Summary
In Roberts, the physician testifying on behalf of the claimant first examined him only 5 days before the Board hearing. He was asked specifically if he could estimate what the claimant's condition was on the closing date. He responded: "No. I do know this condition progresses."
Summary of this case from Edwards v. Labor and IndustriesOpinion
No. 32997.
April 7, 1955.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION — EXTENT OF DISABILITY — OBJECTIVE SYMPTOMS — RELEVANT DATE. On an issue as to the percentage of permanent partial disability suffered by an injured workman, the testimony of a physician before the board of industrial insurance appeals that, in his opinion, the claimant has seventy-five per cent disability of his back, was insufficient to support the verdict of a jury on appeal to the superior court; it appearing that the physician did not base his findings upon objective symptoms which existed on or prior to the closing date, but relied solely upon his subsequent findings.
SAME — BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS — POWERS AND FUNCTIONS. The sole function of the board of industrial insurance appeals is to review the correctness of the supervisor's order.
See 39 A.L.R. 1064; 58 Am. Jur. 904.
Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, No. 460192, Hunter, J., entered March 26, 1954, upon the verdict of a jury increasing an award to an injured workman for permanent partial disability. Reversed.
The Attorney General and Joseph T. Mijich, Assistant, for appellant.
Walthew, Oseran Warner, by James E. McIver, for respondent.
As in Harper v. Department of Labor Industries, ante p. 404, 281 P.2d 859, the question here is whether the claimant presented any medical testimony from which it could be found that there was a greater percentage of permanent partial disability at the time of the closing of his claim than that allowed by the supervisor of industrial insurance.
The supervisor closed the claim on July 5, 1950, with a permanent partial disability award of thirty-five per cent of maximum allowable for unspecified disabilities. Claimant appealed to the board of industrial insurance appeals. A hearing was had November 19, 1952. The board modified the award by increasing it to fifty per cent. Claimant then appealed to the superior court. A jury rendered a verdict reversing the board and granting claimant an additional award of twenty per cent of the maximum allowable for unspecified disabilities, or a total award of seventy per cent. Judgment was entered upon the verdict, after the department's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial were denied. The department has appealed.
The only medical testimony offered by claimant was that of Dr. Charles Peterson, who testified that he saw the claimant only once, five days before the hearing. The doctor testified:
"Q. What would be your opinion as to the rating of this case? A. Well, as it stands now, again looking at my own figures here and that is of the date of the examination [November 14, 1952], I think perhaps he has 75% disability of his back. . . . Q. That is your opinion in this case, Doctor? A. At the present time. . . . I am testifying as to his disability, sir, as to what I found now. Q. What you find now. Then you make no estimation of what the situation would be in 1949, August 31 of 1949? A. No. I do know this condition progresses."
[1] As in the Harper case, the medical expert did not base his findings upon objective symptoms which existed on or prior to the closing date, but relied solely upon his subsequent findings.
[2] Respondent contends that the board considered the testimony of Dr. Peterson, hence it was proper to present the doctor's testimony to the jury. The sole function of the board was to review the correctness of the supervisor's order. Karniss v. Department of Labor Industries, 39 Wn.2d 898, 239 P.2d 555 (1952). The increase allowed by the board could have been granted without consideration of the questioned testimony.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, with instructions to grant appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury.