Opinion
B230501
01-31-2012
BERNICE ROBINSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MARIE G. MONJAUZE, Defendant and Respondent.
Law Offices of Otto L. Haselhoff, Steven R. Hilst and Otto L. Haselhoff for Plaintiff and Appellant. Calendo, Puckett, Sheedy & DiCorrado, Christopher M. Sheedy and Kelly Hara-Tadaki for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC416635)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Otto L. Haselhoff, Steven R. Hilst and Otto L. Haselhoff for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Calendo, Puckett, Sheedy & DiCorrado, Christopher M. Sheedy and Kelly Hara-Tadaki for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Bernice Robinson appeals from the judgment entered against her and in favor of defendant and respondent Marie G. Monjauze, following a jury trial on Robinson's complaint for personal injury and property damage arising out of a car accident. Robinson contends: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the special verdict that Monjauze was not negligent in the operation of her vehicle and (2) denial of Robinson's motion for new trial was error. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We state the facts in accordance with the usual rules of appeal from a judgment. That is, viewing them in the light most favorable to the verdict, and resolving all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. (Hill v. City of Long Beach (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1687; see also Crawford v. Southern Pac. Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429.)
It is undisputed that, at about 3:00 p.m. on September 26, 2007, Robinson, Monjauze and Toinette Peters were involved in a three-car collision on southbound La Cienega Boulevard, at a red light at the intersection of Rodeo Road. Peters, driving a Chevy Camaro, was between two and eight cars back from the light; Robinson, driving a Ford Escort, was behind Peters; and Monjauze, driving a Chevy Tahoe, was behind Robinson. While the light was still red, Monjauze rear-ended Robinson and Robinson rear-ended Peters. Robinson and Monjauze disagree on the sequence in which the two collisions occurred. In June 2009, Robinson filed a complaint for personal injury and property damage against Monjauze. In November 2010, there was a four-day jury trial.
Peters testified that she felt two impacts of equal force, neither of which caused Peters to hit the car in front of her. After the accident, all three cars pulled into a parking lot to exchange insurance information. Robinson remained in her car crying. As Peters and Monjauze tried to calm her down, Monjauze was apologetic. After discussing it with Monjauze at the scene, Peters formed the opinion that Robinson started to move because traffic in the next lane had started to move.
Monjauze testified that she was stopped about two feet behind Robinson's car. Because she was 10 cars back from the red light, Monjauze waited for movement of Robinson's car and not the changing light as her signal to move forward. For this reason, she focused her attention on Robinson's car, not on the light. Accordingly, when Monjauze saw Robinson's car begin to move forward, Monjauze took her foot off the brake but did not press down on the gas. When Robinson stopped suddenly, Monjauze slammed on her breaks but not in time to avoid rear-ending Robinson. It was not until Peters pulled into the gas station with Monjauze and Robinson that Monjauze realized that there was a third car involved in the accident. Based on her conversation with Peters at the scene, Monjauze formed the belief that Robinson stopped suddenly because she hit Peters. Monjauze heard Peters testify that she felt two impacts, which was consistent with what Monjauze learned at the scene.
Robinson testified that when she stopped at the red light there was one-car length between her car and Peters's car and when she looked in the rear view mirror, there was no one behind her. Robinson was completely stopped and did not hear the squeal of breaks before Monjauze rear-ended her, pushing her car into Peters's car. Robinson felt two impacts. After the accident, Robinson was too upset to drive so she called a friend to take her home where she went straight to bed. She began feeling chest pain and left knee pain two or three hours later. Eventually, she was hospitalized. At trial, she sought general and special damages.
The jury was instructed: "Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care to prevent harm to oneself or to others. [¶] A person can be negligent by acting or by failing to act. A person is negligent if he or she does something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation or fails to do something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation. [¶] You must decide how a reasonably careful person would have acted in this situation." (CACI No. 401.) "A person must use reasonable care in driving a vehicle. Drivers must keep a lookout for pedestrians, obstacles, and other vehicles. They must also control the speed and movement of their vehicles. The failure to use reasonable care in driving a vehicle is negligence." (CACI No. 700.) "The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon, and the condition of, the roadway." (Veh. Code, § 21703.)
Nine jurors returned a special verdict in favor of Monjauze, finding that she was not negligent. The remaining questions on the verdict form were left blank.
Robinson filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV). Both motions were based on essentially the same grounds: (1) the unavailability of a reporter's transcript in time for posttrial motions; (2) insufficiency of the evidence; (3) juror misconduct based on a statement made by one of the jurors; and (4) the verdict was contrary to the law, specifically Vehicle Code section 21703 (driving too closely to another vehicle).
Following a hearing on January 10, 2011, the trial court denied both motions. It reasoned that the jury "had to decide whether Ms. Monjauze initiated the collision by hitting Ms. Robinson from behind, pushing her into Ms. Peters, or whether Ms. Robinson initiated the collision by hitting Ms. Peters, and thus stopping suddenly to cause Ms. Monjauze to hit her. Ms. Peters testified that she thought she felt two impacts. That would support Ms. Monjauze's description of the collision sequence. . . . If Ms. Monjauze initiated the collision to push Ms. Robinson into Peters, Peters would have felt one impact." The trial court did not perceive any juror bias.
Robinson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Verdict Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Robinson contends the defense verdict and denial of her JNOV motion were not supported by substantial evidence. As we understand her argument, it is that (1) under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Monjauze was liable as a matter of law because Robinson's car was stopped when Monjauze hit it from behind and (2) Monjauze's testimony that she believed Robinson stopped suddenly because she hit Peters's car was insufficient to support the verdict because it was nothing more than speculation based on hearsay. We disagree.
The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well settled. Our authority begins and ends with a determination of whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence that will support the judgment. Substantial evidence is evidence of ponderable legal significance, reasonable, credible and of solid value. (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633.) The testimony of a single witness may constitute "substantial" evidence. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614.) Even if different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, we may not substitute our own inferences or deductions for those of the trier of fact. We must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court's decision, and resolving conflicts in the evidence in support of the trial court's decision. (Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 778-779.)
The thrust of Robinson's argument is that if Driver A hits Driver B from behind, Driver A is always at fault. This is simply not the law: "accidents happen every day without anyone's being legally liable for the result." (Abney v. Coalwell (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 892, 895.) " 'Cases involving rear-end collisions are legion. Although the contention is made often that the leader alone, or the follower alone, is guilty of negligence, in general, it has been held that the case as presented by each party creates a question of fact for the jury and not a question of law for the court. . . . The reasonableness of the speed at which defendant operated his vehicle, whether plaintiff gave a hand signal indicating an intention to stop [citation], whether the stop was sudden, whether defendant was driving too closely behind plaintiffs' vehicle, whether defendant was inattentive, all were questions of fact.' [Citation.]" (Hazel v. McGrath (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 382, 387; see also McHale v. Hall (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 342, 349 [when one automobile runs into the rear end of another automobile, negligence is a question of fact and not of law]; Pittman v. Boiven (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 207, 214 (Pittman).)
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a presumption affecting the burden of proof. (Evid. Code, § 646, subd. (b).) In car accident cases, it applies as a matter of law only when undisputed evidence establishes that the plaintiff's vehicle was stationary when struck from behind by the defendant's vehicle. (Gagosian v. Burdick's Television & Appliances (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 316, 318; Pittman, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at pp. 212213 [same].)
Here, res ipsa loquitur does not apply because Monjauze's testimony constituted substantial evidence that Robinson's car was not stationary, but was moving forward and stopped abruptly immediately before impact. Substantial evidence also supports the jury's conclusion that Monjauze was not negligent. From Monjauze's testimony that Robinson began moving forward and then stopped suddenly, and Peters's testimony that she felt two impacts, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the first impact Peters felt was Robinson hitting her car and the second impact was Monjauze hitting Robinson and pushing Robinson into Peters a second time. This is consistent with the defense expert theory that the sequence of events could have begun with Robinson moving forward, hitting Peters and then stopping suddenly. The jury could reasonably conclude that Monjauze's actions were that of a reasonably careful driver: in Los Angeles rush-hour traffic, stopping at a red light two feet behind the next car in line at the light; as the 10th car from the light, focusing on the car immediately in front and not the traffic light for a signal to move ahead; taking one's foot off the brake but not immediately accelerating when the car in front begins to move forward; slamming on the breaks when the car in front stops suddenly. That Monjauze could not stop in time to avoid hitting Robinson does not mean that Monjauze was negligent as a matter of law.
To the extent Robinson contends the evidence is legally insufficient once inadmissible hearsay is excluded, we reject that argument. Robinson complains it was error to admit Monjauze's testimony that she believed Robinson hit Peters first because of what Peters told her at the scene. The testimony appears to be hearsay and there was no relevant nonhearsay purpose for its admission. Assuming Peters's statement was hearsay, we find the error harmless. Peters herself testified at trial that she felt two impacts, consistent with Robinson hitting Peters's car first on its own and then being propelled into Peters's car when Monjauze's car struck Robinson's car. Monjauze's reconstruction expert also testified that the physical evidence was consistent with Robinson's car colliding with Peters's car first. Since there was admissible evidence of two collisions beginning with Robinson striking Peters, there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different if Monjauze's challenged testimony had been excluded. (See Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 919 [no reasonable probability outcome of trial would have been different if challenged evidence had been excluded], overruled on another ground in People v Comb (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 860.)
B. Denial of Robinson's Motion for JNOV and New Trial Was Not Error
Robinson contends the trial court erred in denying her motions for JNOV and new trial on the grounds of juror misconduct. She argues that comments by Juror No. 7 establish that she was biased against Robinson. We find no error.
Robinson also argues that her motions should have been granted on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. But as we have already explained, the defense verdict was supported by substantial evidence.
The relevant facts on which this argument is based are as follows. After the jury was instructed and before the end of day recess on Wednesday, November 10, the following colloquy occurred between the trial court and Juror No. 7: "JUROR NO. 7: One quick question. There is no retribution for voting either way? [¶] THE COURT: No. JUROR NO. 7: There is no potential for either party involved in this case to seek retribution against a juror for voting either way? [¶] THE COURT: That's correct. That's necessary. There [are], as a matter of fact, laws against intimidating or threatening retribution against a juror either before or after the juror votes." At the time, neither counsel expressed any concern with Juror No. 7's question. But when trial reconvened on Friday, November 12, Robinson's counsel stated that Juror No. 7's comments suggested that she was biased against Robinson, and asked that Juror No. 7 either be excused or further questioned. The trial court found no good cause to excuse or question Juror No. 7, observing, "I didn't take her comments to be directed toward [Robinson] or to anybody else, but instead to the process. And I think that it would discourage jurors from making comments. I really think it's inappropriate. I don't see that she's biased or has made her mind up at this point in time."
We begin with the standard of review. "Generally, the trial court's ruling on a new trial motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." (Sandoval v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Social Services (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1176, fn. 6.) An evidentiary hearing into alleged juror misconduct should be held only when the party alleging misconduct has come forward with evidence demonstrating a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct has occurred. (People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 419.) While we independently review the trial court's denial of a new trial motion based on alleged juror misconduct, we accept the trial court's credibility determinations and findings of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 396; People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 69.)
A juror's safety concerns or even fear of a litigant do not necessarily suggest bias. People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518 and People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458 are instructive. In Brown, following a death penalty verdict all 12 jurors expressed concern that the defendant's gang would retaliate against them. Our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to hold a hearing into jury misconduct in connection with the defendant's new trial motion because the defendant had failed to demonstrate a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct had occurred. (Brown, at pp. 581-582.) In Navarette, a juror sent a note to the trial court expressing concern for his safety. The trial court did not speak to the juror privately, but explained to the entire jury panel that jury questionnaires had only been seen by court personnel and the attorneys, and asked jurors to speak up if they believed they could not be fair to the defendant. (Navarette, at p. 500.) Our Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court should have dismissed the juror. (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court was in the best position to assess Juror No. 7's state of mind. It concluded that Juror No. 7's comments, which did not single out either party, did not show that she had prejudged the case or was biased against Robinson. We find no abuse of discretion in that conclusion. Robinson has failed to show the requisite strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct occurred.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J.
FLIER, J.