Opinion
C/A 6:24-cv-02136-HMH-KFM
06-21-2024
Joshua Lynn Robinson, Plaintiff, v. David Seay, Brian Johnson, Anthony Basile, Will Davis, Caroline Newton, Lynn Barrett, Nela Laughridge, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on April 19, 2024 (doc. 1). By order filed May 10, 2024 the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (doc. 8). The plaintiff complied with the court's order, and the case is now in proper form for judicial screening. However, for the reasons that follow, it is recommended that this matter be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”), filed this action seeking damages from the defendant (doc. 1). Of note, the plaintiff's allegations, in part, appear to involve pending charges for two counts of domestic violence, first degree in the Greenville County General Sessions Court. See Greenville County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2021A2320500775, 2021A2320500776) (last visited June 21,2024). The charges were indicted by a grand jury in December 2022. Id.
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the defendants, who are individuals involved in his state criminal proceedings, Department of Social Services (“DSS”) proceedings, and family court proceedings (including attorneys, DSS case workers, and a guardian ad litem (“GAL”)) (doc. 1 at 5-6). The plaintiff alleges that several of the defendants falsified his signature and documents, including Mr. Seay, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Basile, Mr. Davis, and Mr. Barrett (id.). Ms. Laughridge, the GAL, had a conflict of interest and took control of the plaintiff's children without his consent (id. at 6). The plaintiff contends that these actions occurred from February to August 2023 (id. at 7). Due to the actions of the defendants, the plaintiff lost his home, his daughter, his reputation, had to move, and had to pay for attorneys (id.). For relief, the plaintiff seeks to have the defendants prosecuted, to be released from pretrial detention, to have his business be respected again, and money damages (id. at 8).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants. Nevertheless, as outlined below, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal. First, although the plaintiff requests relief from pretrial detention in this action, it does not appear that he requests federal court interference with his pending criminal charges; thus, Younger abstention does not apply to this action. See Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881,903 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that a federal court may not award injunctive relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). Additionally, to the extent the plaintiff seeks to bring criminal charges against the defendants, the plaintiff has no standing to pursue this matter criminally because private citizens lack a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
Release from Custody Request
To the extent the plaintiff seeks release from pretrial detention in this action, such relief may only be obtained in a habeas corpus action, not in a § 1983 case. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (complaint or petition challenging the fact or duration of confinement should be construed and processed as a habeas corpus petition, while a complaint or petition challenging the conditions of confinement should be construed and processed as a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that release from prison is not a remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983” (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 488-90)). Therefore, the plaintiff may not seek release from custody in this action.
Not a State Actor
Here, a number of the defendants are subject to summary dismissal because they do not act under color of state law (Mr. Seay, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Davis, Ms. Newton, and Ms. Barrett). It is well-settled that “[a]nyone whose conduct is ‘fairly attributable to the state' can be sued as a state actor under § 1983.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012). However, private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful, is not covered under § 1983. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1999). In distinguishing between state action and private action,
The judicial obligation is not only to preserv[e] an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoi[d] the imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it could not control, but also to assure that constitutional standards are invoked when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assn, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). State action may be found to exist “if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has identified several contexts in which private action may be found to constitute state action, such as “when the state has coerced a private actor to commit an act that would be unconstitutional if done by the state”; “when the state has delegated a traditionally and exclusively public function to a private actor”; “when the state has sought to evade a clear constitutional duty through delegation to a private actor”; or “when the state has committed an unconstitutional act in the course of enforcing a right of a private citizen.” Andrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 998 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1993). The critical inquiry in each case is whether the private actor's conduct was fairly attributable to the state. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2001). “[T]he ultimate resolution of whether an actor was a state actor . . . is a question of law for the court.” Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 344 n.7 (4th Cir. 2000). Here, the plaintiff's complaint “includes no facts that establish such a ‘close nexus' between” the defendants' challenged actions and the state such that their actions “may be ‘fairly treated' as those of the state itself.” See Perry v. Chattem, Inc., C/A No. 7:08-cv-00106, 2008 WL 983428, at *4 (W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 2008). Likewise, there is nothing to suggest that the defendants are somehow state actors (see doc. 1).
For example, several of the defendants (Mr. Seay, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Davis, Ms. Newton, and Ms. Barrett) are attorneys who were involved either in DSS proceedings involving the plaintiff or were previously appointed to represent the plaintiff in his pending criminal charges (see doc. 1). The plaintiff alleges that these defendants falsified his signature on documents or submitted documents he did not approve as part of DSS proceedings or in his pending criminal proceedings (id.). However, the law is well-established that even appointed defense counsel are not state actors for purposes of § 1983 claims because the public defender acts not on behalf of the state; rather, the public defender “is the State's adversary.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323 n.13 (1981); see Mahaffey v. Sumter Cnty. Pub. Defender's Corp., C/A No. 3:06-3557-SB, 2007 WL 3001675, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2007) (“[T]he Sumter County Public Defender's Corp. did not act under color of state law and is entitled to summary dismissal.”); see also Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no state action under § 1983, even where the plaintiff's attorney was court-appointed). As such, these defendants, who represent parties in DSS proceedings or acted as an attorney for the plaintiff in his criminal proceedings - even if appointed by the state to represent him - are not state actors for purposes of § 1983. Accordingly, these defendants are subject to summary dismissal.
Ms. Laughridge
The plaintiff's claims against Ms. Laughridge, the GAL assigned to advocate for his children in the DSS case, are also subject to dismissal because Ms. Laughridge is entitled to immunity. Here, the plaintiff alleges that Ms. Laughridge had a conflict of interest and took control of his children without his consent (doc. 1 at 6). However, a GAL, such as Ms. Laughridge, has absolute immunity from § 1983 claims for duties performed within the confines of her role as a GAL (as asserted by the plaintiff herein). See Grant v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., et al., C/A No. 2:18-cv-01804-RMG-BM, 2019 WL 2093861, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2019) (citing Fleming v. Asbill, 42 F.3d 886, 889 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Even if [the guardian ad litem] lied to the judge in open court, she was still acting as the guardian, and is immune from § 1983 liability.” (footnote omitted)); Smith v. Smith, C/A No. 7:07-cv-00117, 2007 WL 3025097 (W.D. Va. Oct. 12, 2007)), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 1110795 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2019). As noted, the plaintiff's claims regarding Ms. Laughridge involve actions within her role as GAL; thus, Ms. Laughridge is immune from suit and should be dismissed.
Ms. Basile
The plaintiff's claims against Ms. Basile, the DSS caseworker assigned to evaluate matters involving the plaintiff's children, are also subject to dismissal. Here, the plaintiff's only allegations as to Ms. Basile - in total - are that she “falsified documents [and] dates” (doc. 1 at 5). Social workers, such as Ms. Basile, are immune from liability when they are engaged in “activities . . . that could be deemed prosecutorial.” Vosburg v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1989); see Evans v. Perry, 578 Fed.Appx. 229, 232 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in a prosecutorial (not investigative) capacity). Here, the plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations could reference prosecutorial acts by Ms. Basile, which would be barred. However, even if the acts were not prosecutorial in nature, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against her because although the plaintiff's allegations must be liberally construed, the plaintiff must provide more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that liability under § 1983 “requires personal involvement”). Indeed, the plausibility standard requires more “‘an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'” Griffith v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., C/A No. 2:12-cv-00239-DCN, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). As such, the claims against Ms. Basile are also subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).