Opinion
NUMBER 13-15-00572-CV
03-09-2017
SAVANNAH ROBINSON, Appellant, v. TEXAS MEDICAL LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION, Appellee.
On appeal from the 92nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Contreras and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Contreras
In this declaratory judgment action, appellant Savannah Robinson challenges the trial court's summary judgment granting declaratory relief in favor of appellee, Texas Medical Liability Insurance Underwriting Association (TMLIUA). By several sub-issues, which we treat as one issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. We vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
TMLIUA filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that: (1) three judgments against appellant in three underlying lawsuits are valid and enforceable; and (2) it is entitled to recover because it is "the judgment creditor, holder and/or assignee of all three judgments." In each of the underlying lawsuits, appellant served as counsel to a plaintiff in a health care liability claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.) (defining "health care liability claim"). Each of the judgments assessed attorneys' fees against appellant in favor of the health care provider defendant.
The judgment in trial court cause number CL-07-0033-D, styled Elida Ramirez, Individually, and as Representative of the Estate of Enriqueta Gomez, et al. v. Doctors Hospital at Renaissance, Ltd. and dated November 20, 2008, awards attorneys' fees to the health care provider defendant in the amount of $20,000 plus $6,000 if the judgment is appealed to the court of appeals and the defendant prevails on appeal. The judgment in trial court cause number CL-07-2834-F, styled Jose G. Zamora Jr. v. Jose R. Carreras, M.D. and dated February 2, 2010, awards attorneys' fees to the health care provider defendant in the amount of $12,000 plus $5,000 if the judgment is appealed to the court of appeals and the defendant prevails on appeal. The judgment in trial court cause number CL-07-2835-E, styled Julian Trevino v. Jose R. Carreras, M.D. and dated May 25, 2010, awards attorneys' fees to the health care provider defendant in the amount of $46,500 plus $5,000 if the judgment is appealed to the court of appeals and the defendant prevails on appeal.
Appellant filed an answer, motion to transfer venue, counterclaim and third-party claim, in which she asserted that the suit was frivolous and that she was not served in any of the cases and the judgments were therefore void. Appellant also filed a motion for summary judgment concerning standing, in which she asserted that TMLIUA lacked standing because it was not a party to the judgments. TMLIUA filed a response, in which it argued it had standing because it was "the assignee and payor of the legal fees at issue."
Appellant also filed a motion for dismissal pursuant to rule of civil procedure 91a, in which she argued that TMLIUA lacked standing and that the judgments were void because she was not served. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a (providing that "a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact."). TMLIUA filed a response, in which it asserted it had standing as the "judgment creditor, holder or assignee of the judgments" and that the judgments were "not only final, but clearly enforceable." No order ruling on the motion appears in the record.
TMLIUA filed a traditional motion for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). In its motion, TMLIUA argued that: (1) the underlying judgments against appellant were "valid subsisting judgments" and (2) it "owned" the judgments and "is subrogated to, and/or assigned, the judgments because it is the insurance company that paid the legal fees in question." Included in TMLIUA's summary judgment evidence were the following: (1) copies of the three judgments at issue; (2) an affidavit of Sally Stewart, Claim Manager for TMLIUA, stating that TMLIUA is entitled to recovery of attorneys' fees because it paid the legal fees of each of the defendants in the underlying lawsuits; and (3) the affidavit of Ronald Hole, counsel for TMLIUA in the declaratory judgment action, pertaining to attorneys' fees in the declaratory judgment action.
Specifically, the Stewart affidavit states, in relevant part:
It is my understanding that both of the defendants/insureds noted above have been advised of, consented to, and assigned to, [TMLIUA] any interest they might have had in the judgments and are aware that [TMLIUA] is filing this suit in order to clarify the legitimacy of such judgments, as Ms. Savannah Robinson has claimed that these three judgments are invalid, void, or otherwise uncollectable.
Appellant filed a response to TMLIUA's motion and a "counter-motion for summary judgment." In her motion, appellant argued that, as counsel for various plaintiffs in the underlying suits, she is not responsible for attorneys' fees and costs. Appellant argued that: (1) she was not made a party to any of the underlying suits by issuance of citation or service; (2) the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) does not provide for the assessment of attorneys' fees and costs against a non-party, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.); and (3) there is no evidence that the attorneys' fees and costs were awarded as sanctions. In support of her motion, appellant attached her own affidavit, in which she stated that: (1) she was not a party to any of the three underlying cases; and (2) the declaratory judgment action is frivolous because the Thirteenth Court of Appeals has determined that attorneys are not liable for costs in health care liability claims.
The trial court granted summary judgment in TMLIUA's favor, rendered judgment declaring that the judgments in the three underlying suits are valid and enforceable and awarding attorneys' fees in the amount of $7,900 to TMLIUA in the declaratory judgment action, with an additional $10,000 in attorneys' fees if TMLIUA prevails on appeal. This appeal followed.
II. TMLIUA'S MOTION TO DISMISS
During the pendency of the appeal, TMLIUA filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appeal was untimely filed. If the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal. See Gilani v. Kaempfe, 331 S.W.3d 879, 879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction after concluding that appellant's motion for new trial filed 31 days after signing of judgment was untimely and failed to extend appellate timetable). Because this issue challenges our jurisdiction over the appeal, we address it first. See Village of Tiki Island v. Ronquille, 463 S.W.3d 562, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) ("As a threshold matter, we address our own jurisdiction . . . .").
The order granting TMLIUA's motion for summary judgment was rendered by the trial court on October 14, 2015. Appellant filed a Rule 306a motion, in which she asserted that she did not have actual notice of the entry of the order until November 30, 2015. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a. Appellant's motion was accompanied by her sworn affidavit, in which she stated that she did not have notice of the October 14, 2015 hearing and did not receive notice of the judgment until November 30, 2015. The trial court granted appellant's Rule 306a motion and "amended nunc pro tunc" the order granting TMLIUA's motion for summary judgment with a new entry date of November 30, 2015. Appellant's notice of appeal was filed December 3, 2015.
Rule 306a(5) provides that the time for filing a motion for new trial will be extended when the movant is able to prove to the trial court, on sworn motion and notice, the date on which the party or his attorney first either received notice of the judgment or acquired actual knowledge of the signing of the judgment, and that this date was more than twenty days after the judgment was signed. TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(5).
TMLIUA argues that the trial court erred in granting appellant's Rule 306a motion because: (1) there was no hearing on appellant's motion and she did not prove that she did not receive notice of the order until November 30, 2015; and (2) the trial court had no authority to change the date a final order was signed. Appellant filed a response to TMLIUA's motion to dismiss the appeal, in which she argued that a hearing is not required to be held on a Rule 306a motion. Appellant argued that, under Rule 306a(4), the time for perfecting her appeal did not begin to run until November 30, 2015, the date on which she first received actual knowledge of the judgment. If appellant is correct, her notice of appeal filed December 3, 2015, was timely.
Rule 306a provides that if the party against whom judgment has been rendered neither received notice of the judgment from the clerk of the court nor acquired actual knowledge, the period for perfecting the appeal shall begin on the day that such party received notice from the clerk or acquired actual notice of the signing of the judgment. TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(4). In her Rule 306a motion, appellant alleged that she received no notice from the clerk and did not gain knowledge of the judgment until November 30, 2015, more than 20 days after the judgment was signed. Paragraph (5) of the rule provides that the party seeking to gain the benefit of the extension of time granted in paragraph (4), the party adversely affected by the judgment, "is required to prove in the trial court, on sworn motion and notice, the date on which the party or his attorney first either received a notice of the judgment or acquired actual knowledge of the signing and that this date was more than twenty days after the judgment was signed." Id. R. 306a(5). Here, in her sworn affidavit, appellant stated that she first received notice of the judgment on November 30, 2015. We find that this is sufficient to establish the date upon which she received notice of the judgment. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that the appeal was timely filed. We deny TMLIUA's motion to dismiss the appeal.
III. JURISDICTION
We next address sua sponte whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because declaratory relief was an inappropriate vehicle for interpreting or modifying a previous judgment. Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993); Jack Jones Hearing Centers, Inc. v. State Comm. of Examiners in Fitting & Dispensing of Hearing Instruments, 363 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.). It may be raised for the first time on appeal by a party or sua sponte by a reviewing court. Jack Jones Hearing Centers, Inc., 363 S.W.3d at 914. Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
"It is well settled that declaratory relief is not appropriate to attack or modify a prior judgment." Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd., Inc., 2 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). "In Texas, courts generally follow the rule that '[a] litigant cannot use the Declaratory Judgment Act to seek a judicial interpretation of a prior judgment.'" Id. (citations omitted). Suits seeking to interpret judgments of another court are barred even when the claimant expressly states that it is not seeking to declare the prior judgment void or unenforceable, but merely to clarify its rights under it. See Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. SSC Settlements, LLC, 251 S.W.3d 129, 140 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2008, orig. proceeding) ("Declaratory relief is not available for the interpretation of a prior judgment entered by that or any other court."); see also Depumpo v. Thrasher, No. 05-14-00967-CV, 2016 WL 147294, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("A declaratory judgment action may not be used to collaterally attack, modify, or interpret a prior judgment."); Sealy RG Valley Bldgs., L.P. v. Griffin, No 13-07-00598-CV, 2008 WL 3906408, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 26, 2008, no pet. (mem. op.) ("Declaratory relief is not available for the interpretation of a prior judgment entered by that or any other court.").
We find this Court's disposition in Sealy instructive. In that case, Sealy obtained a judgment in county court against DNL Warehouse & Distribution Center (DNL) in 2004. Sealy, 2008 WL 3906408, at *1. The judgment did not mention DNL's president, James Griffin. Id. In 2006, DNL sought a declaratory judgment in district court that Griffin was personally liable for the judgment against DNL. Id. This Court held that declaratory relief was not available for the interpretation of the county court's judgment; thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the county court's earlier judgment. Id. at *2.
Here, the underlying judgments awarded attorneys' fees against appellant to the health care provider defendants. TMLIUA sought a declaration that: (1) the underlying judgments were valid and enforceable; and (2) it was entitled to the attorneys' fees awarded to the health care provider defendants based on a theory of assignment or subrogation. As in Sealy, where Sealy sought a declaration to modify the prior judgment by substituting Griffin for DNL, TMLIUA sought a declaration to modify the prior judgments by substituting itself for the health care provider defendants named in the judgments. See id. at *1. We conclude that TMLIUA obtained relief from the trial court that the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant. See Martin, 2 S.W.3d at 353; Sealy, 2008 WL 3906408, at *2.
IV. CONCLUSION
We: (1) deny TMLIUA's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed; (2) vacate the trial court's judgment; and (3) dismiss TMLIUA's cause for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(e).
See Chimp Haven, Inc. v. Primarily Primates, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 629, 632 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) ("If the trial court lacked jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction only to set aside the judgment of the trial court and to dismiss the cause."). We do not address appellant's arguments as they relate to the granting of TMLIUA's motion for summary judgment as they are not dispositive, see TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
DORI CONTRERAS
Justice Delivered and filed the 9th day of March, 2017.