Opinion
March 20, 2008.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael D. Stall-man, J.), entered June 15, 2007, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, upon granting the motion of plaintiffs attorney to be relieved as counsel, determined that counsel is entitled to a charging lien, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Kaufman Borgeest Ryan LLP, New York (A. Michael Furman of counsel), for appellants-respondents.
Napoli Bern Ripka, LLP, New York (Denise A. Rubin of counsel), for respondents-appellants.
Before: Tom, J.P., Friedman, Nardelli, Catterson and Moskowitz, JJ.
The court properly concluded that plaintiffs attorney was entitled to a charging lien, inasmuch as the termination of the representation did not result from attorney misconduct, discharge for cause, or unjustified abandonment by the attorney ( see Klein v Eubank, 87 NY2d 459, 464). Contrary to plaintiff's contention, there was no need for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether counsel's withdrawal was justifiable, where there is adequate evidence showing a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship ( see Klagsbrun v Klagsbrun, 192 AD2d 306, lv dismissed 82 NY2d 846).