Opinion
34248, 34249.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 1952.
Operating lewd house; from Savannah City Court — Judge Alexander. June 21, 1952.
Edward J. Goodwin, for plaintiff in error.
Andrew J. Ryan Jr., Solicitor-General, Sylvan A. Garfunkel, Thomas M. Johnson Jr., contra.
1. The rule laid down in Code § 38-203, to the effect that the best evidence which exists of the fact sought to be proved shall be produced unless its absence be satisfactorily accounted for, does not apply to facts wholly collateral to the real issues of the case.
2. The verdict is supported by the evidence and, having the approval of the trial court, it will not be disturbed by this court.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 1952.
Minnie L. Roberts was charged with the offenses of maintaining a lewd house (case No. 32428) and permitting another to remain in the hotel for purposes of prostitution (case No. 32429). By agreement these cases were tried jointly in the City Court of Savannah. The defendant was convicted of both offenses. The testimony for the State included that of three prostitutes living in the hotel, police officers, and a man living in the hotel with one of the women. From this testimony it appeared that the defendant had resided at the Mason Hotel at a previous time when it had been raided, that after that she remained and operated the hotel, that she employed a night clerk who brought men to the girls' rooms for purposes of prostitution; that she discussed with the girls the various aspects of their activities, and advised them not to "fill dates" when there was danger of raids; that she charged them no rent but received half of each night's earnings, which was paid over to the room clerk or to her directly. There was testimony as to the present reputation of the hotel as a lewd house, as to its reputation when operated by Mason, and that the defendant lived with Mason at that time. The defendant denied knowledge of the prostitution in her statement to the jury, which statement was supported by the testimony of Richardson, the night clerk. On cross-examination, the latter testified in substance that he was a former taxicab driver but had decided not to drive any more; further examination elicited the statement that he had quit because his permit had been revoked; that he could not find out who had revoked it, but that he was not soliciting for prostitutes at the time of the revocation. He testified, "In other words, the police department wouldn't let me drive a taxicab any more, because I had a date with a girl one night, but was not soliciting." In rebuttal, a police officer testified that the permit had been revoked because of the defendant's actions in procuring women for prostitution.
Following her conviction, the defendant filed motions for a new trial on the general grounds in both cases, each motion being amended by the addition of two special grounds. The judgments overruling the amended motions for a new trial are assigned as error.
1. The special grounds in both cases deal with objections to the testimony of a witness for the State that Richardson, a witness for the defendant, had his taxicab operator's permit revoked because of procuring women for prostitution, on grounds that this was not the highest and best evidence, and that it was prejudicial to the defendant. The witness had previously admitted that his permit was revoked, but contended that this was not the ground of revocation. This evidence had been admitted without objection. Code § 38-1802 provides as follows: "A witness may be impeached by disproving the facts testified to by him." While recognizing the rule that it is not competent to show conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude by parol evidence ( Corley v. State, 64 Ga. App. 841 (3), 14 S.E.2d 121), for purposes of impeachment, it does not here appear that the revocation of the license involved a trial or conviction for any offense whatever. The manner in which licenses are revoked in the City of Savannah is not shown. The fact of the revocation was admitted by the witness, and the only contradiction is as to the reason for such revocation. It is not shown that the City of Savannah keeps records showing the reasons for revocation of taxicab driving permits. In any event, the fact that his permit was revoked is only collateral to the real issue in the case, it having been offered to reflect on the credibility of the witness, and has no bearing on the question of whether or not the defendant is guilty of the offense charged. "Where a matter is collateral to the real issues, and it comes in question, and proof of it is admissible, it may be shown by parol evidence, and need not be established by documentary evidence." 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 390, § 154; Hyde v. State, 70 Ga. App. 823 ( 29 S.E.2d 820); James v. State, 71 Ga. App. 867 (2) ( 32 S.E.2d 431).
2. The evidence was amply sufficient to authorize the jury to find both that the defendant was operating a lewd house and that she knowingly permitted the named witness to remain there for purposes of prostitution.
Judgments affirmed. Gardner, P.J., and Carlisle, J., concur.