Opinion
C/A 0:23-5351-SAL-SVH
03-01-2024
Travis Jamaal Robinson, Plaintiff, v. Christopher Prinz, Police Officer, and Rock Hill Police Department, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Travis Jamaal Robinson (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging his constitutional rights were violated when he was arrested by Christopher Prinz (“Defendant”) on February 19, 2022. Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint.
Plaintiff also sued Rock Hill Police Department (“RHPD”), and the undersigned issued a report and recommendation, which remains pending before the district judge, recommending dismissal of RHPD. [See ECF No. 11].
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 21]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the applicable procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendant's motion. [ECF No. 24]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 26, 28], it is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been assigned to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant in part and deny in part Defendant's motion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges that on February 19, 2022, Defendant “assaulted . . . and illegally seized” him. [ECF No. 1 at 5]. Plaintiff then alleges that another officer “illegally searched” him:
I sustained los[s] of breath after Officer Prinz tackle[d] me[;] then Officer Prinz struck me with his can of pepper spray on the right side of my temple while on my back pinning me down. EMS checked my vitals and stated my h[e]art rate was elevated[.] I sustained a mild concussion also.Id. at 6.
Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 4.In the portion of the complaint form asking to “explain how each defendant acted under color of state or local law,” Plaintiff stated: “They dismissed the probable cause ticket resisting police so that['s] a clear violation of my 4th amendment.” Id. Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant in his individual and official capacities, Id. at 2, seeking “$999,000.00 and case dismissal,” Id. at 6. Plaintiff is currently housed at the York County Detention Center. Id. at 2, 4.
Plaintiff also asserted claims for alleged violations of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights [ECF No. 1 at 4] but has dismissed these claims in briefing. [ECF No. 26].
The Public Index shows that Plaintiff was arrested for three charges on the day in question: a weapons charge and two drug charges. See Public Index for the York County Clerk of Court Office (https://publicindex.sccourts.org/York/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx, last visited on March 1, 2024).On June 23, 2022, true bills of indictment were rendered for all three charges. Id. The Public Index does not show a charge for “resisting police.” Id. On February 2, 2024, Plaintiff pled guilty to two of the charges: “0044-Weapons / Unlawful carrying of pistol,” and “0184-Drugs / MDP, Narcotic drugs in Sch. I(b) & (c), LSD, and Sched. II-2nd offense.” Id. Plaintiff states in briefing he has “taken a plea for 8 yrs.” [ECF No. 26].
This court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's criminal cases. See Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support” the legal conclusion. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may consider “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs. Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff's primary allegations against Defendant is that he “assaulted” and “illegally seized” him, [ECF No. 1 at 5], alleging a Fourth Amendment violation against Defendant in his official and individual capacities.
1. Official Capacity Claim
Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a means to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, but the statute is not, itself, a source of substantive rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). “Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under the color of state law, deprives another person ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'” Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish three elements to state a cause of action: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3) acting under color of state law.” Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Eleventh Amendment provides “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001).
A plaintiff “is not entitled to monetary damages under § 1983 against Defendant in their official capacities.” Moneyhan v. Keller, 563 Fed.Appx. 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars suits against non-consenting state, its agencies, and its officers acting in their official capacities)). However, suits for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose ‘individual and personal liability' on state officials under § 1983.”) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion as to Plaintiff's claims against him in his official capacity.
Defendant seeks dismissal of all official capacity claims pursuant to Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985). [See ECF No. 21-1 at 3]. Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of claims asserted against Defendant in his official capacity. [See ECF No. 26].
2. Illegal Seizure Claim
To establish a claim for illegal seizure or false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must show that Defendant lacked probable cause to arrest him. Tucker v. Price, C/A No. 4:22-01861-MGL-MHC, 2023 WL 7168684, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 4:22-1861-MGL, 2023 WL 7166244 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 2023). “A grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause sufficient to defeat [a claim] for . . . false arrest under § 1983.” Jarvis v. Griffin, C/A No. 3:23-1358-MGL-SVH, 2023 WL 3742295, at *2 (D.S.C. May 9, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 3:23-1358-MGL, 2023 WL 3737917 (D.S.C. May 31, 2023).
An officer's materially false statements or material omissions in obtaining the warrant can negate a finding of probable cause. See Miller v. Prince George's Cty, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007); Trail v. Cressell, 494 F.Supp.3d 349, 360 (W.D. Va. 2020) (“To be sure, the grand jury's return of an indictment is vital indicia of the existence of probable cause. But the deference generally afforded that determination is lost if an officer, deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth, omits material information from his testimony before the grand jury.”). However, Plaintiff has made no such allegations.
Here, the Public Index shows, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that he was arrested on the day in question on three charges: a weapons charge and two charges relating to illegal drugs. The Public Index further shows that on June 23, 2022, a true bill of indictment was returned for each of these charges. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot maintain that he was falsely arrested for these charges because he was indicted on them.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion as to his illegal seizure claim.
3. Excessive Force Claim
Plaintiff alleges that he was “assaulted” and “tackle[d]” by Defendant who thereafter “struck me with a can of pepper spray on the right side of my temple while on my back pinning me down.” [ECF No. 1 at 5-6; see also ECF No. 26 (“There was no reason for Prinz to tackle me and [strike] me with the pepper spray ....”)].
Defendant does not directly address Plaintiff's excessive force claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment [ECF Nos. 21-1, 28], and Defendant's arguments for dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint do not appear applicable to this claim. See, e.g., Riddick v. Lott, 202 Fed.Appx. 615, 616 (4th Cir. 2006) (“In this case, the record is sparse. Without knowing the factual basis for Riddick's plea, we cannot determine whether his claim of police brutality would necessarily imply invalidity of his earlier conviction for assaulting an officer while resisting arrest” and therefore be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)); see also Kinder v. Marinez, No. 19-CV-2692, 2019 WL 5445924, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2019) (“As public dockets now reflect that Kinder has entered a guilty plea to the charges pending when he filed his claims, Younger abstention is no longer necessary ....”).
Defendant correctly argues that Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for excessive force pursuant to the Eighth Amendment in that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies after a conviction, rather than during an arrest. [ECF No. 21-1 at 4]. However, Defendant does not address Plaintiff's excessive force claim in the context of the Fourth Amendment, which is applicable to pretrial detainees. See, e.g., Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 114 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Supreme Court has extended the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard to excessive force claims by pre-trial detainees.”).
Although not clear, Plaintiff appears to allege that he also was arrested for resisting arrest and has argued that “[o]n 2-14-2023 the probable cause resisting police was dismissed at the jury trial hearing” and that he is “awaiting documents to show the dismissal of the ticket resisting police.” [See ECF No. 1 at 5; see also ECF No. 26]. However, Plaintiff's record via the Public Index do not support his allegations that he was arrested for resisting arrest, nor that probable cause for that charge was addressed during a February 14, 2023 hearing. See Public Index for the York County Clerk of Court Office (https://publicindex.sccourts.org/York/PublicIndex/ PISearch.aspx, last visited on March 1, 2024) (showing no actions in conjunction with Plaintiff's criminal cases around February 14, 2023, except for an order for bond issued on February 9, 2023)).
Accordingly, to the extent Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, the undersigned recommends the district judge deny Defendant's motion to dismiss it.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant in part and deny in part Defendant's motion to dismiss, allowing Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force to proceed against Defendant in his individual capacity. [ECF No. 21].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).