Opinion
Nos. 10-1460, 10-1533, 10-1534.
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 May 27, 2010.
Opinion filed: June 2, 2010.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 07-CV-01390), District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson.
Simeon Robinson, Philadelphia, PA, pro se.
Susan J. Kupersmith, Esq., Sirlin, Gallogly Lesser, Philadelphia, PA, for Barbara Porges, Joshua Cohen, David H. Denenberg, Andrew Blum, Advanced Real Estate Concepts, Sterling Search Abstract Co, Marya Wisniewshi, Jon C. Sirlin, Dana S. Plon, Gary Jonas.
Michael T. Sellers, Esq., Newtown, PA, for Robert Messerman, Steven Ryan.
Laurence A. Mester, Esq., Grossman Law Firm, Philadelphia, PA, pro se.
Kelly S. Diffily, Esq., City of Philadelphia Law Department, Mark Maguire, Esq., Office of City Solicitor, Philadelphia, PA, for John Green, Darrell R. Stewart, Barbara Deeley, Crystal Stewart, James W. Zwolak.
Jonathan J. Bart, Esq., Daniel S. Bernheim, III, Esq., Wilentz, Goldman Spitzer, Philadelphia, PA, for Credit Based Asset Servicing and Securitization LLC, Frank Federman, Joseph Marshall, Michelle M. Bradford.
Jermaine Harris, Esq., Philadelphia, PA, for Lillian M. King, Wanda English-Davis.
Alan J. Candell, Esq., Villanova, PA, pro se.
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
Simeon Robinson appeals from orders of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Because no substantial question is raised by his appeals, we will summarily affirm the District Court's judgment and orders.
As the background of this case is provided in the District Court's memorandum and is familiar to the parties, we limit our discussion to those facts essential to our decision. Robinson filed a complaint in federal court including civil rights claims, state law, and common law claims, all arising out of the foreclosure and sheriffs sale of his home and his eviction therefrom. Robinson's suit followed several legal actions in the state court, including a mortgage foreclosure action filed against him, a landlord/tenant action filed against him, and an ejection action filed against him. A fourth suit, filed by Robinson, in which he claimed that he had been deprived of his right, title and interest to his real property without due process of law, was pending at the time he filed his federal complaint.
Many of the defendants in the federal action filed motions to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. The District Court dismissed Robinson's complaint, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Robinson's federal claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Robinson's state-law claims. The District Court also denied Robinson's motion for an evidentiary hearing and dismissed with prejudice his Notice of Lis Pendens. These timely appeals followed.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923).
We agree with the District Court that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Robinson's claims. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2008). This is such a case.
Robinson asserts that his equal protection and due process rights were violated based on the "policies, procedures and protocol of the office of the Sheriff of Philadelphia County concerning Sheriffs sales of foreclosed properties." He argues that these claims are not barred by Rooker-Feldman because they were not previously litigated, and that they are not "inextricably intertwined" with the state courts' adjudications. However, Robinson's complaint "demands the return of his home as his own property with free and clear deed and title," as well as actual and punitive damages. Such an award could only be made by reviewing and rejecting the state court judgments.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court's judgment.
Given the finding that it lacked jurisdiction, we find no error in the District Court's decisions to deny an evidentiary hearing and to dismiss Robinson's Notice of Lis Pendens.