Opinion
78 CAF 17–01433
02-02-2018
In the Matter of Yolanda M. ROBINSON, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Glenn L. ROBINSON, Respondent–Appellant.
R. BRIAN GOEWEY, ROCHESTER, FOR RESPONDENT–APPELLANT.
R. BRIAN GOEWEY, ROCHESTER, FOR RESPONDENT–APPELLANT.
PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Memorandum:In this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, respondent husband appeals from a two-year order of protection entered upon a finding that he committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree (see Family Ct Act § 812[1] ; Penal Law § 240.26[1], [3] ) against petitioner wife. Respondent failed to preserve for our review his contention that Family Court improperly assumed the role of advocate for petitioner, who appeared pro se, in asking questions to guide her direct testimony (see Matter of Gallo v. Gallo, 138 A.D.3d 1189, 1190 [3d Dept. 2016] ) and, in any event, the record does not support respondent's contention (see Matter of Veronica P. v. Radcliff A., 126 A.D.3d 492, 492, 2 N.Y.S.3d 799 [1st Dept. 2015], lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 911, 36 N.E.3d 90 [2015] ). Contrary to respondent's further contention, "the court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to great weight, and the court was entitled to credit the testimony of [petitioner] over that of [respondent]" ( Matter of Kobel v. Holiday, 78 A.D.3d 1660, 1660, 910 N.Y.S.2d 752 [4th Dept. 2010] ; see Matter of Fleming v. Fleming, 52 A.D.3d 600, 601, 859 N.Y.S.2d 739 [2d Dept. 2008] ). The record supports the court's determination that petitioner met her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree (see Family Ct Act § 812[1] ; Penal Law § 240.26[1], [3] ). We reject respondent's contention that the court erred in failing to conduct a dispositional hearing (see Family Ct Act §§ 833, 835[a] ), inasmuch as the record establishes that respondent waived such a hearing. Finally, we conclude that the duration and conditions of the order of protection are reasonably designed to advance "the purpose of attempting to stop the violence, end the family disruption and obtain protection" ( Family Ct Act § 812[2][b] ; see § 842; Matter of Harrington v. Harrington, 63 A.D.3d 1618, 1619, 881 N.Y.S.2d 737 [4th Dept. 2009],lv denied 13 N.Y.3d 705, 887 N.Y.S.2d 2, 915 N.E.2d 1180 [2009] ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.