than focusing on ongoing or future harm, the Motion instead focuses on the fact that Plaintiff's funds have been taken in the past. See Schrier v. Univ. Of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1267 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is not to remedy past harm but to protect plaintiffs from irreparable injury that will surely result without their issuance.”). And, in any event, the “essence” of the concept of irreparable injury “requires a substantial threat of harm to the movant that cannot be compensated by money.” Mountain Med. Equip., Inc. v. Healthdyne, Inc., 582 F.Supp. 846, 848 (D. Colo. 1984). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he cannot be compensated for the lost funds at issue at a later date.
Third, the Motion makes no showing that the balance of equities or the public interest favor granting a preliminary injunction. [See generally #59] “[I]t is not the role of the federal judiciary to scrutinize and interfere with the daily operations of a state prison.” Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998). As a result, “[c]ourts should grant injunctive relief involving the management of prisons only under exceptional and compelling circumstances.” Sanaah v. Howell, No. 08-cv-02117-REB-KLM, 2009 WL 4250147, at *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 23, 2009) (citing Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 269-70 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff has not identified any such exceptional circumstances, thus it is not in the public interest for a federal court to interfere with the administration of prisons by ordering changes to inmate account administration. Thus, these factor likewise supports a denial of the Motion.
Finally, as part of the Motion, Plaintiff requests a 90 day extension of case deadlines. Currently, Plaintiff's only case deadline is a deadline for service of process, set for July 29, 2022. [#47] At this stage, the majority of Defendants have been served by the U.S. Marshals, and Plaintiff does not demonstrate good cause for a further extension of this deadline, which is more than a month away. If circumstances change, Plaintiff may file a renewed motion for extension of his service deadline.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief and Extension [#59] be DENIED.
Within fourteen days after service of a copy of this Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to the magistrate judge's proposed findings of fact, legal conclusions, and recommendations with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Griego v. Padilla (In re Griego), 64 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1995). A general objection that does not put the district court on notice of the basis for the objection will not preserve the objection for de novo review. “[A] party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review.” United States v. 2121 East 30th Street, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Failure to make timely objections may bar de novo review by the district judge of the magistrate judge's proposed findings of fact, legal conclusions, and recommendations and will result in a waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the district court based on the proposed findings of fact, legal conclusions, and recommendations of the magistrate judge. See Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 579-80 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court's decision to review magistrate judge's recommendation de novo despite lack of an objection does not preclude application of “firm waiver rule”); Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Wyo. Coal Refining Sys., Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that cross-claimant waived right to appeal certain portions of magistrate judge's order by failing to object to those portions); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1352 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that plaintiffs waived their right to appeal the magistrate judge's ruling by failing to file objections). But see, Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review).