Opinion
No. 70-408
Decided September 21, 1971. Rehearing denied October 13, 1971.
Action on life insurance policy seeking double-indemnity recovery for accidental death. From jury verdict for plaintiff, insurer appealed.
Affirmed
1. INSURANCE — Death Certificate — Prima Facie Evidence — Accidental Death. In an action on double-indemnity clause of life insurance policy, duly authenticated certificate of death which lists death as being "accidental" constitutes prima facie evidence of accidental death, but its weight depends upon the information upon which it is based, the source of that information, and the manner in which it is obtained.
2. EVIDENCE — Death by Suicide — Never Presumed — Burden on Insurer. Death by suicide is not a natural occurrence, and is never presumed; thus in action on double-indemnity clause of life insurance contract the burden is on the insurer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the insured committed suicide.
3. INSURANCE — Prima Facie Case — Accidental Death — Introduction — Death Certificate — Burden — Insurer — Suicide. In action on double-indemnity clause of life insurance contract, after introducing into evidence death certificate listing fact of death to be accidental, plaintiff had established prima facie case and defendant company then had the burden of proving the death occurred because of suicide.
4. Accidental Death — Prima Facie Case — Conflicting Testimony — Wife — — Manner of Death — Jury Issue. In action on double-indemnity clause of life insurance contract in which plaintiff established prima facie case by means of death certificate listing cause of death as "accidental," the fact that decedent's wife, the only witness to the death, gave testimony which was in conflict with story she had previously told investigator presented a question as to the manner in which decedent met his death which was properly left to the jury.
Appeal from the District Court of Jefferson County, Honorable George G. Priest, Judge.
Robinson, Robinson, Berube and Robinson, P.C., Wm. Hedges Robinson, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.
Grant, Shafroth, Toll McHendrie, P.C., John N. Dahle, for defendant-appellant.
This is an action on the double-indemnity clause of an insurance contract which provides for double recovery of benefits in case of death by accident. However, double recovery is not provided in the policy where death occurs because of suicide. The company claimed the insured committed suicide, whereas the estate maintained that his death was accidental, thereby entitling it to recover under the double-indemnity clause. From a jury verdict favoring the estate, the company appeals.
The alleged error is that the verdict is unsupported by the evidence, and that the trial court should have directed a verdict in the company's favor or granted it a new trial.
The insured in this case was a man in his fifties, suffering from a variety of ailments, including a blood disorder, congestive heart failure and partial paralysis which affected his speech. He was under medication and was being cared for by a private nurse.
The decedent, together with his wife and nurse, went to Hawaii for a vacation. While there, they rented a suite of rooms on the twentieth floor of a hotel. Adjacent to the suite was an outside balcony, the outer perimeter of which was surrounded by a wall and railing. There was a wooden platform in one corner of the balcony upon which the decedent had stood on occasion to view the scenery.
The following evidence was given concerning the death of decedent. On the night of his death, the decedent and his wife had dinner in the hotel restaurant. Both consumed alcoholic beverages and had been quarreling during dinner. The nurse helped both back to their rooms after dinner. She helped the decedent to bed after giving him his medication and a sleeping pill. Some time after 3:00 a.m., the wife awoke and found her husband had left the bed. She went to the balcony and saw him just before he plunged to his death, but had no other recollection of the event.
The police investigated the occurrence but did not question the wife upon their arrival because she was unresponsive and appeared to be in deep, heavy sleep.
Later in the day, in the afternoon, the wife was questioned concerning her husband's death. The police investigator testified that at that time she stated to him that she went to the balcony and found her husband standing there; that she asked him if he was a drink; that he apparently became angry and pushed her away and then went to the platform and began to climb over the wall and railing; that she went to him and attempted to hold him, but again he pushed her away, and went over the side to his death.
This testimony of the officer as to the statement given to him by decedent's wife was the only evidence presented to the jury concerning the precise manner in which the decedent met his death. Whether he accidentally fell or deliberately jumped was the question to be answered by the jury, which found that the death was the result of an accident.
[1] The certificate of death, duly authenticated and admitted into evidence, listed death as being "accidental." The certificate showing death to be accidental was prima facie evidence of "accidental death." C.R.S. 1963, 66-8-24; Michael v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 138 Colo. 450, 334 P.2d 1090. Defendant maintains that the notation on the death certificate was placed there as a routine matter by the medical officer who signed the certificate and that he had no basis for placing the words "accidental death" on the certificate. The certificate would still be prima facie evidence of its contents, but its weight depends upon the information upon which it is based, the source of that information, and the manner in which it is obtained. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cline, 98 Colo. 275, 57 P.2d 1205.
[2] In any event, there is no dispute that defendant met his death as a result of a fall from the balcony. Death by suicide is not a natural occurrence, and is never presumed. The burden is on the company to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the insured committed suicide. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cline, supra.
It is the contention of the insurance company that the statement made by the wife to the investigator is direct evidence as to how and why the fall occurred and is conclusive proof of the fact the decedent took his own life, and that the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in the company's favor. We disagree.
[3] After the death certificate was introduced into evidence showing the fact of death to be "accidental," the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and the defendant company then had the burden of proving that death occurred because of suicide. It was for jury to determine whether the defendant had sustained this burden by producing evidence which outweighed the presumption that decedent had met his death by accident. The presumption has sufficient evidential weight to support the jury verdict. See Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88; Neighbors of Woodcraft v. Hildebrandt, 98 Colo. 231, 54 P.2d 889; Ward v. Teller Reservoir Irrigation Co., 60 Colo. 47, 153 P. 219; Colorado Jury Instructions 3:5.
[4] The only witness to the death of the husband was the wife. There is a conflict between her testimony at the trial when she testified that she did not remember the details of her husband's death and the facts relating to decedent's death as testified to by the investigator, which testimony was received without objections. It was for the jury to hear and weigh the testimony and determine the credibility of the witnesses.
The question as to whether defendant insurance company had sustained the burden of proof as to the manner in which decedent met his death was properly left to the jury. Based on proper instruction, it resolved the matter in favor of the estate.
Judgment affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE SILVERSTEIN and JUDGE DWYER concur.