Opinion
2012 CA 1446
07-10-2013
THERESA & CLARENCE ROBINSON, LAKYSKA ROBINSON, WANEKA AND WILLIAM ROBINSON, THROUGH TUTRIX, SHEAN PHIPPS v. LEONARD J. CHABERT MEDICAL CENTER
William W.Thies Russell W. Beall Beall & Thies, L.L.C. Baton Rouge, LA Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants Laky ska Robinson, Waneka and William Robinson, through tutrix, Shean Marie Phipps William H. Parker, III Allen & Gooch Lafayette, LA Attorney for Defendants-Appellees The Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College as part of the Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center and the State of Louisiana Self Insurance Program
On Appeal from the
Office of Workers' Compensation Administration
District 9, State of Louisiana
Docket No. 11-07798
Honorable Elizabeth C. Lanier, Judge Presiding
William W.Thies
Russell W. Beall
Beall & Thies, L.L.C.
Baton Rouge, LA
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs-Appellants
Laky ska Robinson,
Waneka and William Robinson, through
tutrix, Shean Marie Phipps
William H. Parker, III
Allen & Gooch
Lafayette, LA
Attorney for
Defendants-Appellees
The Board of Supervisors of Louisiana
State University and Agricultural and
Mechanical College as part of the
Louisiana State University Health
Sciences Center, Leonard J. Chabert
Medical Center and the State of
Louisiana Self Insurance Program
BEFORE: PARRO, WELCH, AND KLINE, JJ.
Judge William F. Kline, Jr., retired, is serving as judge ad hoc by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
PARRO , J.
Plaintiffs appeal a summary judgment granted by the workers' compensation judge (WCJ) in favor of the defendants, the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College as part of the Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center (Chabert) and the State of Louisiana Self Insurance Program, dismissing the plaintiffs' workers' compensation claim against the defendants. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LaLisa Robinson was employed as an out-patient coder by Chabert in Houma, Louisiana. On October 15, 2010, Kara James and several other outpatient coders, supervised by Ms. Robinson, arranged to take her out to lunch to celebrate Boss's Day. Ms. Robinson asked her immediate supervisor if she and these co-workers could have permission to take an extended lunch break for the occasion, and this permission was granted.
On the date in question, Ms. Robinson, Kara James, and several of their co-workers "punched out" for an extended lunch break and went to lunch at a restaurant near Chabert. The employees drove their personal vehicles to the restaurant and were not reimbursed by Chabert for gasoline or insurance costs for the outing. In addition, Ms. Robinson's co-workers paid for her lunch to honor her for Boss's Day, and they were not reimbursed for this cost by Chabert.
As Ms. Robinson and her co-workers were returning to work after lunch, the vehicle in which Ms. Robinson, Kara James, and a third person were travelling was involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. As a result, the driver of the vehicle and Ms. Robinson, who were both in the front seat, were killed. Kara James, who was in the back seat, was seriously injured.
Thereafter, Ms. Robinson's children, Lakyska Robinson and two minor children, Waneka Rachelle Robinson and William Clarence Robinson through their court-appointed tutrix, Shean Marie Phipps, filed a disputed claim for workers' compensation on October 11, 2011, seeking death benefits arising from their mother's employment with Chabert. , The defendants denied the claim and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Ms. Robinson was not in the course and scope of her employment with Chabert at the time of the accident. After a hearing, the WCJ found that there were no genuine issues of material fact, that Ms. Robinson was not injured within the course and scope of her employment, and that her injury did not arise out of a work-related accident. Therefore, the WCJ granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' disputed claim for compensation, with prejudice. Plaintiffs have appealed.
The tutrix had originally been appointed to represent all three children; however, Lakyska Robinson reached the age of majority on July 19, 2011, which was prior to the filing of any disputed claim in this matter,
Ms. Robinson's parents, Theresa and Clarence Robinson, also joined in the claim for death benefits, asserting that they were entitled to benefits because they were dependent on their daughter. Chabert filed a peremptory exception pleading the objection of no cause of action, contending that the parents did not have a cause of action pursuant to LSA-R.S. 23:1232. Specifically, Chabert noted that, according to the hierarchy of dependents established by that statute, the parents were not entitled to benefits because the decedent's dependent children are higher on the hierarchy established by the statute. Ms. Robinson's parents consented to a judgment against them on the exception of no cause of action, and their claim was dismissed.
Kara 3ames also filed a disputed claim for compensation against the same defendants. Her claim was also dismissed, with prejudice, pursuant to a motion for summary judgment granted by the WCJ. Ms. James has appealed, and this court has rendered a separate opinion in that matter on this date in James v. Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center, 12-1467 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/10/13), __ So.3d __.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by LSA-C.C.P. art. 969; the procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). Summary judgment shall be rendered in favor of the mover if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2).
An appellate court's review of a summary judgment is a de novo review based on the evidence presented to the trial court, using the same criteria used by the trial court in deciding whether a summary judgment should be granted. Buck's Run Enterprises, Inc. v. Mapp Const., Inc., 99-3054 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/16/01), 808 So.2d 428, 431. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable or material fact. All doubts should be resolved in the non-moving party's favor. Hines v. Garrett, 04-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765.
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the moving party's burden on the motion is to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the WCJ erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, as genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the threshold question of whether Ms. Robinson was in the course and scope of her employment with Chabert at the time of her death. Under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act, an employer is only liable for compensation benefits to an employee who is injured as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. See LSA-R.S. 23:1031(A).
The requirement that an employee's injury occur "in the course of" employment focuses on the time and place relationship between the injury and the employment. McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc., 02-1539 (La. 7/02/03), 851 So.2d 1135, 1139-40. An accident occurs in the course of employment when the employee sustains an injury while actively engaged in the performance of her duties during work hours, either on the employer's premises or at other places where employment activities take the employee. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1140. The requirement that an employee's injury "arise out of" the employment relates to the character or origin of the injury suffered by the employee and whether the injury was incidental to the employment. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1140. An injury arises out of the employment if the risk from which the injury resulted was greater for the employee than for a person not engaged in the employment. Arabie Brothers Trucking Co. v. Gautreaux, 03-0120 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/4/04), 880 So.2d 932, 936, writ denied, 04-2481 (La. 12/10/04), 888 So.2d 846.
However, injuries sustained by an employee while travelling to and from work are generally not considered to have occurred within the course and scope of employment, and thus, are not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1140. Furthermore, in Craig v. Fournet, 457 So.2d 760, 762 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), this court stated:
Ordinarily, an employee who leaves his employer's premises and takes his lunch period at some place of his own choosing is outside the course of his employment from the time he leaves the work premises until he returns. Absent a further showing, it is assumed that the nature of his employment has not affected his personal eating practices. The mere fact that he expects to return to his job at the end of the lunch period is not enough to warrant the inclusion of this period within the course of his employment.
As the movants, the defendants bore the burden of proof on the motion for summary judgment. Therefore, in support of their motion, they attached nine affidavits from Ms. Robinson's co-workers. In her affidavit, Saundra Bird stated that the lunch was not organized or sponsored by Chabert; rather, she wanted to "treat" Ms. Robinson for Boss's Day and decided to involve her fellow co-workers in the plans, Ms. Bird further stated that she "punched out" for lunch, as required by company policy, and that she was not paid for her time away from work, nor was she reimbursed for her meal or Ms. Robinson's.
The affidavits of the remaining employees all state the same facts: (1) that the lunch was not organized or sponsored by Chabert; (2) that the employees were required to "punch out" when they went to lunch and were not paid for their time away; (3) that the employees were not reimbursed for their meals or for other expenses related to the lunch outing; and (4) those who attended the lunch did so voluntarily.
Also attached to the motion for summary judgment was the affidavit of Jennifer D. Michel, the director of health information management at Chabert and Ms. Robinson's direct supervisor. Ms. Michel stated that Ms. Robinson had asked her for permission to take an extended lunch break on October 15, 2010, so that some of her co-workers could take her out to lunch for Boss's Day. Ms. Michel authorized Ms. Robinson and the other employees, including Kara James, to take an extended lunch break on that date; however, she noted that the lunch was not organized or sponsored by Chabert. She further stated that the employees were not encouraged or required to attend the Boss's Day lunch, nor were the employees reimbursed for any expenses related to the lunch. Finally, Ms. Michel stated that the employees were required to "punch out" when they left for lunch and that they were not compensated for the time they were away from work.
Three employees who did not attend the lunch outing, Timothy Adams, Sandra Cooper, and Stacey Bennett, also submitted affidavits. All three indicated that they were invited to the lunch, but had to decline for various reasons. They further indicated that failing to attend the lunch had no effect on their employment.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs contend that the Boss's Day lunch was acknowledged and sponsored by Chabert, and they further argue that the risk associated with driving to and from the lunch was directly attributable to Ms. Robinson's status as an employee of Chabert. According to the plaintiffs, if Ms. Robinson had never been a Chabert employee, she, Kara James, and the other employees would never have been driving to and from the lunch, they would not have felt pressured into attending such a lunch, nor would they have been at the scene of the accident on the date and time in question. However, despite this argument, the plaintiffs have failed to offer any evidence to support it.
The plaintiffs appear to suggest that the defendants have failed to carry their initial burden of proof as the movants on the motion for summary judgment; however, after a thorough de novo review of the record, we find that the defendants met the initial burden of proof to point out to the court that there was an absence of factual support for an element essential to the plaintiffs' claim. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). As the plaintiffs, Ms. Robinson's children bore the burden of proving that she suffered personal injury or death as a result of a work-related accident. See Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center v. Matthews, 06-1584 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/07), 971 So.2d 354, 357. The affidavits submitted by the defendants demonstrate that the employees who attended the lunch did so voluntarily and that those who did not attend did not have their employment affected by their failure to attend. In addition, the affidavits clearly state that the lunch was organized by various coworkers in order to "treat" Ms. Robinson and that Chabert did not sponsor or participate in the planning of the lunch.
With these affidavits, the defendants pointed out that the lunch was simply a private activity planned and carried out by certain co-workers without Chabert's assistance or sponsorship and that the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate any connection between Chabert's interests and the lunch. Once the defendants demonstrated this deficiency in the plaintiffs' case, the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to produce factual support sufficient to establish that they would be able to satisfy their evidentiary burden of proof at trial. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). However, the plaintiffs failed to offer any affidavits, depositions, or any other evidence whatsoever in support of their claim. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). Accordingly, we find that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the defendants.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the WCJ granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College as part of the Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center and the State of Louisiana Self Insurance Program is affirmed. Ail costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiffs, Lakyska Robinson and the minor children, Waneka and William Robinson, through their tutrix, Shean Marie Phipps.
AFFIRMED. THERESA & CLARENCE ROBINSON, ET AL.
VERSUS
LEONARD J. CHABERT MEDICAL CENTER
NUMBER 2012 CA 1446
WELCH, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I find that Chabert did not meet its burden on the motion for summary judgment of demonstrating the absence of factual support for plaintiffs claim that Ms. Robinson's death arose out of and in the course of her employment with Chabert.
The determination of workers' compensation coverage is a subjective one in that each case must be decided from all of its particular facts. Jackson v. American Insurance Company, 404 So.2d 218 (La. 1981). The "arising out of and "in the course of requirements for compensability may not be considered in isolation of each other; a strong showing in one requirement may compensate for a weak showing on the other. Id. The "in the course of requirement generally refers to the time and place of the accident as it relates to the particular employment; it brings into focus the time and place relationship between the risk and the employment. The "arising out of requirement looks at the character and origin of the risk. Id.
Whether an incident occurred "in the course of employment" is a fact-dependent inquiry into the particular time, place and employment activity at issue in a given place. Harris v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 950 So.2d 795,800 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/06). Summary judgment was inappropriate in this matter because genuine issues exist regarding the material fact of whether Ms. Robinson was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident.
The jurisprudence has set forth some general rules regarding activities falling outside of an employee's course and scope of employment. For instance, this court has stated the general rule that an employee who leaves his employer's premises and takes a lunch break at a place of his own outside the course of his employment from the time he leaves until he returns, observing that absent a further showing, it is assumed that the nature of the employment has not affected the employee's personal eating practices. Craig v. Fournet, 457 So.2d 760, 762 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). However, there are facts in this case suggesting a relationship between the employees' lunch activity and their employment and those facts support a finding that in this case, the nature of the employment did have an effect on the employees' eating practice. The evidence on the motion for summary judgment demonstrated that Ms. Robinson was taken to lunch by her co-workers who wanted to honor her on "Boss's Day" which provides support for the claim that the lunch activity was employment-rooted. Additionally, a Chabert supervisor gave the workers permission to take an extended lunch break to accommodate their lunch plans, which supports the claim that the lunch activity was carried out by the employees that day with the assistance of Chabert. Although attendance at the Boss's Day luncheon was not mandatory per the employer, a reasonable juror may infer that Ms. Robinson felt an obligation relating to her employment to attend, as she was being honored for being a supervisor at the luncheon. A reasonable juror could determine that these facts relating to Ms. Robinson's employment may have affected her personal eating practices on Boss's Day.
I agree that there are factors in this case weighing against a finding that Ms. Robinson's death arose out of and in the course of her employment with Chabert; such as, the fact that she and other employees had "clocked out" the fact that Chabert did not formally organize or sponsor the lunch event and the fact that Chabert did not formally organize or sponsor the lunch event and the fact that attendance was voluntary. Those factors must be weighed against the factors supporting a finding of compensability; such as, whether there was a feeling that attendance at "Boss's Day" was obligatory or whether Chabert gained a benefit from the luncheon. A reasonable juror could find that Ms. Robinson's attendance at the Boss's Day luncheon was in pursuit of her employer's business and not merely pursuing her own business or pleasure. It is possible that if the supervisor being honored at the Boss's Day lunch did not attend, it would cause deflation of employee morale; conversely, her attendance may have benefitted Chabert by increasing employee morale and strengthening the sense of community among coworkers. Therefore, a reasonable juror could find that Ms. Robinson's attendance directly affected her employment and created a sense of obligation to attend. The factors on both sides raise a genuine issue of material fact that cannot be weighed on summary judgment and instead should be determined by the trier of fact.
Because a court may not weigh evidence on a motion for summary judgment, I find this case to be entirely inappropriate for disposition on a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, I would reverse the summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.